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In principle, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security based
on the laws of physics. In practice, however, the imperfections of realistic devices might
introduce deviations from the idealized models used in security analyses. Can quantum
code-breakers successfully hack real systems by exploiting the side channels? Can quan-
tum code-makers design innovative counter-measures to foil quantum code-breakers?
This article reviews theoretical and experimental progress in the practical security as-
pects of quantum code-making and quantum code-breaking. After numerous attempts,
researchers now thoroughly understand and are able to manage the practical imper-
fections. Recent advances, such as the measurement-device-independent protocol, have
closed the critical side channels in the physical implementations, paving the way for
secure QKD with realistic devices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Secure communication
For thousands of years, code-makers and code-breakers
have been fighting for supremacy. With the recent rise
of Internet of Things, cyber security has become a hot
topic. Cyber warfare that can undermine the security
of critical infrastructures, such as smart power grids and
financial systems, threatens the well-being of individual
countries and the global economy.
In conventional cryptography, two distant parties, tra-
ditionally called Alice and Bob, share a communication
channel and they would like to communicate privately in
the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. The Holy Grail
of secure communication is information-theoretical secu-
rity. It is known that one could achieve information-
theoretically secure communication via the one-time-pad
(OTP) method (Vernam, 1926), if the two users, Alice
and Bob, share a long random string that is kept se-
cret from Eve. Note that, for the OTP scheme to be
information-theoretically secure, it is important not to
re-use the key (Shannon, 1949). That is to say that the
key has to be as long as the message itself and can only
be used once. How to distribute such a long key in the
presence of Eve is called the key distribution problem. In
fact, the key distribution problem is a central challenge
in all kinds of encryption methods.
In principle, all conventional key distribution schemes
that rely on classical physics and mathmatics can only
provide computational security, because in classical
physics, there is nothing to prevent an eavesdropper
from copying the key during the key distribution pro-
cess. Now, if Eve and Bob have the same key, whatever
Bob can decrypt, Eve can decrypt too.
Currently, the key distribution problem is often solved
by public key cryptography. In public key cryptography,
there are a pair of keys: a public key and a private key.
An intended recipient Bob will publish the public key so
that anyone, such as an intended sender Alice, can en-
crypt a message, called a plain text, with the public key
and send the encrypted message, a cipher text, to Bob.
On the other hand, only Bob with the private key can de-
crypt the cipher text to recover the plain text efficiently.
The security of public key cryptography is based on com-
putational assumptions. Given the public key, there is no
efficient known algorithm for Eve to work out the private
key or to recover the plain text, from the cipher text.
For instance, the security of the best-known public key
crypto-system, RSA (Rivest et al., 1978), is based on the
presumed hardness of factoring large integers. Unfortu-
nately, public key cryptography is vulnerable to unan-
ticipated advances in hardware and software. Moreover,
in 1994, Peter Shor then at AT&T invented an efficient
quantum algorithm for factorization (Shor, 1997). For
this reason, if a large scale quantum computer is ever
constructed, much of conventional cryptography will fall
apart!
After more than two decades of intense theoretical and
experimental efforts, primitive small scale quantum com-
puters have already been built. Several big companies
and a number of labs and start-ups are racing to build
the world’s first practical quantum computer. For in-
stance, Google AI Quantum Laboratory1 has realized
the quantum advantage (or supremacy) over state-of-the-
art classical supercomputer for a specific computational
task (Arute et al., 2019), and plans to commercialize
quantum computers within a few years (Mohseni et al.,
2017); IBM Q has already put its sixteen-qubit quantum
processor online for client use2; Rigetti has also provided
the quantum cloud service3; Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences (CAS) and Alibaba have established the Quantum
Computing Laboratory to advance the research of quan-
tum computing4; Other companies, such as Intel, Mi-
crosoft, Baidu, Tencent, IonQ, Xanadu, Zapata and so
1 Google Q: research.google/teams/applied-science/quantum
2 IBM Q: www.research.ibm.com/ibm-q
3 Rigetti: www.rigetti.com
4 CAS-Alibaba: quantumcomputer.ac.cn/index.html
3forth, have also joined the international race to build a
quantum computer. Moreover, China is building the Na-
tional Laboratory for Quantum Information Science to
support the revolutionary research in quantum informa-
tion; The European Commission is planning to launch
the flagship initiative on quantum technologies5; USA
has already launched the National Quantum Initiative
Act in 20186. All in all, the risk of successful construc-
tion of a quantum computer in the next decade can no
longer be ignored.
Note that some data such as our DNA data and health
data need to kept secret for decades. This is called long-
term security. However, cryptographic standards could
take many years to change. An eavesdropper intercepting
encrypted data sent in 2019 may save them for decades
as they wait for the future successful construction of a
quantum computer. The eavesdropper could then retro-
actively successfully crack an encryption scheme, there-
fore cryptographic standards need to consider potential
future technological advances of the next few decades.
For instance, Canadian Census Data is required to be
kept confidential for 92 years7 or until 2111. To ensure
such security, we need to predict the future technology
in the next century. As a comparison, the first general-
purpose electronic computer, ENIAC, was formally ded-
icated in 1946, which was less than 92 years ago. This
meant that general-purpose electronic computers did not
even exist 92 years ago. Therefore, if history is any guide,
we think that it is not realistic for one to predict with
any confidence what types of technology would exist 92
years from now.
In 2015, the US National Security Agency (NSA) an-
nounced a plan for transition to quantum-safe crypto-
systems. For instance, the US National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) has made a call for
quantum-safe candidate algorithm nominations, which
was due November 30, 20178. Over the next few years,
those candidate algorithms will be evaluated.
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to a
quantum-safe encryption scheme. The first approach is
to use conventional cryptography and to develop alterna-
tive public-key encryption schemes, such as hash-based
or code-based encryption schemes, in which known quan-
tum attacks such as Shor’s algorithm (Shor, 1997) do
not apply. This approach is called post-quantum cryp-
tography and it has the advantages of being compati-
ble with existing crypto infrastructure while having high
key rates that are available over long distances. Re-
cently, Google has performed a test deployment of a post-
5 ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/quantum-europe-
2017-towards-quantum-technology-flagship
6 www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/6227
7 www12.statcan.ca/English/census01/Info/chief.cfm
8 csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography
quantum crypto algorithm in Transport Layer Security
(TLS)9. One drawback of post-quantum algorithms is
that those conventional algorithms are only shown to be
secure against known quantum attacks. There is always
a possibility that some smart conventional or quantum
physicist or computer scientist might one day come up
with clever algorithms for breaking them efficiently. As
said, this would lead to a retroactive security breach in
future for data transmitted today with potentially disas-
trous consequences.
The second approach is to use quantum cryptogra-
phy (Bennett and Brassard, 1984; Ekert, 1991), particu-
larly quantum key distribution (QKD). It has the advan-
tage of promising information-theoretical security based
on the fundamental laws of quantum physics, i.e., the se-
curity is independent of all future advances of algorithm
or computational power.
Note however that quantum cryptography cannot
replicate all the functionalities of public key cryptogra-
phy. In future, quantum cryptography is likely to be com-
bined with the post-quantum cryptography to form the
infrastructure of quantum-safe encryption scheme. For
instance, the post-quantum cryptography can be used to
perform the initial authentication. This authentication
is only required in a short time, and once it is done, the
generated QKD key will be secure. Therefore, we be-
lieve that the two approaches—post-quantum cryptogra-
phy and quantum cryptography—are complementary to
each other (rather than mutually exclusive).
B. Quantum key distribution (QKD)
The main goal of QKD is to achieve information-
theoretical security by harnessing the laws of
physics (Bennett and Brassard, 1984; Ekert, 1991).
The quantum no-cloning theorem dictates that an un-
known quantum state cannot be cloned reliably (D.Dieks,
1982; Wootters and Zurek, 1982). If Alice distributes a
key via quantum (e.g., single-photon) signals, because
there is only a single copy of the key to begin with,
there is no way for Eve to clone the quantum state
reliably to produce two copies of the same quantum
state. Therefore, if Eve tries to eavesdrop in QKD, she
will unavoidably introduce disturbance to the quantum
signals, which will then be detected by the users, Alice
and Bob. Alice and Bob can then simply discard such a
key10 and try the key distribution process again.
Note that an important advantage of QKD is that,
since the communication is quantum, once a QKD session
9 security.googleblog.com/2016/07/experimenting-with-post-
quantum
10 Note that a key is simply a random string of numbers and if a
key is aborted, it will not be used. So, there is no loss in security
in aborting.
4is over, there is no classical transcript for Eve to keep.
Therefore, an eavesdropper has to break a QKD session
real-time or it will be secure forever. This is very different
from conventional key distribution schemes.
1. BB84 protocol
The best-known QKD scheme is the Bennett-Brassard-
1984 (BB84) protocol (Bennett and Brassard, 1984). The
BB84 protocol allows two users, Alice and Bob, who
share a quantum channel (e.g., an optical fiber or free-
space) and an authenticated conventional classical chan-
nel, to generate a secure key in the presence of an eaves-
dropper with unlimited quantum computing powers. In
the BB84 protocol, a sequence of single photons carrying
qubit states are sent by Alice to Bob through a quantum
channel. A schematic diagram of the BB84 protocol is
illustrated in Fig. 1, and the steps of the protocol are
listed in Box I.B.1.
Box I.B.1: BB84 protocol.
(1) For each signal, Alice randomly encodes a sin-
gle photon with one of the four polarization states,
namely, vertical, horizontal, 45-degree and 135-
degree, and sends the photon through a quantum
channel to Bob.
(2) For each signal, Bob chooses one of the two
bases, rectilinear and diagonal, to perform a mea-
surement on the polarization of a received photon.
After detection, Alice and Bob publicly announces
their basis choices through an authenticated con-
ventional channel.
(3) Alice and Bob discard the polarization data
that have been encoded and detected in different
bases. They keep only those polarization data in
the same basis. This remaining data forms the
sifted key. Alice and Bob can choose a random
sample of the sifted key bits and compare them
to compute the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
(4) If the computed QBER is too high, they abort.
Otherwise, they proceed with classical postpro-
cessing such as error correction and privacy am-
plification to generate a secret key.
2. Intuition of security
The quantum no-cloning theorem guarantees that Eve
cannot copy the unknown quantum state sent by Alice
reliably (D.Dieks, 1982; Wootters and Zurek, 1982). Fur-
thermore, a key feature in quantum mechanics is the com-
plementarity between the two conjugate bases, rectilinear
and diagonal. Since the two measurements corresponding
to the two bases do not commute with each other, there
Alice's bits 1 1 0 0 1 0
Sifted key 1 1 0
Bob's measurements
Bob's results
Sifted key
Lasers Bob
ChannelAlice
Secret key Secret key
FIG. 1 Schematic diagram of the BB84 protocol. Alice en-
codes random bits on the polarization states of single photons.
Bob randomly selects measurement bases, rectilinear (+) or
diagonal (×), to perform measurements using two detectors.
They keep only those polarization data that have been en-
coded and detected in the same basis as the Sifted key, and
perform additional classical postprocessing on the Sifted key
to produce the final Secret key.
is no way to measure the two observables simultaneously
without disturbing the state. Therefore, Eve who tries
to eavesdrop and extract information on the polarization
data will inevitably introduce disturbance to the state.
Bob on the other hand, with the authenticated classical
channel, has a fundamental advantage over Eve because
he can compare his basis choice with Alice and determine
the QBER for data that is encoded and detected in the
same basis.
What happens if Eve attacks the quantum channel?
A simple example of an eavesdropping strategy is the
intercept-resend attack (Bennett and Brassard, 1984). In
this attack, for each photon sent from Alice, Eve performs
a measurement in a randomly chosen basis and re-sends a
new photon to Bob according to her measurement result.
Let us focus on those cases when Alice and Bob happen
to use the same basis since they will throw away the rest.
If Eve happens to use the correct basis (50%), then both
she and Bob will decode Alice’s bit value correctly. No
error is introduced by Eve. On the other hand, if Eve
uses the wrong basis (50%), then both she and Bob will
have random measurement results. This suggests that if
Alice and Bob compare a subset of the sifted key, they
will see a significant amount of errors. Here, for these
bits, the photons will be passed on to Bob in the wrong
basis, so regardless of Eve’s measurement result, Bob will
have a 50% probability of measuring the opposite of Al-
ice’s bit value. In other words, Eve’s attack will introduce
50% QBER for half of the total bits, and thus a total of
25% QBER. This example illustrates the basic principle
behind QKD: Eve can only gain information at the cost
of introducing disturbance, which will expose her inter-
ference.
53. Overview of recent developments
Theoretical developments. On the theoretical side, the
first security proof of QKD was based on the uncertainty
principle by Mayers (Mayers, 2001). Mayers’s proof was
put into a conceptually simple framework based on en-
tanglement distillation by Lo and Chau (Lo and Chau,
1999), building on the earlier work of quantum pri-
vacy amplification (Deutsch et al., 1996) and entangle-
ment distillation (Bennett et al., 1996). Later on, Shor
and Preskill employed the idea of the Calderbank-Shor-
Steane (CSS) quantum error correcting code (Calder-
bank and Shor, 1996; Steane, 1996) to simplify the
entanglement-based proof to a prepare-and-measure pro-
tocol (Shor and Preskill, 2000). See also (Biham et al.,
2000; Devetak and Winter, 2005; Koashi, 2009) for secu-
rity proofs of QKD.
Rather interestingly, the rigorous definition of secure
keys was presented afterwards in 2000s (Ben-Or et al.,
2005; Renner and König, 2005), where the composable se-
curity definition in conventional cryptography (Canetti,
2001) was introduced to quantum cryptography (Ben-
Or et al., 2005). A further development was the secu-
rity proof for the consideration of finite-key effects in a
more rigorous manner (Renner, 2008; Scarani and Ren-
ner, 2008; Tomamichel et al., 2012).
Device imperfections in practical systems were in-
vestigated in security analyses (Inamori et al., 2007;
Lütkenhaus, 2000), and the remarkable framework of
the security analysis for realistic devices was established
by Gottesman-Lo-Lütkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) (Gottes-
man et al., 2004). Moreover, new protocols, such
as the decoy-state (Hwang, 2003; Lo et al., 2005;
Wang, 2005), differential-phase shift (DPS) (Inoue et al.,
2002), SARG-04 (Scarani et al., 2004), coherent-one-
way (COW) (Stucki et al., 2005), measurement-device-
independent (MDI) (Lo et al., 2012) [see also (Braun-
stein and Pirandola, 2012)] and round-robin DPS (Sasaki
et al., 2014), were proposed to address the issues of de-
vice imperfections. In particular, the decoy-state proto-
col enables secure QKD with weak coherent pulses and
the MDI protocol removes all side channels in the detec-
tion. Furthermore, device-independent QKD was pro-
posed (Acín et al., 2007; Barrett et al., 2005; Mayers
and Yao, 1998) to allow QKD with uncharaterized de-
vices. Its security was proven effective against collective
attacks (Masanes et al., 2011; Pironio et al., 2009) [see
also (Hänggi et al., 2010)] and later against general at-
tacks (Arnon-Friedman et al., 2018; Vazirani and Vidick,
2014).
Experimental developments. After more than two
decades of efforts (Gisin et al., 2002; Lo et al., 2014),
QKD developments include the first laboratory demon-
stration performed in 1992 over 32.5-cm free space (Ben-
nett et al., 1992a), to the recent landmark accomplish-
ment of quantum satellite QKD experiment in 2017 over
1200 km by China (Liao et al., 2017a), and 7600 km in
2018 between China and Austria (Liao et al., 2018). Note
that this is a seven order of magnitude of improvement in
terms of the distance of QKD. There are also on-going ef-
forts on satellite-based quantum communications by Eu-
rope, USA, Canada, Japan, and Singapore (Joshi et al.,
2018). In fiber, the distance has been pushed to 500-km
ultra-low loss fiber (Chen et al., 2019; Fang et al., 2019).
In addition to long distances, high secret key rate is
important for practical applications. Researchers have
recently pushed the secret key rate of QKD from 1
Mbits/s over 50-km fiber (Lucamarini et al., 2013) to
more than 10 Mbits/s (Islam et al., 2017; Yuan et al.,
2018). Commercial QKD systems are currently available
on the market by several companies such as ID Quan-
tique, Quantum CTek, Qasky and Toshiba Europe. Sev-
eral institutes, e.g., European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute (ETSI), International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), and International Telecommuni-
cation Union (ITU), have made great efforts to address
the standardization issues in QKD.
Besides point-to-point link, a number of field-test QKD
networks have been conducted in USA (Elliott et al.,
2005), Europe (Peev et al., 2009; Stucki et al., 2011),
Japan (Sasaki et al., 2011), China (Chen et al., 2009,
2010; Wang et al., 2010), UK (Dynes et al., 2019) and
so forth. Based on trustful relays11, remote users can be
connected beyond point-to-point links. Recently, China
has successfully completed the 2000-km-long fiber-optic
backbone link between Beijing to Shanghai (Chen et al.,
2020). UK has launched the Quantum Communications
Hub project that aims to build quantum networks in Eng-
land12. US is deploying their first dark fiber quantum
network connecting Washington DC to Boston over 800-
km13.
Overall, QKD is already mature for several real-life ap-
plications (Qiu, 2014). For instance, QKD was used to
encrypt security communications in the 2007 Swiss elec-
tion and the 2010 World Cup. In China, QKD is being
widely used to ensure long-term security for numerous
users in government, financial and energy industry (Chen
et al., 2020), including the People’s Bank of China, the
China Banking Regulatory Commission, and the Indus-
trial and Commercial Bank of China. Figure 2 shows a
11 In trusted-relay scenario, Alice and Bob respectively share a se-
cret key with a relay in the middle, and then the relay announces
the XOR results of both keys publicly. With the announced re-
sult, Alice and Bob can get each other’s key via the XOR with
her/his own key. The negative side for this method is that the
relay must be trustful. However, the positive side is reducing the
cost and complexity as compared to the all-connected point-to-
point links, and extending the transmission distance.
12 www.quantumcommshub.net/about-us/
13 techcrunch.com/2018/10/25/new-plans-aim-to-deploy-the-first-
u-s-quantum-network-from-boston-to-washington-dc/
6schematic diagram of the space-ground integrated quan-
tum network (Chen et al., 2020), constructed already in
China, which spans more than 2000 km coverage area
and has more than 600 QKD links.
C. Focus of this review
In the Code Book by Simon Singh (Singh, 2000), the
author boldly proclaimed that quantum cryptography
achieves the Holy Grail of cryptography by offering un-
conditional security. Therefore, quantum cryptography
presents the final stage of evolution of cryptography. Af-
ter quantum cryptography, cryptography will no longer
continue to evolve. Is this really true?
In principle, QKD promises unconditional security
based on the laws of physics. In practice, however, the re-
alistic devices display imperfections, which might seldom
conform to idealized theoretical models used in the secu-
rity analysis by theorists. The deviations might also be
vulnerable by some special attacks, i.e., quantum hack-
ing. For this reason, an arms race has been going on
in quantum cryptography among quantum code-makers
and quantum code-breakers. The main goal is to assess
the deviations between the system and the ideal, thus
establishing the practical security for real QKD systems.
Table I summarizes the quantum hacking strategies de-
veloped in the last two decades. See also (Jain et al.,
2016) for an earlier review on the subject. Right af-
ter the QKD security proofs, in which ideal devices
were presented, a well-known hacking strategy was pro-
posed — photon number splitting (PNS) attack (Bras-
sard et al., 2000; Lütkenhaus, 2000) that targets practi-
cal QKD source. The source device imperfection severely
undermines the performance of a QKD system, typically
below 30-km fiber (Gottesman et al., 2004; Lütkenhaus,
2000; Ma, 2006). In order to close this side channel for
a QKD source, the decoy state method has been pro-
posed by quantum code-makers to make QKD practi-
cal with standard weak coherent pulses (WCPs) that are
generated by attenuated lasers (Hwang, 2003; Lo et al.,
2005; Wang, 2005). Decoy-state QKD presents dramatic
performance improvement over the conventional security
proofs (Gottesman et al., 2004), and it has become a
standard technique in current QKD experiments. Ta-
ble II provides a list of decoy-state QKD experiments.
After the decoy-state method, however, various quan-
tum hacking attacks have been performed by quan-
tum code-breakers against other components in practi-
cal QKD systems (see Table I). To counter those at-
tacks, a few important concepts have been proposed by
quantum code-makers. One practical counter-measure
against quantum hacking is the measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) (Lo
et al., 2012) [see also (Braunstein and Pirandola, 2012)].
MDI-QKD completely removes all security loopholes in
the detection system and ensures a QKD network secu-
rity with untrusted relays. It is practical with current
technology. Table III summarizes the MDI-QKD experi-
ments after its invention.
In addition, an efficient version of MDI-QKD — twin-
field (TF) QKD — has the potential to greatly extend
the secure distance. Table IV summarizes the recent TF-
QKD experiments. Also, we note some of the recent de-
velopments of continuous-variable (CV) QKD (see Ta-
ble V), chip-based QKD (see Table VI), and other QKD
protocols and implementations (see Table VII). We also
summarize a list of some developments of recent quantum
cryptographic protocols, besides QKD (see Table VIII).
Note that the side channels are common problems to
any cryptosystems, i.e., not only to quantum cryptog-
raphy but also to conventional cryptographic systems.
For instance, the power consumption of the CPU per-
forming encryption and decryption and the timing of the
signals are common side channels, which can threaten im-
plementations of both quantum and conventional cryp-
tographic systems (Brumley and Boneh, 2005; Kocher
et al., 1999). Therefore, closing the side channels are
essentially required in all cryptographic technologies. It
is only through painstaking battle-testing that the se-
curity of a practical crypto-system could be established
with confidence. The arms race between code-makers and
code-breakers will continue in cryptographic systems.
Nonetheless, QKD is a physics-based crypto system
and its security is working on the physical layer. Com-
pared to the conventional mathematical-based cryptog-
raphy, QKD can provide an accurate description of the
physical realization of a cryptographic system, and the
security can be proved based on this description. More
importantly, QKD has the fundamental advantage of
promising information-theoretical security, which is inde-
pendent of all future advances of computational power.
Furthermore, the recent advances, such as MDI-QKD,
have closed the critical side channels in the detection
of physical implementations, paving the way for secure
QKD with realistic devices. Therefore, we believe that
QKD does represent an important chapter in the history
of code-making. We hope that QKD will play an impor-
tant role in the quantum-safe encryption infrastructure
for real applications, and it will bring us one step closer
to the dream of information-theoretical security.
D. Outline of this review
This review will focus mainly on the practical security
of realistic QKD systems. We begin with a discussion of
security analysis in Section II and the basic implementa-
tion of QKD in Section III. In Section IV, we review
various quantum hacking attacks against QKD imple-
mentations. In Section V, we review the security of a
practical QKD source. In particular, we focus on the
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FIG. 2 (Color online) Schematic diagram of the space-ground integrated quantum network in China (Chen et al., 2020),
consisting of four quantum metropolitan area networks in the cities of Beijing, Jinan, Shanghai, and Heifei, a backbone network
over 2000 km, and ground-satellite links. There are three types of nodes in the network: user nodes, all-pass optical switches,
and trusted relays. The backbone network is connected by trusted intermediate relays. The satellite is connected to a ground
satellite station near Beijing, which can provide ultralong distance communications (Liao et al., 2018).
decoy-state protocol which is a standard method for se-
cure QKD with attenuated lasers. In Section VI, we turn
to detector security. We primarily review the MDI-QKD
protocol and how it automatically foils all attacks on the
detection system. In Section VII, we review the develop-
ments of CV-QKD schemes and their practical security
aspects. Section VIII contains a review of other quantum
cryptographic protocols. In Section IX, we present some
concluding remarks.
For those readers who want to learn further basics of
QKD, we refer to the two earlier reviews published in Re-
view of Modern Physics, one by Gisin et al. that intro-
duces the basic experimental elements and systems (Gisin
et al., 2002) and the other one by Scarani et al. that dis-
cusses the basic security analysis tools of various QKD
protocols (Scarani et al., 2009). An early review on
the first stage of development of QKD can be found in
the book by Sergienko (Sergienko, 2018). An earlier re-
view on quantum attacks can be seen in (Jain et al.,
2016). A brief overview of the implementation secu-
rity of QKD can be found in a survey article in (Lo
et al., 2014) and an ETSI white paper14 by Lucamarini
et al. A short overview of the practical challenges as-
sociated with QKD can be found in (Diamanti et al.,
14 https://www.etsi.org/images/files/ETSIWhitePapers/
2016). Moreover, the entropy uncertainty relation, an
important tool to analyze the security of QKD, can be
seen in (Coles et al., 2017), and the quantum random
number generator, a basic element in a practical QKD
system, can be found in (Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-
Escartin, 2017; Ma et al., 2016b). A review on vari-
ous techniques of single-photon detectors can be seen
in (Hadfield, 2009; Zhang et al., 2015). Furthermore,
we may not cover too much on some important top-
ics, but we refer the readers to other review articles on
the topics of CV-QKD (Diamanti and Leverrier, 2015;
Laudenbach et al., 2018; Weedbrook et al., 2012), high-
dimensional QKD (Xavier and Lima, 2020), quantum re-
peaters (Munro et al., 2015; Pan et al., 2012; Sangouard
et al., 2011), quantum Internet (Kimble, 2008; Wehner
et al., 2018), Bell nonlocality and device-independent
protocols (Brunner et al., 2014), and blind quantum com-
puting (Fitzsimons, 2017). These related review articles
are summarized in Table IX.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We review the security aspects of QKD, including the
security definition, various security proofs and implemen-
tation assumptions. We present a general framework to
address device imperfections in security analysis. While
we mainly focus on the widely implemented BB84 pro-
8TABLE I List of quantum hacking strategies.
Attack Source/Detection Target component Manner Year
Photon-number-splitting (Brassard et al., 2000; Lütkenhaus, 2000) Source WCP (multi-photons) Theory 2000
Detector fluorescence (Kurtsiefer et al., 2001) Detection Detector Theory 2001
Faked-state (Makarov et al., 2006; Makarov and Hjelme, 2005) Detection Detector Theory 2005
Trojan horse (Gisin et al., 2006; Vakhitov et al., 2001) Source&Detection Backflection light Theory 2006
Time shift (Qi et al., 2007a; Zhao et al., 2008) Detection Detector Experiment∗ 2007
Time side-channel (Lamas-Linares and Kurtsiefer, 2007) Detection Timing information Experiment 2007
Phase remapping (Fung et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2010) Source Phase modulator Experiment∗ 2010
Detector blinding (Lydersen et al., 2010; Makarov, 2009) Detection Detector Experiment∗ 2010
Detector blinding (Gerhardt et al., 2011a,b) Detection Detector Experiment 2011
Detector control (Lydersen et al., 2011a; Wiechers et al., 2011) Detection Detector Experiments 2011
Faraday mirror (Sun et al., 2011) Source Faraday mirror Theory 2011
Wavelength (Huang et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011) Detection Beam-splitter Experiment 2011
Dead-time (Henning et al., 2011) Detection Detector Experiment 2011
Channel calibration (Jain et al., 2011) Detection Detector Experiment∗ 2011
Intensity (Jiang et al., 2012; Sajeed et al., 2015b) Source Intensity modulator Experiment 2012
Phase information (Sun et al., 2012, 2015; Tang et al., 2013) Source Phase randomization Experiment 2012
Memory attacks (Barrett et al., 2013) Detection Classical memory Theory 2013
Local oscillator (Jouguet et al., 2013a; Ma et al., 2013b)∗∗ Detection Local oscillator Experiment 2013
Trojan horse (Jain et al., 2014, 2015) Source&Detection Backflection light Experiment 2014
Laser damage (Bugge et al., 2014; Makarov et al., 2016) Detection Detector Experiment 2014
Laser seeding (Sun et al., 2015) Source Laser phase/intensity Experiment 2015
Spatial mismatch (Chaiwongkhot et al., 2019; Sajeed et al., 2015a) Detection Detector Experiment 2015
Detector saturation (Qin et al., 2016)∗∗ Detection Homodyne detector Experiment 2016
Covert channels (Curty and Lo, 2019) Detection Classical memory Theory 2017
Pattern effect (Yoshino et al., 2018) Source Intensity modulator Experiment 2018
Detector control (Qian et al., 2018) Detection Detector Experiment 2018
Laser seeding (Huang et al., 2019; Pang et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2015) Source Laser Experiment 2019
Polarization shift (Wei et al., 2019a) Detection SNSPD Experiment 2019
∗Demonstration on commercial QKD system
∗∗Continuous-variable QKD
tocol, most of the results can be extended to other QKD
protocols. We shall leave the MDI-QKD case in Sec-
tion VI.B, and the DI-QKD case in Section VIII.A.
A. Security definition
To prove the security of QKD, one needs to define the
security criteria first. Ideally, a secure key satisfies two
requirements. First, the key bit strings possessed by Al-
ice and Bob need to be identical, i.e., be correct. Second,
the key bit string should be uniformly distributed to any-
one (say Eve) other than Alice and Bob, i.e., be secret.
Due to practical issues, such as the finite data size and
non-ideal error correction, Alice and Bob cannot gener-
ate an ideal key. In reality, it is reasonable to allow the
key to have a small failure probability . For some cor
and sec, we say that the QKD protocol is -secure with
 = cor + sec, if it is cor-correct and sec-secret (Ben-Or
et al., 2005; Renner and König, 2005).
We define KA and KB (with the same length m) to
be the key bit strings obtained by Alice and Bob, re-
spectively. The secret key can be correlated to a quan-
tum state ρE held by Eve. The joint state ρABE is a
classical-classical-quantum (c-c-q) state,
ρABE =
∑
kA,kB
Pr(kA, kB) |kA〉 〈kA|⊗|kB〉 〈kB |⊗ρ(kA,kB)E ,
(1)
where kA, kB ∈ {0, 1}m are the bit values. In particular,
an ideal key state held by Alice and Bob is described by
the private state,
ρidealABE = 2
−m∑
k
|k〉A 〈k| ⊗ |k〉B 〈k| ⊗ ρE , (2)
where kA = kB = k implies that Alice and Bob hold the
same string, and ρE is independent of k, i.e., Eve has no
information on the key string variable K.
A QKD protocol is defined to be cor-correct, if the
probability distribution Pr(kA, kB) of the final state
ρABE in Eq. (1) satisfies,
Pr(kA 6= kB) ≤ cor. (3)
A QKD protocol is defined to be sec-secret (Renner and
König, 2005), if the state ρAE is close in trace distance
to the single-party private state ρidealAE
min
ρE
1
2
(1− pabort)||ρAE − ρidealAE ||1 ≤ sec, (4)
9TABLE II List of decoy-state QKD experiments and their performance.
Reference Clock rate Encoding Channel Maximal distance Key rate (bps) Year
(Zhao et al., 2006a,b) 5MHz Phase Fiber 60km 422.5 2006
(Peng et al., 2007) 2.5MHz Polarisation Fiber 102km 8.1 2007
(Rosenberg et al., 2007) 2.5MHz Phase Fiber 107km 14.5 2007
(Schmitt-Manderbach et al., 2007) 10MHz Polarisation Free-space 144km 12.8∗ 2007
(Yuan et al., 2007) 7.1MHz Phase Fiber 25.3km 5.5K 2007
(Yin et al., 2008) 1MHz Phase Fiber 123.6km 1.0 2008
(Wang et al., 2008)∗∗ 0.65MHz Phase Fiber 25km 0.9 2008
(Dixon et al., 2008) 1GHz Phase Fiber 100.8km 10.1K 2008
(Peev et al., 2009) 7MHz Phase Fiber network 33km 3.1K 2009
(Rosenberg et al., 2009) 10MHz Phase Fiber 135km 0.2 2009
(Yuan et al., 2009) 1.036GHz Phase Fiber 100Km 10.1K 2009
(Chen et al., 2009) 4MHz Phase Fiber network 20km 1.5K 2009
(Liu et al., 2010) 320MHz Polarisation Fiber 200km 15.0 2010
(Chen et al., 2010) 320MHz Polarisation Fiber network 130km 0.2K 2010
(Sasaki et al., 2011) 1GHz Phase Fiber network 45km 304.0K 2011
(Wang et al., 2013) 100MHz Polarisation Free space 96km 48.0 2013
(Fröhlich et al., 2013) 125MHz Phase Fiber network 19.9km 43.1K 2013
(Lucamarini et al., 2013) 1GHz Phase Fiber 80km 120.0K 2013
(Fröhlich et al., 2017) 1GHz Phase Fiber 240km‡ 8.4 2017
(Liao et al., 2017a) 100MHz Polarisation Free space 1200km 1.1K 2017
(Yuan et al., 2018) 1GHz Phase Fiber 2dB 13.7M 2018
(Boaron et al., 2018) 2.5GHz Time-bin Fiber 421km‡ 6.5 2018
∗Asymptotic key rate
∗∗Heralded single-photon source
‡Ultralow loss fiber
TABLE III List of MDI-QKD experiments and their performance.
Reference Clock rate Encoding Distance/loss Key rate (bps) Year Notes
(Rubenok et al., 2013)‡ 2MHz Time-bin 81.6km 0.24∗ 2013 Field-installed fiber
(Liu et al., 2013) 1MHz Time-bin 50km 0.12 2013 First complete demonstration
(Ferreira da Silva et al., 2013)‡ 1MHz Polarisation 17km 1.04∗ 2013 Multiplexed synchronization
(Tang et al., 2014b) 0.5MHz Polarisation 10km 4.7× 10−3 2014 Active phase randomization
(Tang et al., 2014a) 75MHz Time-bin 200km 0.02 2014 Fully automatic system
(Tang et al., 2015) 75MHz Time-bin 30km 16.9 2015 Field-installed fiber
(Wang et al., 2015a) 1MHz Time-bin 20km 8.3∗ 2015 Phase reference free
(Valivarthi et al., 2015) 250MHz Time-bin 60dB 5× 10−2 2015 Test in various configurations
(Pirandola et al., 2015)‡ 10.5MHz Phase 4dB 0.1 2015 Continuous variable
(Tang et al., 2016b) 75MHz Time-bin 55km 16.5 2016 First fiber network
(Yin et al., 2016) 75MHz Time-bin 404km 3.2× 10−4 2016 Longest distance
(Tang et al., 2016a) 10MHz Polarisation 40km 10 2016 Include modulation errors
(Comandar et al., 2016)‡ 1GHz Polarisation 102km 4.6K 2016 High repetition rate
(Kaneda et al., 2017)‡ 1MHz Time-bin 14dB 0.85 2017 Heralded single-photon source
(Wang et al., 2017a) 1MHz Time-bin 20km 6.3× 10−3 2017 Stable against polarization change
(Valivarthi et al., 2017) 20MHz Time-bin 80km 100 2017 Cost-effective implementation
(Liu et al., 2018a) 50MHz Time-bin 160km 2.6∗ 2018 Phase reference free
(Liu et al., 2019a) 75MHz Time-bin 100km 14.5 2019 Asymmetric channels
(Wei et al., 2019b) 1.25GHz Polarisation 20.4 dB 6.2K 2019 Highest repetition/key rate
∗Asymptotic key rate
‡No random modulations
where pabort is the probability that the protocol aborts,
ρidealAE ≡ 2−m
∑
s |s〉A 〈s| ⊗ ρE , and ||A||1 ≡ Tr[
√
A†A] is
the trace norm. It turns out that the security definition
from the trace-distance metric owns a composable secu-
rity property (Ben-Or et al., 2005; Renner and König,
2005).
In general, following the definition from Ben-Or et al.’s
work (Ben-Or et al., 2005), a QKD protocol can be de-
fined to be -secure, if the final distilled c-c-q state ρABE
is -close to the ideal key state ρidealABE given in Eq. (2)
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TABLE IV List of TF-QKD experiments.
Reference Distance/loss Key rate (bps) Year
(Minder et al., 2019) 90.8dB 0.045∗ 2019
(Wang et al., 2019a) 300km 2.01k∗ 2019
(Liu et al., 2019b) 300km 39.2 2019
(Zhong et al., 2019) 55.1dB 25.6∗ 2019
(Fang et al., 2019) 502km‡ 0.118 2019
(Chen et al., 2019) 509km‡ 0.269 2019
∗Asymptotic key rate
‡Ultra-low loss fiber
with a proper chosen ρE
min
ρE
1
2
(1− pabort)||ρABE − ρidealABE ||1 ≤ . (5)
Note that if a distilled state is -close to the ideal key
state, then the guessing probability for Eve on the final
key is also bounded by . Here, we want to emphasize
that one should not interpret the security parameter 
used in the above definition as the guessing probability.
In fact, the statement, a key is -close to the ideal key, is
much stronger than the statement, Eve’s guessing prob-
ability on a key is bounded by . Let us show a simple
example. Denote l = − log  and l < m. We consider
an m-bit key Kbad, which concatenates a uniformly dis-
tributed l-bit string with m− l bit of 0’s. Obviously, this
key Kbad does not satisfy the trance-distance (statistical
distance in this case since everything is classical here)
-security definition used in Eq. (5), because the statisti-
cal distance between Kbad and Kideal is close to 1 when
m l. However, the guessing probability of Eve on the
key Kbad is bounded by . Clearly, the guessing proba-
bility alone is not a proper security parameter definition.
This is a common mistake for those who are confused
about the security foundation of (quantum) cryptogra-
phy, see for example (Yuen, 2016). This common mis-
take has also been pointed out and clearly explained by
Renner in (Renner, 2012).
B. Security proofs
1. Lo-Chau security proof
In the Lo-Chau security proof (Lo and Chau, 1999),
the joint quantum state shared by Alice and Bob before
the final key measurement is one of the Bell states,∣∣Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉)∣∣Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉).
(6)
To see how security of QKD is related to entanglement,
consider the case where Alice and Bob share m-pairs of
perfect EPR pairs |Φ+〉⊗m. It is not hard to verify that if
both of them perform the local Z measurement, Mzz, on
their halves of m pairs, they will share the ideal key state
ρidealABE in Eq. (2). In other words, the amount of distillable
entanglement from quantum transmission would give a
lower bound on the key generation rate.
The main job for a security analysis is to make sure
that Alice and Bob eventually share (almost perfect)
EPR pairs before they make the final ZZ measurement
to obtain secure key bits. The procedure to extract
perfect EPR pairs from imperfect ones is called entan-
glement distillation (Bennett et al., 1996). The main
idea of the Lo-Chau security proof lies on quantum er-
ror correction (Lo and Chau, 1999), which proved the
security of an entanglement-based QKD protocol. Let
us recap the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin-1992 (BBM92)
(Bennett et al., 1992c) protocol, an entanglement ver-
sion of BB84 in Box II.B.1. For the simplicity of descrip-
tion, we assume Alice and Bob own quantum memories,
which will be removed shortly in the Shor-Preskill secu-
rity proof (Shor and Preskill, 2000).
Box II.B.1: BBM92 protocol with quantum mem-
ories, an entanglement version of BB84.
(1) Alice prepares an EPR pair, |Φ+〉, stores one
half of it locally, and sends the other half to Bob.
(2) Upon receiving a qubit, Bob stores the half of
the EPR pair in a quantum memory. If the qubit
is lost in the channel or the quantum storage fails,
they discard the pair.
(3) Repeat the above two steps many times until
Alice and Bob store N pairs of qubits.
(4) With the help of pre-shared perfect EPR pairs,
Alice and Bob apply a quantum error correcting
code to correct all the errors in the N pairs.
(5) After a random hashing test, Alice and Bob
share almost perfect EPR pairs. They return the
cost of pairs in the previous step and measure the
rest in the local Z basis to obtain the final key.
The (quantum) random hashing test happens in the
two conjugate bases separately. In each basis, Alice and
Bob can compare the parities of the qubits. Comparison
of each parity will cost Alice and Bob an EPR pair. Once
they agree on an enough number of parities, the states
are stabilized by the operations, X ⊗X and Z ⊗Z, with
a small failure probability. This step comes from the
error verification in classical error correction (Fung et al.,
2010). There are a few notes on this scheme.
1. This scheme is source-device-independent,
which means that the source can be fully un-
trusted (Koashi and Preskill, 2003). In the first
step, the state preparation can be done by Eve.
Then, Eve prepares qubits pairs (designed to be
EPR pairs) and sends to Alice and Bob who store
the quantum states in memories. The rest steps, 4
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TABLE V List of some recent CV-QKD experiments and their performance.
Reference Clock rate Distance/loss Key rate (bps) Year Notes
(Jouguet et al., 2013b) 1MHz 80.5km ∼250 2013 Full implementation
(Qi et al., 2015) 25MHz — — 2015 Local LO
(Soh et al., 2015) 250KHz — — 2015 Local LO
(Huang et al., 2015a) 100MHz 25km 100K 2015 Local LO
(Pirandola et al., 2015) 10.5MHz 4dB 0.1 2015 CV MDI-QKD
(Huang et al., 2015b) 50MHz 25km ∼1M 2015 High key rate
(Kumar et al., 2015a) 1MHz 75km 490 2015 Coexistence with classical
(Zhang et al., 2019b) 5MHz 50km 5.8K 2019 Field test
(Zhang et al., 2020) 5MHz 202.8km‡ 6.2 2020 Long distance
‡Ultra-low loss fiber
TABLE VI List of chip-based QKD experiments.
Reference Clock rate Distance/loss Key rate (bps) Year Notes
(Ma et al., 2016a) 10MHz 5km 0.95K 2016 Silicon, decoy-BB84
(Sibson et al., 2017a) 1.72GHz 4dB 565K 2017 InP, DPS
(Sibson et al., 2017b) 1.72GHz 20km 916K 2017 Silicon, COW
(Bunandar et al., 2018) 625MHz 43km 157K 2018 Silicon, decoy-BB84
(Ding et al., 2017) 5KHz 4dB ∼7.5 2018 Silicon, high-dimension
(Zhang et al., 2019a) 1MHz 16dB 0.14K 2019 Silicon, CV-QKD
(Paraïso et al., 2019) 1GHz 20dB 270K 2019 InP, modulator-free
(Wei et al., 2019b) 1.25GHz 140km 497 2019 Silicon, MDI-QKD
TABLE VII List of recent experiments of other QKD protocols.
Reference Clock rate Distance/loss Key rate (bps) Year
Quantum access network (Fröhlich et al., 2013) 125MHz 19.9km 259 2013
Centric network (Hughes et al., 2013) 10MHz 50km — 2013
RR-DPS (Guan et al., 2015) 500MHz 53km ∼118.0 2015
RR-DPS (Takesue et al., 2015) 2GHz 20km 2.0K 2015
RR-DPS (Wang et al., 2015c) 1GHz 90km ∼800 2015
RR-DPS (Li et al., 2016) 10KHz 18dB 15.5 2016
High-dimension (Lee et al., 2014) 8.3MHz — 456 2014
High-dimension (Zhong et al., 2015) CW 20km 2.7M 2015
High-dimension (Mirhosseini et al., 2015) 4KHz — 6.5 2015
High-dimension (Sit et al., 2017) — 0.3km ∼30K 2017
High-dimension (Islam et al., 2017) 2.5GHz 16.6dB 1.07M 2017
Coherent-one-way (Korzh et al., 2015) 625MHz 307km 3.2 2015
Modulator-free (Yuan et al., 2016) 1GHz 40dB ∼10 2018
and 5, are the same.
2. After quantum transmission, Alice and Bob share
N EPR pairs. Due to channel disturbance or Eve’s
interference, these N EPR pairs are generally im-
perfect and might be entangled with each other and
Eve’s system. Here, we consider the most general
coherent attacks.
3. In a security proof, it is crucial to evaluate the num-
ber of EPR pairs cost in Step 4.
When Alice and Bob both measure in the local Z basis,
an error occurs when the outcomes are different. We call
it a bit error. Similarly, when they both measure in the
X basis, a phase error occurs when the outcomes are
different. Denote the bit and phase error rates to be eb
and ep, respectively,
eb =
# of bit errors
N
,
ep =
# of phase errors
N
.
(7)
Since we are considering the most general coherent at-
tacks, the errors are in general not independent but cor-
related. Note that bit and phase errors can be defined
in any two complementary bases in the qubit case. For
quantum signals measured in a particular basis, where
the bit error is defined, the phase error denotes the hy-
pothetical error if these signals were measured in its com-
plementary basis. For higher dimension cases, such def-
12
TABLE VIII List of recent developments of other quantum cryptographic protocols beyond QKD.
Protocol Theory/Experiment Notes
Noisy quantum storage (DamgÅrd et al., 2008; Konig et al., 2012; Wehner et al., 2008) Theory Unconditional security
Oblivious transfer (Erven et al., 2014) Experiment Noisy-storage model
Bit commitment (Ng et al., 2012) Experiment Noisy-storage model
Bit commitment (Kent, 2012) Theory Relativistic assumption
Bit commitment (Liu et al., 2014; Lunghi et al., 2013) Experiment Relativistic assumption
Bit commitment (Chakraborty et al., 2015; Lunghi et al., 2015; Verbanis et al., 2016) Experiment Long commitment time
Digital signature (Clarke et al., 2012) Experiment First demonstration
Digital signature (Collins et al., 2014; Dunjko et al., 2014) Experiment No quantum memory
Digital signature (Donaldson et al., 2016; Yin et al., 2017a) Experiment Insecure channel
Coin flipping (Berlín et al., 2011; Pappa et al., 2014) Experiment Loss tolerance
Data locking (Fawzi et al., 2013; Lloyd, 2013; Lupo et al., 2014) Theory Loss tolerance
Data locking (Liu et al., 2016; Lum et al., 2016) Experiment Loss tolerance
Blind quantum computing (Barz et al., 2012; Broadbent et al., 2009) Theory,Experiment No quantum memory
Blind quantum computing (Huang et al., 2017; Reichardt et al., 2013) Theory,Experiment Classical clients
TABLE IX List of related reviews to QKD.
Reference Subject
(Gisin et al., 2002) Experimental basics of QKD
(Scarani et al., 2009) Theoretical basics of QKD
(Diamanti et al., 2016; Lo et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2018) Practical challenges of QKD
(Jain et al., 2016) Quantum hacking attacks
(Xu et al., 2015) Measurement-device-independent QKD
(Hadfield, 2009; Zhang et al., 2015) Single-photon detector
(Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin, 2017; Ma et al., 2016b) Quantum random number generator
(Coles et al., 2017) Entropy uncertainty relation
(Diamanti and Leverrier, 2015; Laudenbach et al., 2018; Weedbrook et al., 2012) Continuous-variable QKD
(Munro et al., 2015; Pan et al., 2012; Sangouard et al., 2011) Quantum repeaters
(Kimble, 2008; Wehner et al., 2018) Quantum internet
(Brunner et al., 2014) Bell nonlocality/device-independent QKD
(Fitzsimons, 2017) Blind quantum computing
(Xavier and Lima, 2020) High-dimensional QKD
initions would be slightly trickier with more than one
types of phase errors.
In order to distill perfect EPR pairs from imperfect
ones with errors defined in Eq. (7), Alice and Bob can
employ quantum error correction. Entanglement distil-
lation can be done in two steps via bit and phase er-
ror correction. In bit error correction, Alice hashes her
qubits in the Z basis by applying Control-NOT (C-NOT)
to ancillary perfect EPR pairs, as shown in Fig. 3. Alice
sends the measurement results of ancillary qubits to Bob,
which serves as error syndrome in error correction. In the
infinite data size limit, the number of perfect EPR pairs
cost in this procedure is given by the Shannon entropy,
NH(eb). By applying Hadamard gates, one can switch
between bit and phase spaces. Then, similarly, the phase
error correction will cost additional NH(ep) EPR pairs.
Finally, the net rate of EPR pairs generated is given
by,
r ≥ 1−H(eb)−H(ep), (8)
where H(e) = −e log e − (1 − e) log(1− e) is the binary
Shannon entropy function. Note that this formula is not
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syndrome in error correction. In the innite data size limit, the number of perfect EPR pairs cost in this procedure is
given by the Shannon entropy, NH(eb). By applying Hadamard gates, one can switch between bit and phase spaces.
Then, similarly, the phase error correction will cost additional NH(ep) EPR pairs. Finally, the net rate of EPR pairs
generated is given by (Shor and Preskill, 2000),
r ≥ 1−H(eb)−H(ep), (10)
where H(e) = −e log e− (1− e) log(1− e) is the binary Shannon entropy function.
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FIG. 3 Illustration of bit error correction. By adding Hadamard gates, the circuit can also be used for phase error correction.
In general, such quantum error correction based entanglement distillation procedure requires quantum memory and
quantum computer, which is the essence of the Lo-Chau security proof (Lo and Chau, 1999). In order to remove this
quantum memory or quantum computer requirement, one can move the nal measurement ahead of the two error
correction steps. The bit error correction becomes classical error correction, and the phase error correction becomes
privacy amplication. There are a few steps for this permutation of operations to work.
1. Quantum bit and phase error correction commute, as shown in Figure 3. The key point here is that Alice and
Bob use EPR pairs as ancillary qubits.
2. The Z-basis measurement on the ancillary EPR qubits commute with all the operations for error correction.
This is straightforward to see since there are only two possible operations on ancillary qubits, I and X (from
C-NOT), both of which commute with the Z measurement.
3. The Z measurement on the Alice and Bob qubits commute with bit error correction. This is also straightforward
since the Z⊗Z measurement with C-NOT. After moving the Z measurement ahead, C-NOT operation becomes
regular exclusive-OR (X-OR) on the two outcome bits.
4. The Z-basis measurement on the Alice and Bob qubits commute with phase error correction. This relies on the
usage of EPR pair ancillary states.
5. In phase error correction, after locate the errors, phase error correction does not aect the values of nal key
measurement in the Z basis. Thus, no correction" operation is needed. Of course, the EPR pairs are still cost
here.
6. Then, all the quantum operations become classical bit operations, essentially, hashing.
7. In order to perform privacy amplication, one still needs to estimate the phase error rate ep. Now, let us focus
on the case that the key bits are measured in the Z basis. The phase error rate can be estimated by measuring
the key bits in the X basis. Of course, in order for this estimation to work, one needs to make sure the sampling
is fair, which raises the following critical assumptions in security proof.
After considering the permutation of quantum error correction and measurement, Alice and Bob can directly
measure the EPR pairs once they receive them. Suppose Alice prepares the original EPR pairs, measures halves
of the pairs, and send the rest halves to Bob. Conditioned on Alice's measurement outcomes, the states sent from
FIG. 3 Illustration of bit error correction. By adding
Hadamard gates, the circuit can also be used for phase er-
ror correction.
tight in general. If two-way classical communication is
allowed in quantum error correction, more key can be
distilled (Chau, 2002; Gottesman and Lo, 2003).
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In reality, when the data size is finite, the entangle-
ment distillation might fail with a small failure probabil-
ity, which can be understood as the failure probability
of quantum error correction. In original security proofs
(Koashi, 2009; Lo and Chau, 1999; Shor and Preskill,
2000), the fidelity between the key state ρABE to the
ideal state ρidealABE is often used as an intermediate mea-
sure to finally bound the mutual information between
the final key and Eve’s system. In fact, this definition is
not composable. In order to make the security parame-
ter composable (Ben-Or et al., 2005; Renner and König,
2005), one can apply the connections between fidelity and
trace distance using a general inequality relating them
[see Section III in (Fung et al., 2010)].
2. Shor-Preskill: reduction to prepare-and-measure schemes
In general, this quantum error correction based entan-
glement distillation procedure, which is the essence of
the Lo-Chau security proof, requires quantum memories
and quantum computers. However, these quantum mem-
ories and quantum computers are not available with the
current technology (Lo and Chau, 1999). In order to
remove this quantum memory or quantum computer re-
quirement, one can move the final measurement ahead
of the two error correction steps. The bit error correc-
tion becomes classical error correction, and the phase er-
ror correction becomes privacy amplification (Shor and
Preskill, 2000). There are a few steps for this permuta-
tion of operations to work.
1. Quantum bit and phase error correction operations
commute, as shown in Fig. 3. This is due the
fact that Alice and Bob use EPR pairs as ancillary
qubits.
2. The Z-basis measurement on the ancillary EPR
qubits commutes with all the operations for er-
ror correction. This is straightforward to see since
there are only two possible operations on ancillary
qubits, I andX (from C-NOT), both of which com-
mute with the Z measurement.
3. The Z-basis measurement on the Alice and Bob
qubits commutes with the bit error correction. This
is true since the Z⊗Z measurement commutes with
C-NOT. After moving the Z measurement ahead,
the C-NOT operation becomes regular exclusive-
OR (XOR) on the two outcome bits.
4. The Z-basis measurement on the Alice and Bob
qubits commutes with the phase error correction.
This relies on the usage of EPR pair ancillary
states.
5. In phase error correction, after locating the errors,
phase error correction does not affect the values of
final key measurement in the Z basis. Thus, no
“correction” operation is needed. Of course, the
EPR pairs are still cost in this step.
6. Then, all the quantum operations become classical
bit operations, essentially, hashing.
7. In order to perform privacy amplification, one still
needs to estimate the phase error rate ep. Now, let
us focus on the case that the key bits are measured
in the Z basis. The phase error rate can be esti-
mated by measuring the key bits in the X basis.
Of course, in order for this estimation to work, one
needs to make sure the sampling is fair, which raises
the critical assumptions in security proof discussed
in Section II.C.
After considering the permutation of quantum error
correction and measurement, Alice and Bob can directly
measure the EPR pairs once they receive them. Suppose
Alice prepares the original EPR pairs, measures halves
of the pairs, and sends the rest halves to Bob. Condi-
tioned on Alice’s measurement outcomes, the states sent
from Alice to Bob are pure. It is equivalent for Alice
to prepare these states directly and send to Bob. Now,
the entanglement-based protocol is reduced to a prepare-
and-measure one.
Reduction from quantum bit error correction to clas-
sical error correction is easy to understand. Let us take
Fig. 3 for example. Alice and Bob need to compare the
ancillary qubit measurement results. Since the final Z⊗Z
measurement commute with C-NOT operation, one can
measure all the qubits in the Z basis first and XOR the
bit values of all the measurement outcomes of the control
qubits to the target qubits. The CNOT links shown in
Fig. 3 can be understood as a hashing matrix, meaning it
is equivalent to construct a matrix and multiply with the
raw bit string. Of course, such error correction is linear.
In general, any error correcting code can be applied, once
bit and phase error correction can be decoupled.
Reduction from quantum phase error correction to pri-
vacy amplification is trickier. In general, after Hadamard
gates, C-NOT operation does not commute Z measure-
ment any more. In fact, those two operations become
anti-commute. In this case, Alice and Bob can design
phase error correcting code such that it commutes with
the Z measurement. Again, let us take the linear code
as an example. Certain number of parity bits need to
be exchanged for error correction. Assuming universal
hashing, Alice sends NH(ep) bits to Bob and Bob cor-
rects the phase errors. Note that final key measurement
must commute with this hashing. Then, they can use the
null space of the hashing matrix as for the final key space.
The equivalence between the phase error correction and
privacy amplification is illustrated in Fig. 4. This can also
be understood as a random number extraction. Alice and
Bob use phase error rate to estimate the randomness in
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the key and apply universal hashing to extract out true
randomness.
Three-qubit phase code (P step) Circuit that computes











FIG. 4 Equivalence between the phase error correction and
privacy amplification. The outcome of a simple 3-qubit rep-
etition phase error correcting code is same as the hashing of
three bit values.
In quantum error correction, we assume Alice and Bob
to use ancillary EPR pairs. As shown in Fig. 3, with EPR
pairs, bit and phase error correction operations commute
with each other. That is, one can decouple these two
error correction steps (Lo, 2003). In the Shor-Preskill se-
curity proof (Shor and Preskill, 2000), no ancillary EPR
pairs are employed. Instead, the CSS quantum error cor-
recting code (Calderbank and Shor, 1996; Steane, 1996)
is used to decouple these two steps.
After the reduction to prepare-and-measure schemes,
the data postprocessing can be divided into two steps:
error correction and privacy amplification. Error correc-
tion is a step to reconciliate Alice’s and Bob’s sifted key.
If we allow one-way key reconciliation, the cost in this
step is H(A|B), where A and B represent the random
variables of Alice’s and Bob’s sifted key, respectively. In
a symmetric channel, where the detected numbers of bits
0’s and 1’s are the same, the cost per bit is given by
H(eb) as shown in Eq. (8). It turns out that the cost can
be reduced if we allow two-way key reconciliation. The
optimal key rate is an open question even in the classical
key agreement case (Maurer and Wolf, 1999).
Privacy amplification is a procedure for Alice and Bob
to distill a common private key from a raw key about
which Eve might have partial information (Bennett et al.,
1995). The concept of privacy amplification is closely re-
lated to the randomness extraction problem (De et al.,
2012; Ma et al., 2013a). The difference is that in pri-
vacy amplification local randomness is a free resource,
which in randomness extraction any randomness is valu-
able. Note that initially, the classical treatment on pri-
vacy amplification (Bennett et al., 1995) is only applica-
ble to QKD under restrictive assumptions, i.e., the ad-
versary has no quantum memory. Later on, however, this
treatment has been generalized to the case where the ad-
versary has quantum memory (Renner, 2008). Details of
data postprocessing, which distills a secure key from the
raw data measured in quantum transmission (see Fig. 6),
are presented in Section III.E.
In the end, Eq. (8) gives the key rate of the BB84
protocol. Considering the symmetric case where the bit
and phase error rates are the same, it is not hard to see
that the tolerable error rate of Eq. (8) is 11%, compar-
ing to 7% in the Mayers’s proof (Mayers, 2001). Similar
to the entanglement distillation case, this formula is not
tight. With two-way classical communication, one can
achieve advantage distillation (Gottesman and Lo, 2003)
using bit-flip error detection. Nonetheless, phase error
detection remains forbidden in the absence of quantum
computers. From the QKD postprocessing point of view,
the bit and phase errors might be correlated. Alice and
Bob can perform some preprocessing to reduce the total
amount of key cost in error correction and privacy am-
plification. For example, they can group bits into pairs
and compare parities and discard the ones with differ-
ent parities. In this way, one can reduce the errors in
remaining bits. This is called B step (Gottesman and
Lo, 2003). It terms out that, such prepossessing is use-
ful in practical QKD processing (Ma et al., 2006). With
two-way classical communication, one can also increase
the tolerable error rates (Chau, 2002; Gottesman and Lo,
2003). Also, with the six-state protocol (Bruß, 1998; Lo,
2001), it has been shown that the tolerable error rate is
higher. We list all the tolerable error rates in Table X.
Apparently, there are gaps between the lower (tolerable)
and upper error rate bounds. This is an open question
in QKD as well as in entanglement distillation for many
years, which is also related to key agreement problem in
classical communication case (Maurer and Wolf, 1999).
TABLE X List of tolerable error rate bounds for different
schemes and proofs. The upper bounds are evaluated by sim-
ple individual (intercept-and-resend) attacks (Gottesman and
Lo, 2003).
Scheme One-way Two-way Upper bound
BB84 11.0% 20.0% 1/4
Six-state 12.7% 27.6% 1/3
3. Koashi’s complementarity approach
The aforementioned security analyses by Lo-Chau and
Shor-Presill based on quantum error correction compli-
cation certainly enjoy the strong intuition from entangle-
ment to privacy. In fact, it turns out that entanglement
(or a quantum channel that is capable of transmitting en-
tangled state) is a precondition for secure QKD (Curty
et al., 2004). The main drawback of this approach is
its complication of introducing a virtual entanglement-
based protocol. Although the bit and phase error correc-
tion can be decoupled in postprocessing by employing the
CSS quantum error correcting code (Shor and Preskill,
2000) or ancillary EPR pairs (Lo, 2003), these two steps
always mix together in security proofs. Sometimes, con-
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structing a virtual entanglement protocol could be highly
nontrivial (Fung et al., 2009; Tamaki et al., 2003; Tamaki
and Lütkenhaus, 2004). Error correction and privacy am-
plification are very different procedures in conventional
cryptography. The former is to guarantee that Alice and
Bob share an identical key, while the latter is to make
sure they share a private key. One key observation is
that error correction step is not directly related to quan-
tum laws in the security analysis. That is, if Alice and
Bob only want to share an identical key, they can just
transmit classical states to do the job. From this obser-
vation, Koashi has developed a simplified security proof
framework based on complementarity (Koashi, 2009).
In Koashi’s approach, error correction and privacy am-
plification are decoupled from the beginning. Alice and
Bob perform error correction first to make sure that the
two bit strings are the same. Now, the problem becomes
how many private key bits can be distilled from Alice’s
(same as Bob’s) error corrected key. In this case we only
need to deal with two parties, Alice and Eve. Denote
the length of Alice’s key string to be N . Alice’s N -bit
string can be regarded as the Z-basis measurement out-
come of N qubits ρA ∈ H2N . Note that, under the most
general coherent attacks, these N qubits are correlated
(or even entangled) with each other. The key idea is that
in a virtual protocol, if each qubit of ρA is measured in
the complementary X-basis measurement and only +1
results are obtained, then ρA = |+〉N , where |+〉 is the
eigenstate of X with the eigenvalue +1. In this ideal sce-
nario, no one (including Eve) can predict Alice’s key bits
without accessing the measurement results directly. Like
EPR pairs discussed in the Lo-Chau security proof, this
ideal case will render perfect privacy. Interestingly, this
unpredictability on the (computational) Z-basis is quan-
tified by the coherence measure in the resource theory
(Yuan et al., 2015), which is recently connected to the
security of QKD (Ma et al., 2019).
In general, ρA is not a product of |+〉 states. In this
framework, the phase error rate ep is defined as the ratio
of getting −1 eigenstates of the complementary X-basis
measurement on ρA. The parameter ep can be estimated
differently in different QKD protocols. For instance, in
BB84, essentially Alice randomly chooses some qubits to
be measured in the X-basis and use random sampling to
estimate ep. Details of random sampling for parameter
estimation will be discussed in Section III.E. Now, Al-
ice can perform a virtual phase error correction on her
N qubits by the similar means discussed in the Lo-Chau
phase error correction. Alice can hash the X-basis mea-
surement outcomes and find the error syndrome. Af-
ter phase error correction, Alice’s state becomes close to
|+〉N , again, measured by fidelity or trace distance.
The key difference between Lo-Chau and Koashi secu-
rity proofs lies on the definition of the phase error rate ep.
In Lo-Chau security proof, ep is defined on Bob’s system
relative to Alice’s, while in Koashi’s, it is defined on Al-
ice’s (or Bob’s) side locally depending on protocols and
Bob (Alice) can have an arbitrary system (irrelevant for
security). In Koashi’s approach, the complementary ba-
sis can be chosen arbitrary as long as ep can be estimated
accurately. Meanwhile, along the line of complementarity
approach, security proofs based on entropic uncertainty
relations (Coles et al., 2017) have been developed (Berta
et al., 2010; Koashi, 2006).
In summary, the Lo-Chau, Shor-Preskill and Koashi
security proofs are all based on the phase error correc-
tion. Note that, in this line of approach, the estimation
of ep is the core of the security analysis. Sometimes,
more sophisticated tools like semi-definite programming
is employed to upper bound the phase error rate (Wang
et al., 2019c). Recently, there is an effort to make a
connection between Shor-Preskill’s type security proof
(Koashi, 2009; Shor and Preskill, 2000) and Entropic ap-
proach (Renner, 2008) by Tsurumaru (Tsurumaru, 2018).
So far, the security proof we reviewed here focuses
on the BB84 protocol. Obviously, the security proof
based on phase error correction can be extended to
other protocols, like Bennett-1992 (B92) (Bennett, 1992;
Tamaki et al., 2003) and six-state protocols (Bruß, 1998;
Lo, 2001). Meanwhile, this technique can also be em-
ployed to general qudit systems (Chau, 2005). Note that
there is also security proof based on the idea of twisted
states (Horodecki et al., 2008; Horodecki et al., 2008).
Intuitively twisted states include shields. It allows the
phase error correction syndrome to be hidden in the
shield and thus become unaccessible to Eve. In princi-
ple, a virtual conceptual measurement on the joint state
of Alice and Bob’s shield will allow them to extract the
missing phase error correction syndrome to complete the
quantum error correction process. In practice, Alice and
Bob do not need to perform such a virtual measurement.
4. Entropic approach
There is another line of security analysis (Coles et al.,
2017; Renner, 2008; Renner et al., 2005; Scarani and Ren-
ner, 2008; Tomamichel et al., 2012) that originates from
the communication complexity and quantum memory ap-
proach (Ben-Or, 2002; Renner, 2008). Based on the en-
tanglement distillation idea, a framework has been estab-
lished for a general ρAB by Devetak and Winter (Deve-
tak and Winter, 2005). In this quantum-entropy based
framework, Alice and Bob share many i.i.d. copies of ρAB ,
on which they perform measurements to obtain key bits.
The Devetak-Winter key rate formula is given by
r = S(A|E)−H(A|B),
S(A|E) = S(ρAE)− S(ρE)
= S(ρB)− S(ρAB),
(9)
where S(A|E) is conditional quantum entropy, S(A) =
−Tr(ρA log ρA) is the von Neumann entropy. In the
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derivation, we assume the worst case scenario where
ρABE is pure. In fact, the privacy amplification term can
also be written in a relative entropy form (Coles et al.,
2016),
S(A|E) = D(ρAB ||∆z(ρAB)), (10)
where ∆z(ρAB) =
∑
i |i〉〈i|A ρAB |i〉〈i|A is the partial de-
phasing operation on system A in the Z basis and the
relative entropy function D(ρ||σ) = Tr ρ log ρ−Tr ρ log σ.
This allows us to give an operational interpretation of co-
herence in QKD (Ma et al., 2019).
The density matrix information ρAB is unknown to
Alice and Bob due to Eve’s interference. They have to
monitor ρAB in real time, say via tomography. Thus,
the Devetak-Winter analysis is normally applied to the
i.i.d. case, where Eve interferes all rounds of QKD iden-
tically and independently, i.e., collective attack (Ren-
ner, 2008; Scarani and Renner, 2008). Nonetheless, the
security analysis can be extended to the case of co-
herent attack by further analysis (Coles et al., 2017;
Tomamichel et al., 2012), such as the de Finetti theorem
(Renner, 2007), the post-selection technique (Christandl
et al., 2009) and uncertainty relation for smooth entropies
(Tomamichel and Renner, 2011). Another advantage of
this approach is that the security of a complicated QKD
scheme can be analyzed numerically (Coles et al., 2016;
Winick et al., 2018).
C. Security assumptions
We will discuss the security assumptions made in gen-
eral security proofs. We focus on the BB84 protocol, but
most of the discussions can be applied to other protocols,
such as B92, BBM92, and the six-state protocols. In se-
curity proofs (Koashi, 2009; Lo and Chau, 1999; Shor
and Preskill, 2000), as shown in Section II.B, we assume
Alice sends ideal qubit states in {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} and
Bob performs ideal qubit Z-basis and X-basis measure-
ment. The channel, on the other hand, is assumed to be
under a full control of Eve.
Nevertheless, in actual experiments these assumptions
can be problematic. Table XI summarizes the main dif-
ferences between the security assumptions of security
proofs and typical experimental setups. These differ-
ences, if unnoticed, might essentially open the security
issue of basis dependency between Z-basis and X-basis,
thus causing the problem of quantum hacking attacks
(see Table I).
1. Source
First, let us relax the requirement on source by consid-
ering a more general source. In a prepare-and-measure
QKD protocol, Alice randomly prepares system B on
TABLE XI Security assumptions and actual setup for BB84.
Component Security assumption Practical setup
Photon source Ideal single photon Coherent laser
Encoding state Two-dimension Arbitrary-dimension
Encoding state Basis-independent Source flaws
Measurement Two-dimension Arbitrary-dimension
Measurement Basis-independent Measurement flaws
Photon detection Ideal SPD Threshold detector
one of the four states, {ρx0, ρx1, ρz0, ρz1}, and sends it
to Bob. These four states can be denoted as ρβκ, where
β ∈ {X,Z} represents the encoding basis, and κ ∈ {0, 1}
represents the encoding key bit. Here, we consider four
states with two bases, but such scenario can be easily ex-
tended to more general cases with an arbitrary number
of states and bases.
The prepare-and-measure protocol can be linked to the
entanglement-based one as follows. Define the purifica-
tion of state ρβκ as |ψβκ〉A0B , where system A0 is an
ancillary system. From an entanglement-based view of
protocol, Alice sends out state ρβκ is equivalent to her
preparing
|Ψβ〉AA0B =
1√
2
∑
κ
|βκ〉A |ψβκ〉A0B , (11)
then measuring system A in the β-basis, and sending
out system B according to measurement result κ. Here,
systemA is a qubit system, |βκ〉A is the β-basis eigenstate
whose eigenvalue is κ. For the ideal BB84 protocol, there
is no ancillary system A0 (or A0 is just a detached trivial
system), since all encoding states ρβκ are pure. Then,
the states sent by Alice are,
ρβκ = TrA0(|ψβκ〉 〈ψβκ|A0B), (12)
the four BB84 states.
To send out ρxκ, in the entanglement-based equivalent
protocol, Alice prepares |Φ+〉AB =
1√
2
(|++〉+ |−−〉)AB ,
measures system A on the X basis, and obtains the mea-
surement result κ. Similarly, to send out ρzκ, Alice first
prepares |Φ+〉AB =
1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉)AB , measures A on
the Z basis, and obtains the measurement result κ. No
matter which basis Alice wants to send, the initial en-
tangled states prepared are the same. Let us denote the
X-basis state and Z-basis state are
ρx =
1
2
(ρx0 + ρx1),
ρz =
1
2
(ρz0 + ρz1),
(13)
which are the quantum state transmitted given Alice and
Bob choose the X and Z bases, respectively. Thus, in
the ideal BB84 source case, the state sent out by Alice is
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independent of the basis choice,
ρx = ρz. (14)
We call this kind of source basis-independent (Koashi and
Preskill, 2003; Ma et al., 2007).
In the original proposal of the BB84 protocol, the
basis choice is assumed to be unknown to Eve. This
is also a crucial assumption in security proofs (Lo and
Chau, 1999; Shor and Preskill, 2000), as shown in Sec-
tion II.B. This is important for phase error estimation. If
the source is basis-dependent, one cannot simply use one
basis information to estimate the other. This is guaran-
teed by Eq. (14). In fact, as long as the source is basis-
independent, it can be in arbitrary dimension or state.
It can even be assumed to be under the control of Eve.
In practice, it is hard to construct single-qubit sources.
Instead, entangled photon sources are widely used as a
basis-independent source. Notice that, for entangled pho-
ton sources to work as a basis-independent source, the
measurement for heralding has to be basis-independent.
Later in Section II.D.1, we will show that the security can
be guaranteed once the source contains a certain amount
of basis-independent components.
In some QKD schemes, such as BBM92 (Bennett et al.,
1992c), Alice and Bob choose basis after the quantum
signals transmitted through the channel. In BBM92 pro-
tocol, Alice prepares an entangled source, holds one part
by herself and sends another to Bob. Alice measures her
own part in some basis to realize the basis choice and en-
coding. In these schemes, the quantum source can even
be assumed to be in the possession of Eve. Then for these
schemes, Eq. (14) can be guaranteed by the experimental
setting.
2. Measurement
The requirement on measurement is very similar.
Again, take the BB84 protocol as an example. There
are four measurement outcomes labeled by two bits, β, κ.
The corresponding four POVM elements are Mβκ,
Mx = Mx0 +Mx1,
Mz = Mz0 +Mz1.
(15)
Here, {Mx0, Mx1} form the X-basis measurement, while
{Mz0,Mz1} form the Z-basis measurement. We also re-
quire the measurement to be basis-independent,
Mx = Mz. (16)
On the measurement side, the requirement is more
strict. For the security proof presented in Section II.B, it
must be qubit measurements in the X and Z bases. Such
requirement can be extended to more general projection
measurements.
In practice, a squashing model is widely employed
(Beaudry et al., 2008; Fung et al., 2011; Gottesman et al.,
2004). In a squashing model, an arbitrary quantum state
(from the channel) is projected to a qubit or vacuum.
Then the X or Z measurement is performed. It has been
proved that a typical threshold detector model adapts to
the squashing model (Beaudry et al., 2008; Tsurumaru
and Tamaki, 2008).
Now, one can see that the assumptions on the source
and measurement are quite different. For source, one
only needs to guarantee its basis-independent property
in Eq. (14). On measurement, it must be specific projec-
tion measurements. In practice, the source requirement
is easier to meet comparing to the measurement require-
ment. Hence, there are more practical security issues on
measurement than on source. A full security analysis
needs to take account of these measurement deviations.
We present it in Section II.D.1. This problem is finally
resolved by MDI-QKD (see Section VI.B).
3. Channel
In security proofs, the channel is assumed to be under
the full control of Eve. Thus, in principle, we do not put
any requirement on channel. In fact, if any implementa-
tion deviation from the ideal QKD protocol can be put
into the channel, it will not cause any security problems.
For example, detectors normally have a finite efficiency.
The loss caused by detectors can be moved to channel.
Then, a detector can be replaced by a 100% efficiency
one in security analysis.
Now, the question is what kind of implementation de-
viations can be moved to channel. The implementation
deviation can be regarded as some deviation operation
acting on an ideal implementation. The key requirement
is that the deviation operation must commute with basis
switch operation. Alice and Bob each uses a basis switch-
ing device (say, a phase modulator in phase-encoding
schemes). The channel is defined as the operation on
the quantum signals in between the two basis switching
devices.
D. Practical security analysis
In practice, there are two issues that need to be ad-
dressed: device imperfection and statistical fluctuation.
In Section II.C, we review the assumptions in the secu-
rity proofs. In reality, these assumptions might be fully
satisfied. Implementation devices might be (slightly) de-
viated from the ideal case used in the security proofs.
When the deviation is small enough, we expect that a
secure key can still be generated. In Section II.D.1, we
review the quantification of device imperfections and its
effects on the security analysis.
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In principle, the error rates defined in Eq. (7) can-
not be obtained accurately since they are measured in
complementary bases. In the security proofs reviewed
in Section II.B, we employ random sampling to estimate
the error rates. When the data size goes to infinite, the
error rates approach error probabilities, which can be es-
timated accurately. In a finite data size, such parameter
estimation would render a finite confidence interval. In
Section II.D.2, we review the parameter estimation with
random sampling by calculating the failure probabilities
and parameter bounds.
In Section III.E, we review the classical postprocessing
of QKD and explain how can Alice and Bob distill secure
keys in the raw bit strings from quantum measurement
to final secure keys, with the help of public discussions.
Note that some of the discussions need to be encrypted
and/or authenticated.
1. GLLP
There exist deviations between realistic QKD systems
and the ideal QKD protocol. In order to achieve practical
security of a QKD system, Alice and Bob need to char-
acterize these device deviations or imperfections care-
fully and take them into account in the security analysis.
Based on previous works on the topics (Inamori et al.,
2007; Lütkenhaus, 2000), Gottesman, Lo, Lütkenhaus,
and Preskill (GLLP) established a general framework for
security analysis with realistic devices (Gottesman et al.,
2004).
First, Alice and Bob need to characterize their devices
to see how much deviation from the ideal ones used in
the security proofs. One can employ typical distance
measures, like fidelity and trace distance, to quantify the
deviation. In principle, Alice and Bob can perform some
virtual measurement on the devices for each run in re-
altime to see whether it works the same as the “ideal
device" or its “orthogonal case". Then, they can tag
the sifted key bit as “good" if the virtual measurement
projects to the ideal case, and tag “bad" if it is “orthog-
onal case". Of course, in reality, Alice and Bob do not
know the virtual measurement result. Instead, they know
the ratio of these two cases. Both source and measure-
ment imperfections can fit into this scenario. The GLLP
security analysis essentially tells us how to extract secure
bits when the good bits are mixed with bad ones. So far,
the discussion is rather abstract, in the following discus-
sions, we take the source imperfection as an example.
The framework is generic. Here, let us take the BB84
protocol for example. In reality, a weak coherent state
photon source is widely used as an approximate sin-
gle photon source. With phase randomization, one can
treat it as a mixture of Fock states (Lo et al., 2005).
The vacuum and single-photon components are basis-
independent, whereas the multiphoton components are
not. In principle, Alice can measure the photon num-
ber to tag each encoded state being basis-independent
or not (this is the aforementioned virtual measurement
part). Denote the ratio of Bob’s detected bits from the
basis-independent source (good part, e.g. vacuum and
single-photon component in the BB84 protocol) to be
1 − ∆, and the rest (bad parte.g., multiphoton compo-
nents in the BB84 protocol) is ∆. Details of the source
model and its security analysis will be presented in Sec-
tion III.B.
With Alice’s tagging information (photon number in
this example), she can sort the sifted key bit string kA
into two sub-strings, kgood and kbad, where
|kgood| = (1−∆)N,
|kbad| = ∆N.
(17)
Following the phase error correction security proof, the
underlying phase error rate of kgood is ep, which can be es-
timated accurately via complement measurements. The
phase error rate of kbad is unknown. In the worst case
scenario, the phase error rate of the string kbad could
be as high as 1/2. The main idea of the GLLP security
analysis is that if Alice and Bob employ linear privacy
amplification, such as the matrix hashing introduced in
Section III.E, they can still distill secure keys from kgood
by accessing kA only.
Denote k′good to be the bit string if Alice modifies the
sifted key bit string by setting the bad bit positions to
be 0. Similarly, denote k′bad to be the bit string if Alice
sets the good bit positions to be 0. Then,
|k′good| = |k′bad| = |kA|,
k′good ⊕ k′bad = kA.
(18)
Suppose a hashing matrix T can distill secure bits from
kgood. That is, Tkgood is a secure key. Then, it is not hard
to show that T ′k′good results in the same secure key if one
extends the matrix T to T ′ by inserting new columns
corresponding to the bad positions of k′good. That is, T
is a sub-matrix of T ′ by taking certain column vectors.
Here comes the clever trick of GLLP: since T ′k′good is
private, the XOR result
T ′k′good ⊕ T ′k′bad = T ′(k′good ⊕ k′bad)
= T ′kA
(19)
is also private even Eve knows everything about T ′k′bad.
Note that the new added columns from T to T ′ can be
arbitrary. In practice, Alice can just pick up a universal
hashing matrix T ′ to do privacy amplification and its
sub-matrix T will automatically a smaller-size universal
hashing matrix.
Therefore, the secure key rate formula of GLLP is given
by
r ≥ −H(E) + (1−∆)[1−H(ep)]. (20)
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where E is the total QBER. This key rate formula can be
viewed as an extension to Eq. (8). Furthermore, we do
not need to restrict ourselves to two tags case, good and
bad. In principle, Alice and Bob can label sifted key bits
with an arbitrary dimensional tag g and for each g they
can derive its corresponding phase error rate egp. With
the same argument as above, we can extended the GLLP
formula (Ma, 2008),
r ≥ −H(E) +
∑
g
qg[1−H(egp)], (21)
where qg is the ratio of sifted key bits with the tag g
and
∑
g qg = 1. Here, we assume Alice and Bob cannot
access the tag g in reality and hence they have to do the
error correction part for all bits together. If they can
really read out tags for each run, they can divide this
error correction part as well.
2. Random sampling and finite-data size
The infinite data size limit (N → ∞) is used for the
key-rate formula Eq. (8) and (21). When the data size
is finite, the phase error rate, ep, used for evaluate the
amount of privacy amplification cannot be measured ac-
curately. Instead, Alice and Bob can bound ep via certain
complementary measurements.
In the BB84 protocol, the phase error probability in the
Z-basis is the same as the bit error probability in the X-
basis. In the following discussions, we assume Alice and
Bob obtained the sifted key in the Z-basis measurement
and want to estimate the underlying phase error rate ep.
Thus, by sampling the qubits in the X-basis, Alice and
Bob can bound ep. This is a typical random sampling
problem. Given a certain number of phase error rates in
nx+nz positions, Alice and Bob randomly sample nx po-
sitions for phase error testing and find nxebx errors. The
sampling problem lies on bounding the phase error rate
epz in the remaining nz positions. The (upper) bound
is related to the failure probability by a hypergeometric
function (Fung et al., 2010).
Specifically, the main objective is to evaluate the de-
viation θ of the phase error rate from the tested value,
the bit error rate in the complementary basis, due to the
finite-size effect. Here we recap the results from Section
IX of (Fung et al., 2010) and list the variables in Table
XII. The phase error rate epz is bounded by
epz ≤ ebx + θ, (22)
with a failure probability of
εph ≤
√
nx + nz√
ebx(1− ebx)nxnz
2−(nx+nz)ξ(θ), (23)
where ξ(θ) = H(ebx+θ−qxθ)−qxH(ebx)−(1−qx)H(ebx+
θ). If we take the Taylor expansion of Eq. (23), one can
obtain the first order approximation essentially the same
as the Gaussian limit used in the Shor-Preskill security
proof (Shor and Preskill, 2000).
Another approach to deal with the problem of finite-
size effect is by employing the smooth min-entropy (Ren-
ner, 2008), which is a valid measure of randomness
in the non-asymptotic cases, and degenerates to Shan-
non entropy in the i.i.d. limit. This approach has
been applied to QKD to prove the finite-key security
with almost tight bounds (Tomamichel et al., 2012;
Tomamichel and Renner, 2011). Moreover, the smooth
min-entropy approach is rather general to deal with non-
i.i.d. case and can be applied to other quantum informa-
tion processing protocols, such as one-shot coherence re-
source theory (Zhao et al., 2018) and device-independent
QKD (Arnon-Friedman et al., 2018). Note that for the
security analysis of QKD systems with realistic devices,
the finite data size effects are much more complicated.
We shall review it in Section V.A.
TABLE XII List of notations in phase error estimation.
Notation Definition
nz number of bits measured in the Z-basis
nx number of bits measured in the X-basis
ebx bit error rate in the X-basis
epz phase error rate in the Z-basis
qx sampling ratio nx/(nx + nz)
θ deviation of the phase error rate
εph failure probability of phase error estimation
III. QKD IMPLEMENTATION
In practice, security of a QKD system is often related
to its implementation. A QKD implementation is com-
posed of three parts: source, channel, and detection. In
a rigorous security proof, the channel is assumed to be
under the full control of Eve, who can replace the channel
with any quantum operation she desires. In the security
proof model, no implementation assumption is required
on the channel. As a result, the security of the system
does not depend on the physical realization of the quan-
tum channel. Therefore, the practical security for the
channel is not an issue. For the quantum source and
detection, on the other hand, a security proof normally
requires some assumptions on practical realization.
Photons are most widely used for communication, due
to their robustness against decoherence due to noisy envi-
ronment and fast traveling speed. Hence, we mainly focus
on the quantum optical realization of QKD systems. We
first discuss the encoding and decoding methods, then
briefly introduce the practical source, channel and de-
tection devices, and finally the classical postprocessing.
Here, we primarily review the practical components of a
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discrete-variable QKD (DV-QKD) system, while the dis-
cussions for continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) can be
found in Section VII.
A. Encoding and decoding
Different encoding and decoding methods are reflected
on source, channel, and detection. For discrete-variable
QKD schemes, Alice needs to figure out an efficient
method to encoding her qubit (or qudit) into the quan-
tum states. Accordingly, Bob needs to develop an effi-
cient method to read out the quantum information en-
coded by Alice.
In general, for qubit-based QKD, the quantum infor-
mation can encoded into two quantum modes, s and r,
and their relative phases. Normally, the two modes are
assumed to be orthogonal, say, using orthogonal polar-
izations or distinct time bins. Then, for a photon, the
states {|10〉sr , |01〉sr} form a Hilbert space, named Z ba-
sis. Here, “0" and “1" refer to the photon number in a
mode. Two complementary bases, X and Y , are defined
with the relative phases. The X and Y basis states can
be written as, {|10〉sr ± |01〉sr} and {|10〉sr ± i |01〉sr}.
In reality, a widely applied method is polarization en-
coding, which utilizes the polarization modes. The hori-
zontal and vertical polarizations of a photon, denoted by
|10〉HV and |01〉HV , are used for the Z basis encoding.
Then, the X basis states, {|10〉HV ±|01〉HV }, denote the
linear polarization modes along the directions of ±45◦,
respectively. The Y basis states, {|10〉HV ± i |01〉HV },
denote the left- or right-handed circular polarizations.
In the decoding process, the basis choice is realized by a
polarization controller (Fig. 5), and the polarization mea-
surement is realized by polarization beam splitter (PBS)
connected with single photon detectors.
Another common method is time-bin phase encoding,
where Alice chooses two pulses, a signal pulse and a refer-
ence pulse, for two encoding modes, denoted by s and r,
respectively. Similar to the polarization encoding, for a
single photon, the two time-bin modes form the Z basis,
{|10〉sr , |01〉sr}. Here, the qubit in the Z basis deter-
mines whether the photon stays in the signal time bin
or the reference time bin. The X and Y basis states,
{|10〉sr ± |01〉sr} and {|10〉sr ± i |01〉sr}, denote the pho-
tons with a relative phase 0, pi and pi/2, 3pi/2 between the
signal and reference pulses, respectively. In the decoding
process, an interferometer (Fig. 5) is employed to extract
the phase information.
For qudit-based QKD, Alice and Bob need to find d
orthogonal modes and the encoding and decoding are
similar. For example, the orbital angular momentum
is the freedom of photons on spatial distribution, which
contains a large Hilbert space. By encoding the high-
dimensional key information into the orbital angular mo-
mentum, one can enhance the performance of QKD (Cerf
et al., 2002; Gröblacher et al., 2006). Another example is
to encode with multiple time bins. In differential phase
shift (DPS) QKD, the relative phase or each time-bin
pulse is only 0 or pi, and the key is encoded into rel-
ative phase of two neighbouring pulses. Round-Robin-
DPS QKD (Sasaki et al., 2014) encoding and decoding
the phase difference circularly.
B. Photon sources
Here, we mainly discuss various practical photon
sources for QKD: weak coherent-state source, thermal
source, heralded single photon source, and entangled pho-
ton source. For most of prepare-and-measure QKD pro-
tocols, a single photon source is preferred. However, it is
experimentally challenging to realize a high-quality and
high-performance single photon source. We will discuss
the photon sources according to different QKD schemes.
1. Prepare-and-measure
In a standard prepare-and-measure scheme like BB84,
the common way is to employ other practical weak light
sources to approximate the single photon source. In gen-
eral, they are modulated to be a Fock state mixture,
ρ =
∞∑
n=0
P (n) |n〉 〈n| , (24)
where P (n) is the photon number distribution and |n〉
is the n-photon number state. For different types of
sources, the photon number distribution will also be dif-
ferent. Normally, the single photon component, |1〉 〈1|,
is required to be dominant comparing to higher order
components.
The weak coherent-state source is the most widely em-
ployed in QKD, which can be easily realized by atten-
uating laser lights. The light generated by a laser can
be regarded as a coherent pulse |α〉 within the coherence
time, where α is a complex number, and µ = |α|2 is the
average photon number. The coherent state can be ex-
panded in the Fock basis as
|α〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉 . (25)
The phase of α reflects the relative phase between dif-
ferent photon number components. To realize a photon
source in the form of Eq. (24), Alice can randomize the
phase of coherent pulses, and make it a mixture of photon
number states (Lo et al., 2005),
ρµ =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dφ
∣∣αeiφ〉 〈αeiφ∣∣
=
∞∑
n=0
Pµ(n) |n〉 〈n| ,
(26)
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FIG. 5 Illustration of optical device of a, polarization encoding, and b, relative phase encoding. The top shows the encoding,
while the bottom shows the decoding. PolM: polarization modulator; PM: phase modulator; PBS: polarization beam splitter;
SPD: single photon detector; BS: beam splitter.
where the photon number follows a Poisson distribution,
Pµ(n) = e
−µµ
n
n!
. In many QKD protocols, such as BB84,
only single photon component is secure for key distribu-
tion. Thus, the light intensity µ is typically in the single
photon level, µ = O(1).
The thermal source is a Fock state mixture, expanded
by
ρth =
∞∑
n=0
Pth(n) |n〉 〈n|
=
∞∑
n=0
µn
(µ+ 1)n+1
|n〉 〈n| ,
(27)
where µ is the average photon number and the photon
number follows a thermal distribution Pth(n). Note that
for a small average photon number µ ≤ 2, the single pho-
ton component ratio is bigger in a Poisson distribution
than in a thermal distribution. This is the reason why
the weak coherent state source normally can outperform
the thermal one in QKD (Curty et al., 2010).
2. Entanglement-based
For the entanglement-based QKD protocol, such as
BBM92 (Bennett et al., 1992c), an entangled photon
source via the parametric down-conversion (PDC) pro-
cess is normally adopted. In a PDC process, a high fre-
quency photon is converted to a pair of low frequency
photons. A PDC source emits a superposition state of
different number of photon pairs (Ma and Lo, 2008; Walls
and Milburn, 2008),
|Ψ〉 = (coshχ)−1
∞∑
n=0
(tanhχ)n |n, n〉 , (28)
where χ is the nonlinear parameter for the down-
conversion process, µ = sinh2 χ is the average photon
pair number, and |n, n〉 represents n photon pairs in two
optical modes.
The PDC process is widely used to generate photon
pairs. In this case, four optical modes are used. For ex-
ample, a typical PDC photon source emits photon pairs
in two directions. In each direction, the photon can be
in H or V polarization. The two optical modes are en-
tangled in polarization. Comparing to Eq. (28), due to
different collection means, the amplitudes of photon pair
numbers are slightly different from the one in Eq. (28)
(Kok and Braunstein, 2000; Ma et al., 2007),
|Ψ〉 = (coshχ)−2
∞∑
n=0
√
n+ 1 tanhn χ |Φn〉 , (29)
where χ is the nonlinear parameter for the down-
conversion process, µ = 2 sinh2 χ is the average number
of entangled photon pairs, and |Φn〉 is the state of an
n-entangled-photon pair,
|Φn〉 = 1√
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
(−1)m|n−m,m〉a|m,n−m〉b.
(30)
In the aforementioned example, a and b represent two
direction of the light, and |n−m,m〉a represents n−m
photons in the H polarization and m photons in the V
polarization. The number of the entangled-photon pairs
follows a Super-Poissonian distribution, slightly different
from the thermal distribution,
P (n) =
(n+ 1)(µ2 )
n
(1 + µ2 )
n+2
. (31)
Notice that the PDC source can also be used as a her-
alded photon source in the prepare-and-measure scheme.
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If we only focus on one of the optical modes (normally
called signal mode), tracing out the other (normally
called idle mode), the photon number follows the thermal
distribution, Pth(n) given in Eq. (27). A typical usage
of a PDC source for heralded photon involves measuring
the idle optical mode locally as a trigger and encoding
the signal mode for QKD. In this case, once Alice ob-
tains a trigger locally, she can largely rule out the vac-
uum component in the signal mode. In fact, conditioned
on whether or not a detection clicks on the idle mode,
the photon number distribution is different on the signal
mode. Such source can be used as a passive decoy-state
source (Adachi et al., 2007; Ma and Lo, 2008). Note that
when µ is very small, such heralded photon source can
well approximate a single photon source, which is widely
used in multi-photon processing (Pan et al., 2000).
C. Channel
Theoretically, we put no assumption on the quantum
channel used for QKD. However, in the real-world imple-
mentation, we will build the QKD channel with mature
optical communication technology to enhance the perfor-
mance of QKD protocol. There are two widely adopted
channels for QKD: fiber and free space. The most com-
mon channel used in QKD is built with commercial op-
tical fiber. For a standard commercial single mode fiber
(SMF), losses depend exponentially on the channel dis-
tance l as 10−αl/10, where the loss rate α is roughly 0.2
dB/km for telecom wavelength at around 1550 nm. The
loss rate can be remarkable if we extend the transmission
distance to over 400 km fiber (Fang et al., 2019; Yin et al.,
2016). Besides loss, a fiber-based QKD implementation
should also solve several problems, such as chromatic dis-
persion, polarization mode dispersion, birefringence and
so forth (Gisin et al., 2002).
Free space channel features some advantages compared
to optical fiber. There are several atmospheric transmis-
sion windows, such as 780–850 nm and 1520–1600 nm,
which have a low loss with an attenuation less than 0.1
dB/km in clear weather (Bloom et al., 2003). More im-
portantly, the attenuation is even negligible in the outer
space above the Earth’s atmosphere, which enables long-
distance QKD over 1000 km between ground and satel-
lite (Liao et al., 2017a). Furthermore, the decoherence of
polarization or of any other degree of freedom is practi-
cally negligible. However, there are also some drawbacks
concerning the free space. For instance, the weather con-
ditions influence the losses of free space heavily. The ef-
fective apertures of the sending and receiving telescopes,
influenced by alignment, movements and atmospheric
turbulence, contribute coupling losses and affect the per-
formance of free space QKD.
D. Detection
For DV-QKD schemes, single photon detection is real-
ized with threshold detectors which can only distinguish
the vacuum (zero photon) from single photon or multi-
photon cases. Besides, some imperfections may exist in
the single-photon detector (SPD): the detector efficiency
η is not 100%, which means some non-vacuum signals
will not cause a click on the SPD; there exists a dark
count factor pd, which means some vacuum signals will
incorrectly cause a click. This will affect the performance
of QKD systems.
The measurement model is based on the threshold
SPDs mentioned above. For the single-photon subspace,
the detection here can be regarded as X/Y basis qubit
measurement. However, there is multi-photon compo-
nent in the final signal, and the behavior of the mea-
surement device will be different from the required Z-
basis and X-basis measurement in DV-QKD. For exam-
ple, there will be double-click signals caused by multi-
photon component, which will not happen in the ideal
X/Y basis detection. To address this issue, the squashing
model of measurement is proposed, combined with the
random-assignment of double-clicked signals (Beaudry
et al., 2008; Fung et al., 2011).
In 2012, the MDI-QKD scheme (Lo et al., 2012) was
proposed to fill the detection loophole. The design of
measurement devices in MDI-QKD is similar to the one
in point-to-point QKD protocol. In discrete variable
MDI-QKD scheme, the measurement device, assumed to
be manipulated by the adversary, can be divided into two
categories, single detection and coincidence detection.
The coincident detection MDI-QKD schemes (Ma and
Razavi, 2012) is based on the schemes in which the two
communication parties, Alice and Bob, encode their key
information into a single photon, and build correlation
between their key value by a Bell state projection. The
single detection MDI-QKD scheme (Lucamarini et al.,
2018; Ma et al., 2018) can be regarded as the detection on
the coherent states rather than the single photon. They
both build correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s bit val-
ues by Bell state projections.
E. Postprocessing
Postprocessing is a procedure for Alice and Bob to dis-
till a secure key from the raw data measured in quantum
transmission with the help of public discussions. The
flow chart of QKD postprocessing is shown in Figure 6.
There are a few practical aspects need to be taken into
consideration when the number of signals are finite, i.e.,
the finite-key effect. For example, the error correction ef-
ficiency may not reach to the Shannon limit; depending
on the data size, normally a factor is applied. Also, on
the privacy amplification side, there will be a small fail-
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ure probability. Some public communication between Al-
ice and Bob need to be authenticated and/or encrypted.
Table XIII summarizes the resource cost and the failure
probabilities in the various steps.
Abort 
Key pool Encryption Authentication 
Yes 
Key sift 
Privacy amplification 
Error verification 
No 
Error correction 
Raw key assign 
Basis sift 
Device characterization 
Quantum state transmission and measurement 
FIG. 6 Flow chart of data postprocessing procedures. The
resource cost and the failure probabilities in encryption and
authentication is listed in Table XIII. The encryption is op-
tional for error correction depending on whether or not more
privacy application is performed later. [Figure adapted from
(Fung et al., 2010)].
The first step is raw key assignment, which depends on
different schemes. For example, in the commercial BB84
implementation, Alice and Bob discard all the no-clicks
and randomly assign double-clicks. In the MDI-QKD,
this step is based on the announcement of the measure-
ment site. In DI-QKD, Alice and Bob can perform ar-
bitrary assignment. Of course, any improper assignment
will reduce the key rate.
During the public discussions, some of the classical
communication need to be authenticated, as listed in Ta-
ble XIII. In the security proofs we reviewed, we assume
the encryption of classical communication in error correc-
tion. Such encryption can be avoided in other security
proofs. In this case, there may be some restriction on
the error correction procedure and more follow-up pri-
vacy amplification is required. For example, in the orig-
inal Shor-Preskill security proof, such encryption is not
necessary when the CSS code is employed. In practice,
there is an advantage to using error correction without
encryption, since if Alice and Bob abort the QKD proce-
dure after error correction, no pre-shared secret bits will
be lost due to encryption. In the following discussions,
we assume the number of bits communicated in error cor-
rection is counted for later privacy amplification. Thus,
in privacy amplification, the extraction ratio will be r
given in Eq. (21) without considering the finite data size
effects. If the one-time pad encryption is used for error
correction, the privacy amplification ratio will be higher
(by removing the error correction term in Eq. (21)). Af-
ter that, certain amount of secure key bits need to return
to the keep pool for encryption consumption. In the end,
the final key rate will still be same in the encryption and
non-encryption cases.
TABLE XIII List of resource cost and the failure probabilities
in the various steps. The numbers of consumed secret key
bits are denoted with k while the failure probabilities with
ε. Alice sends out N signals and Bob detected n of them in
the Z-basis measurement. The final key output length is l.
The tag length refers to authentication tag and - means no
authentication is required. In error verification, no message
but only an encrypted (authentication) tag is transmitted.
The cost of error correction kec is given by nfH(E). No
communication is required in phase error estimation. [Table
adapted from (Fung et al., 2010)]
Procedures Message Tag Failure Prob
1. Raw key assign N - -
2. Basis sift n kbs εbs [Eq. (32)]
3. Bit error correction kec - -
4. Error verification - kev εev [Eq. (32)]
5. Phase error estimation - - εph [Eq. (23)]
6. Privacy amplification (n+ l − 1) kpa εpa [Eq. (34)]
1. Error correction
For practical error correction, normally an efficiency
factor f > 1 is put before the H(E) term Eq. (21), which
means the actual cost is larger than the theoretical Shan-
non limit. Previously, a widely used error correction pro-
tocol for QKD is Cascade (Brassard and Salvail, 1994).
The Cascade protocol is simple and highly efficient that
is able to achieve an error correction factor of around
1.1 ∼ 1.2 for a large QBER range from 0% to beyond
11%. In the Cascade protocol, Alice and Bob divide
their sift key bit strings into blocks and compare parities
of each block to look for errors. They perform a binary
search to locate the error when the parity of a block is dif-
ferent. The process repeats for a few times with different
block sizes and permutation to ensure all the error bits
are corrected. The Cascade protocol is highly interactive
because the binary search requires 1 + log2(n) commu-
nications and successful error correction often requires
several passes. Later, several improved protocols have
been proposed to reduce the interaction rounds (Buttler
et al., 2003; Elliott et al., 2005; Nakassis et al., 2004).
Another family of error correcting codes is forward er-
ror correction, which only needs to send one syndrome
from Alice to Bob. Due to its light classical communi-
cation load, the forward error correction is widely im-
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plemented in commercial QKD systems. One outstand-
ing example is the low-density parity-check (LDPC) code
(MacKay and Neal, 1996). The LDPC code works well
for QKD due to its the high error correction efficiency
and very limited communication requirement. The de-
sign and optimization of LDPC codes in QKD postpro-
cessing is similar to the classical case, which can be di-
vided into three steps.
1. The first step is to find a good degree distribution
(MacKay et al., 1999; Richardson and Urbanke,
2001) for the target error rate.
2. The second step is to generate a good parity-
check matrix. Like in classical communication, the
small cycles may contribute to localized informa-
tion transmitted in decoding. Thus, a good parity-
check matrix generation algorithm should yield a
relatively large girth. Progressive edge-growth is
one of the most successful algorithms to generate
parity-check matrix eliminating small cycles (Hu
et al., 2005).
3. The third step is to decode with Bob’s key string
and the received syndrome. The brief-propagation
algorithm (Fossorier et al., 1999), which is also
known as the sum-product algorithm, is highly ef-
ficient in decoding.
The standard LDPC algorithm is only optimum at its
designed rate for the designed QBER. But the actual
QBER is fluctuating from round to round. The rate
compatible LDPC can solve this problem with punctur-
ing and shorting (Ha et al., 2006). The main technol-
ogy here is to select a mother code close to the target
rate, and then to adjust the code rate with puncturing.
The puncturing operation can be done multi-times, in or-
der to find a best code rate suitable for the actual error
rate. This method has been employed in QKD (Elkouss
et al., 2009; Martinez-Mateo et al., 2010). Besides ef-
ficiency, another important factor of error correction is
the throughput. The limitation for the Cascade code is
the highly interactive communications, and for LDPC is
the computational cost in iterative decoding. It was re-
ported the throughput with both the Cascade (Pedersen
and Toyran, 2013) and the LDPC (Dixon and Sato, 2014)
codes can be higher than 10 Mbps. Note that the com-
puting in decoding LDPC is always assisted with GPU
acceleration.
2. Error verification and authentication
Before error correction, Alice and Bob sample the
sifted key bits to roughly estimate the error rates. Then
they perform error correction. After error correction, Al-
ice and Bob can perform error verification to make sure
they share the same key (Lütkenhaus, 1999; Ma et al.,
2011). Then, the failure probability for error correction
is reflected in error verification step when finite data size
is considered. It is not hard to see that the two jobs,
error verification and message authentication, are very
similar. In both cases, Alice and Bob want to make sure
the bit strings on the two ends are the same. The only
difference is that authentication tag might reveal infor-
mation about the message, but error verification should
not. This difference can be overcome by encrypting the
tag, which has already been done in most of information-
theoretically secure authentication schemes. If we employ
the LFSR-based Toeplitz matrix construction, the rela-
tion between the tag length (the same as the key cost)
and the failure probability is given by
ε = n2−k+1, (32)
where n is the message length and k is the key cost.
After error correction and error verification, Alice and
Bob are almost sure that they have located all the errors.
Then, they can accurately count the number of bit errors
and hence the rate eb defined in Eq. (7). If Alice and Bob
choose not to encrypt error correction, they can count
the amount of classical communication used in the error
correction, kec. Then they perform addition amount of
privacy amplification. For example, in the ideal devices
case of Eq. (8) and infinite data limit, kec = nH(eb). The
final key output length is given by l = rn.
3. Privacy amplification
Practical privacy amplification turns out to be very
efficient in terms of finite data size effect, once the nec-
essary parameters, such as the phase error rates, are es-
timated as reviewed in Section II.D.2. Denote the error
corrected bit strings for Alice and Bob to be kA = kB
with a length of n and the output length to be l. In the
infinite key limit, l/n = r given in Eq. (21) if error correc-
tion is not encrypted. In the privacy amplification proce-
dure, Alice randomly chooses a universal hashing matrix
T ∈ {0, 1}l×n and sends it to Bob via a public classical
channel. The final key will be given by TkA = TkB , with
a small failure probability.
Privacy amplification works for general classes of
two-universal hash functions (Tomamichel et al., 2011).
In particular, the universal hashing function based on
Toeplitz matrices is widely used for privacy amplifica-
tion. An l × n Toeplitz matrix is a Boolean matrix with
the structure of
T =

a0 a−1 a−2 · · · a−n+1
a1 a0 a−1
. . .
a2 a1
. . .
...
...
. . .
al−1 · · · al−n

, (33)
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where ai ∈ {0, 1} for −n+1 ≤ i ≤ l−1. The Toeplitz ma-
trix can also be concisely written as T(i,j) = ai−j where
T(i,j) is the (i, j) element of T . Apparently, an l × n
Toeplitz matrix can be specified by N + K − 1 bits, as
opposed to N ×K bits for completely random matrices.
The main advantage of Toeplitz matrix hashing is that
the computational complexity for TkA is O(n log n) by
the fast fourier transform (FFT).
Following the security proofs reviewed in Section II.B,
the matrix T should be related to the phase error cor-
rection. In order to ensure the phase error correction to
commute with the final key measurement, we require the
null space of H to be capable of correcting the underlying
phase errors. For universal hashing functions, such error
correcting capability can be evaluated with certain fail-
ure probabilities. Details of derivation can be found in
Section X of (Fung et al., 2010). The failure probability
for privacy amplification with Toeplitz hashing is given
by,
εpa = 2
−tpa .
tpa = nr − l,
(34)
If Alice transmit the Toeplitz matrix to Bob, then she
needs to authenticate that communication as well, which
would add an extra term of Eq. (32) to εpa. Here in
privacy amplification, by sacrificing tpa extra bits in pri-
vacy amplification, one can obtain a failure probability
of 2−tpa . More general discussions for hash functions be-
sides Toeplitz hashing can be seen in (Tomamichel et al.,
2011).
Note that message authentication can be done more
efficiently by piling up classical communication data and
authenticate them at once. That is, the authentica-
tion terms listed in Table XIII can be done once with
one authenticated tag and one failure probability. The
main drawback of this saving data and authenticating
approach is that it might require lots of local data stor-
age. In QKD system design, it is normally preferred that
each procedure of postprocessing is isolated.
From the simulation results (Fung et al., 2010), we
learn that the failure probabilities for authentication, er-
ror verification, and privacy amplification are not the
main contributions to the total system one. In fact, the
one in phase error rate estimation, Eq. (23), is the domi-
nate term. The summation of failure probabilities evalu-
ated here can be converted to the trace-distance measure
in Eq. (5).
4. Finite-key length
When the failure probability of the postprocessing pro-
cedure is , the final key is
√
(2− )-secure in accordance
with the composable security definition given in Eq. (5).
Finally, by including the finite-data statistics for param-
eter estimation (see Sec. II.D.2) and the postprocessing
costs (see Table XIII), we have the finite-key length NR
for the finite-size security of QKD, which can be written
as (Fung et al., 2010),
NR ≥ l − kbs − kec − kev − kpa (35)
with a failure probability of
ε ≤ εbs + εev + εph + εpa (36)
where l is given by,
l = nx[1−H(ebz + θz)] + nz[1−H(ebx + θx)], (37)
where the variables can be found in Table XII.
Notice that one can also utilize the smooth min-
entropy approach to obtain the finite-key length (Ren-
ner, 2008; Scarani and Renner, 2008) or the tight
bounds (Tomamichel et al., 2012). Note that for QKD
systems with realistic devices, the finite-key length is
slightly complicated, we refer to (Lim et al., 2014) for
decoy-state QKD, (Curty et al., 2014) for measurement-
device-independent QKD, (Lorenzo et al., 2019) for twin-
field QKD, (Arnon-Friedman et al., 2018) for device-
independent QKD and (Furrer et al., 2012; Leverrier
et al., 2013) for continuous-variable QKD.
IV. QUANTUM HACKING
In theory, it is traditional to divide Eve’s hacking strat-
egy to three main classes: individual, collective and co-
herent (or general) attack. Individual attack means that
Eve interacts with each secure qubit in the channel sep-
arately and independently; Collective attack means that
Eve prepares independent ancilla, interacts each qubit
independently, but can perform a joint measurement on
all the ancilla; Coherent attack means that Eve can pre-
pare an arbitrary joint (entangled) state of the ancilla,
which then interact with the qubits in the channel be-
fore being measured jointly. The last one does not limit
Eve’s capabilities beyond what is physically possible.
Any QKD system aiming to implement an informational-
theoretically secure protocol therefore has to be proven
secure against coherent attacks. Another aspect which
cannot be neglected is security in a finite size scenario.
No key transmission session can be endless and the re-
sulting statistical fluctuations have to be taken into ac-
count (Scarani et al., 2009).
In this section, different from the theory attacks, we
focus on the practical attacks which exploit the device
imperfections in QKD systems. Specifically, Eve may try
to exploit the imperfections in real QKD systems and
launch the so-called quantum hacking not covered by the
original security proofs. Researchers have demonstrated
several quantum hacking attacks in practical QKD sys-
tems. An earlier review on quantum hacking attacks can
be seen in (Jain et al., 2016). Here we will provide a
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review for the quantum attacks to both the source and
the detection. The detection attacks are similar to those
reviewed in (Jain et al., 2016), but we provide more de-
tails for the attacks at source which exploit the multiple
photons, timing or phase information of the laser source.
Also, some new attacks after (Jain et al., 2016) will also
be mentioned. Table I summarizes a list of the attacks
developed from early 2000 to the present.
A. Attacks at source
In the standard QKD scheme, it is assumed that Al-
ice (state preparation) is placed in a protected labora-
tory and she prepares the required quantum state cor-
rectly. Unfortunately, imperfect state preparation may
leak information about the secret key. Indeed, practical
preparation may introduce some errors due to imperfect
devices or Eve’s disturbance (Brassard et al., 2000; Fung
et al., 2007; Lütkenhaus, 2000; Sun et al., 2012, 2015;
Tang et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2010). To steal the infor-
mation about the states, Eve can also actively perform
the Trojan-horse attack (Gisin et al., 2006; Jain et al.,
2014, 2015) on intensity modulators and phase modula-
tors. This section will review some examples of attacks
at source.
1. Photon-number-splitting attack
The first well known kind of hacking strategy that
was considered is the photon-number-splitting (PNS) at-
tack (Brassard et al., 2000; Lütkenhaus, 2000) aiming
at the imperfect photon source. As described in sec-
tion III.B, because of technological challenge, weak co-
herent pulses (WCPs) generated by a highly attenuated
laser are widely used in QKD implementations. Since
the photon number of a phase-randomized WCP follows
the Poisson distribution (Eq. (26)), there is a non-zero
probability for multiple-photon pulses, i.e., those pulses
containing two or more photons. Consequently, Eve may
exploit the multiple-photon pulses and launch the PNS
attack. In this attack, for each WCP, Eve first utilizes
a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement to ob-
tain the photon number information. Conditioned on
the QND measurement result, Eve either blocks the one-
photon pulse or splits the multiple-photon pulse into two.
She stores one part of the multiple-photon pulse and
sends the other part to Bob. Later on, during the basis-
reconciliation process of the BB84 protocol, Eve can get
the secret key information for the multiple-photon pulse
without introducing any errors. By doing so, Alice and
Bob could not notice Eve’s attack.
The PNS attack restricts the secure transmission dis-
tance of QKD typically below 30 km (Gottesman et al.,
2004). Actually, in early 2000s, there were not many
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FIG. 7 Phase-remapping attack (Xu et al., 2010). a, Di-
agram of phase modulation signal. t0 is the original time
location where the signal pulse is properly modulated to have
phase φ0. Eve can time-shift the signal pulse from t0 to t1,
where the pulse will undergo a new modulated phase φ1. b,
Implementation of the phase-remapping attack in a commer-
cial IDQ QKD system. Original QKD system: LD, laser
diode. Det1/Det2, single photon detector; PMB/PMA, phase
modulator; C, circulator. PBS, polarization beam splitter;
FM, Faraday mirror; CD, classical detector; DL, delay line.
Eve’s modifications: VODL, variable optical delay line; PC,
polarization controller. [Figure reproduced from (Xu et al.,
2010)].
research groups working on QKD experiments (Gobby
et al., 2004; Hughes et al., 2000; Ribordy et al., 2000).
Researchers in the field had a doubt on the future of
QKD, and they generally thought that QKD may be im-
practical with WCP source. This concern severely limits
the development of QKD at that time. Fortunately, the
discovery of the decoy state method perfectly resolved
the problem of PNS attack and made QKD practical
with standard WCP (Hwang, 2003; Lo et al., 2005; Wang,
2005). More details on the decoy state method will be
discussed in section V.
2. Phase-remapping attack
Phase modulators are commonly used to encode ran-
dom bits in the source of phase-coding QKD sys-
tems (Gisin et al., 2002). In practice, a phase modu-
lator has finite response time, as shown in Fig. 7a. Ide-
ally, the pulse passes through the phase modulator in the
middle of the modulation signal and undergoes a proper
modulation (time t0 in Fig. 7a). However, if Eve can
change the arrival time of the pulse, then the pulse will
pass through the phase modulator at a different time
(time t1 in Fig. 7a), and the encoded phase will be differ-
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ent. This phase-remapping process allows Eve to launch
an intercept-and-resend attack, i.e., phase-remapping at-
tack (Fung et al., 2007). The phase-remapping attack is
a particular threat for the bidirectional QKD schemes,
such as the plug-and-play QKD structure (Stucki et al.,
2002).
In 2010, the phase-remapping attack was success-
fully demonstrated in a commercial ID-500 plug-and-play
QKD system (manufactured by ID Quantique15) (Xu
et al., 2010), as shown in Fig. 7b. In this experiment,
Eve utilized the same setup as Bob to launch her attack.
Eve modified the length of the short arm of her Mach-
Zehnder interferometer by adding a variable optical delay
line (VODL in Fig. 7b) to shift the time delay between
the reference pulse and the signal pulse. To remap the
phase small enough into the low QBER range, Eve shifted
the forward signal pulse out and only the backward signal
pulse in the phase modulation range by using VODL, and
properly aligned the polarization direction of the back-
ward signal pulse orthogonal to the principal axis of the
phase modulator by using a polarization controller (PC
in Fig. 7b). The experiment demonstrated that Eve could
get full information and only introduce a QBER of 19.7%,
which is much lower than the well-known 25% error rate
for an intercept-and-resend attack in BB84.
3. Nonrandom-phase attack
Phase randomization is a basic assumption in most se-
curity proofs of QKD (Gottesman et al., 2004; Hwang,
2003; Lo et al., 2005; Wang, 2005). Although the security
of QKD with non-random phase had been proven (Lo and
Preskill, 2007), the performance is very limited in dis-
tance and key rate. By assuming that the overall phase is
uniformly distributed in [0, 2pi], a coherent state with in-
tensity can be reduced into a classical mixture of photon
number states, i.e., Eq. (26). This can greatly simplify
the security proofs and allow one to apply classical statis-
tics theory to analyze quantum mechanics. In practice,
however, the phase randomization assumption may be vi-
olated in practice, thus resulting in various attacks (Sun
et al., 2012, 2015; Tang et al., 2013).
The first example is the USD attack demonstrated
in (Tang et al., 2013). When the phase of WCPs is not
properly randomized, the quantum state will be a pure
state. Then in decoy state QKD (Hwang, 2003; Lo et al.,
2005; Wang, 2005), it is possible for Eve to distinguish
the signal state and decoy state with an unambiguous
state discrimination (USD) measurement. Hence, Eve
first measures each of Alice’s WCPs to distinguish be-
tween signal state and decoy state by performing a USD
15 https://www.idquantique.com/
measurement, which is combined with positive operator-
valued measurement (POVM) operators without disturb-
ing the quantum state sent by Alice. After the USD, Eve
performs the PNS attack. Since Eve knows which state
the pulse belongs to (signal or decoy), she could do dif-
ferent strategies for signal state and decoy state. As a
result, the key assumption in decoy state QKD (Lo et al.,
2005) – a decoy state and a signal state have the same
characteristics – is violated.
The second example is the laser seed-control attack
which was proposed and demonstrated in (Sun et al.,
2015). Semiconductor laser diode (SLD) is normally used
as a single-photon source in most commercial and re-
search QKD systems. In the interdriven mode, the semi-
conductor medium of the SLD is excited from loss to
gain by each driving current pulse. A laser pulse is gen-
erated from seed photons originating from spontaneous
emission. The phase of the laser pulse is determined by
the seed photons. Since the phase of the seed photons
is random, the phase of each laser pulse is random in-
herently. However, if a certain number of photons are
injected from an external source into the semiconductor
medium, these photons will also be amplified to generate
laser pulses. Consequently, the seed photons consist of
two parts: one from spontaneous emission and the other
part from the external source. Both parts will affect the
phase of the resulting laser pulse. If the injected pho-
tons greatly outnumber the photons from spontaneous
emission, the phase of the output laser pulse is largely
determined by the phase of the injected photons. There-
fore, Eve can control the phase of Alice’s signal laser
by illuminating the SLD from an external control source
and successfully violate the phase randomization assump-
tion (Gottesman et al., 2004).
B. Attacks at detection
The detection component is much more vulnerable to
quantum hacking attacks than the source. Since Eve con-
trols the channel and can send any signals (e.g strong op-
tical pulses combined with X-ray and neutrinos) to Bob
and Bob has no choice but to receive Eve’s signal and any
filters used by Bob may be imperfect, it may be hard for
Bob to isolate his lab and avoid side channels or detector
control from/by Eve. For instance, a significant num-
ber of attacks have been proposed to hack single-photon
detectors (SPDs)16 (Gerhardt et al., 2011a,b; Lydersen
et al., 2010; Makarov, 2009; Sauge et al., 2011; Wiechers
16 The vulnerabilities of SPDs are mainly due to their complex
working mechanism: the detection is affected by incoming light
and the control electronic circuits. Therefore, Eve can manipu-
late the intensity, the time, or the wavelength of incoming light
to control the responses of SPDs.
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et al., 2011). SPDs are regarded as the “Achilles heel" of
QKD by C. H. Bennett17. This section will review some
examples of attacks at detection. The first two examples,
double-click attack and fake-state attack, were proposed
only in theory. The last two examples, time-shift attack
and detector-blinding attack, were successfully demon-
strated in experiment.
1. Double-click attack
Since QKD systems require the detection of two differ-
ent bit values, bit 0 and bit 1, they require at least two
SPDs. The double-click event refers to the case where
both SPDs detect signals. The double-click event will in-
troduce a QBER of 50% when either one of the two bits
is selected. A naive strategy is to determine double-click
events as abnormal events and discards these events so
as to minimize the QBER. However, this strategy results
in the problem of double-click attack. In this attack, Eve
simply floods Bob’s polarization beam splitter with mul-
tiple photons or a strong pulse of the same polarization.
Then, when Bob makes a measurement using a conjugate
basis different from that of Eve, a double-click event oc-
curs and it is discarded; when the receiver makes a mea-
surement using the same basis as Eve’s, a normal event
is detected. Consequently, Alice and Bob finally share
the same information with Eve. To solve this problem,
Lütkenhaus has proposed that double-click events are not
discarded and bit 0 or bit 1 is randomly allocated by Bob
whenever a double-click event occurs (Lütkenhaus, 1999;
Lütkenhaus, 2000).
2. Fake-state attack
In 2005, Makarov et al. proposed a faked-state at-
tack, which exploits the efficiency mismatch of two de-
tectors in a practical QKD system (Makarov et al., 2006;
Makarov and Hjelme, 2005). In practice, the standard
SPDs such as Si/InGaAs APDs are often operated in a
gated mode. Therefore, the detection efficiency of each
detector is time-dependent. Since QKD systems require
the detection of two different bit values, 0 and 1, they of-
ten employ at least two SPDs. It is inevitable that finite
manufacturing precision in the detector and the electron-
ics, and difference in optical path length will slightly mis-
align the two detector gates, and cause detector-efficiency
mismatch. This is illustrated in Fig. 8a. At the expected
arrival time T, the detection efficiencies of the two de-
tectors are identical. However, if the signal is chosen to
17 C. H. Bennett, “Let Eve do the heavy lifting,
while John and Won-Young keep her honest,”
http://dabacon.org/pontiff/?p=5340
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FIG. 8 Schematic of detection efficiency mismatch (Makarov
et al., 2006) and time-shift attack (Qi et al., 2007a; Zhao
et al., 2008). a, SPD, single-photon detector. At the expected
arrival time T, the detection efficiencies of SPD0, η0, for the
event of bit 0, and SPD1, η1, for the event of bit 1 are the
same. However, at time t1, SPD0 is more sensitive to the
incoming photon than SPD1, while at time t2, SPD1 is more
sensitive to the incoming photon than SPD0. b, Real detector
efficiencies of the two SPDs characterized on a commercial
QKD system (manufactured by IDQ) by Zhao et al. (Zhao
et al., 2008). [Fig.b reproduced from (Zhao et al., 2008)].
arrive at some unexpected times (such as t1 and t2 in
Fig. 8a), it is possible that the detector efficiencies of the
two detectors, η0 and η1, differ greatly. This problem
often exists in practical QKD systems, and it will leave
a back door for Eve to attack the system.
The faked-state attack is an intercept-and-resend at-
tack. For each signal, Eve randomly chooses one of the
two BB84 basis to perform a measurement and obtain
a measurement result. Then, she re-sends the opposite
bit value from her measurement result in the opposite
basis, at a time when the detector for the opposite bit
has a lower detection efficiency than the other detector.
As analyzed in (Makarov et al., 2006), Eve introduces
less than 11% QBER if the detection efficiency η ≤6.6%.
The faked-state attack, while conceptually interesting, is
hard to implement in a real-life QKD system. This is be-
cause it is an intercept-resend attack and as such involves
finite detection efficiency in Eve’s detectors and precise
synchronization between Eve and Alice-Bob’s system. A
typical countermeasure against detector efficiency mis-
match is the four-state QKD protocol (Makarov et al.,
2006).
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3. Time-shift attack
Motivated by the faked-state attack, in 2007, Qi et al.
(Qi et al., 2007a) proposed the time-shift attack. This is
also based on the detection-efficiency mismatch for gated
SPDs in the time domain, but is much easier to imple-
ment. Let us suppose Fig. 8a illustrates the detection
efficiencies of the two gated SPDs in a real-life QKD sys-
tem. Eve can simply shift the arrival time of each pulse
sent from Alice by employing a variable optical delay
line. For example, Eve randomly shifts the pulse from
Alice to arrive at t1 or t2 through a shorter path or a
longer path of optical line. This shifting process can par-
tially reveal the bit value of Bob: if the pulse arrives
at t1 (or t2) and Bob announces receipt, the bit value
is more likely to be 0 (1). Moreover, Eve can carefully
set how many bits should be shifted forward and how
many should be shifted backward to ensure that the dis-
tribution of bit 0 and bit 1 received by Bob is balanced.
Hence, the time-shift attack does not make any measure-
ment on the quantum state, and quantum information is
not destroyed.
Since Eve does not need to make any measurement
or state preparation, the time-shift attack is practically
feasible with current technology. In 2008, it has been
successfully implemented on a commercial QKD system
by Zhao et al. (Zhao et al., 2008) as shown in Fig. 8b.
This is one of the first successful demonstrations of quan-
tum hacking on a widely-used commercial QKD sys-
tem. In their experiment (Zhao et al., 2008), Eve got an
information-theoretical advantage in around 4% of her
attempts. The successful implementation of the quan-
tum attack shows that a practical QKD system has non-
negligible probability to be vulnerable to the time-shift
attack.
4. Detector-control attack
The detector-control attack is the most powerful at-
tack and it has been successfully demonstrated on several
types of practical QKD systems (Lydersen et al., 2010;
Makarov, 2009). In general, the detector-control attacks
can be divided into three categories: (i) detector-blinding
attack (Huang et al., 2016a; Lydersen et al., 2011a, 2010;
Makarov, 2009), where Eve illuminates bright light to
control detectors; (ii) detector-after-gate attack (Wiech-
ers et al., 2011), where Eve just sends multi-photon pulses
at the position after the detector gate; (iii) detector-
superlinear attack (Lydersen et al., 2011b; Qian et al.,
2018), where Eve exploits the superlinear response of
single-photon detectors during the rising edge of the gate.
Most available SPDs are InGaAs/InP APDs operat-
ing in a Geiger mode (Hadfield, 2009), in which they are
sensitive to a single photon. The working principle of
this type of APDs is shown in Fig. 9a. In the detector
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FIG. 9 Schematic illustration of the detector blinding at-
tack (Lydersen et al., 2010). a, Linear-mode and Geiger-mode
APD operation. When the APD is reverse-biased above its
breakdown voltage Vbr, a single photon can cause a large cur-
rent IAPD to flow, and register this as photon detection (a
‘click’). After that, an external circuit quenches the avalanche
by lowering the bias voltage below Vbr, and then the APD
goes into a linear mode. In the linear mode, IAPD is propor-
tional to the incident bright optical power Popt. b, Eve sends
Bob a tailored light pulse that produces a ‘click’ in one of
his detector only when Bob uses the same measurement basis
as Eve. Otherwise, no detector ‘clicks’. [Figure reproduced
from (Lydersen et al., 2010)].
blinding attack, by sending a strong light to Bob, Eve
can force Bob’s SPDs to work in a Linear mode instead
of Geiger mode, as shown in Fig. 9a. In the Linear mode,
the SPD, such as the one based on InGaAs APD, is only
sensitive to bright illumination. This detector operation
mode is called “detector blinding". After blinding the
detectors, Eve sends a bright pulse with tailored optical
power such that Bob’s detector always reports a detection
event from the bright pulse, but never reports a detection
event from a pulse with half power. This is illustrated
in Fig. 9b. Consequently, Eve can successfully launch an
intercept-and-resend attack without increasing QBERs.
For example, when Eve uses the same basis as Bob to
measure the quantum state from Alice, Bob gets a detec-
tion event as if there were no eavesdropper. But if Eve
uses the opposite basis from Bob to measure the quan-
tum state from Alice, her bright pulse will strike each
of Bob’s detectors with half power, and neither detec-
tor will report a detection event. In practice, a simple
detector blinding attack will introduces a 50% total loss.
However, Eve can place her intercept-unit close to Alice’s
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laboratory while compensating the loss in the remaining
fiber by re-sending brighter states.
The detector-control attack is applicable to various
types of SPDs, such as gated APDs (Huang et al., 2016a;
Lydersen et al., 2010), passively or actively quenched
APDs (Makarov, 2009; Sauge et al., 2011), supercon-
ducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) (Ly-
dersen et al., 2011a), and so forth. A full field imple-
mentation of the attacking strategy has been investi-
gated in (Gerhardt et al., 2011a). The blinding attack
was also demonstrated to fake the violation of Bell’s in-
equality (Gerhardt et al., 2011b). How to remove the
detector-control attacks is a challenge in the field of
QKD. One proposed countermeasure is carefully operat-
ing the single-photon detectors inside Bob’s system and
monitoring the photocurrent for anomalously high val-
ues (Yuan et al., 2010, 2011). This work also highlights
that mis-operation of QKD devices allows the loophole to
be exploited, which is related to the best-practice criteria
for all QKD devices in QKD implementations (Koehler-
Sidki et al., 2018). Recently, Qian et al. propose another
countermeasure against the detector-control attacks by
introducing a variable attenuator in front of the detec-
tor (Qian et al., 2019). However, these countermeasures
may seem ad hoc and lead away from provable security
models of QKD and can often be defeated by advanced
hacking technologies. A practical and promising solution
is the MDI-QKD protocol, which will be reviewed in sec-
tion VI.B.
C. Other attacks
for performing the attack in all these works is (in the vicinity 
of) 1550 nm, the standard telecom wavelength which is also 
employed by Alice and Bob for their communication. The 
feasibility and constraints of launching Trojan-horse attacks at 
different wavelengths have not been explored, especially from 
an experimental perspective. Such a study is crucial for a 
comprehensive analysis of the threat of these attacks and 
(re)design of suitable prevention mechanisms and 
countermeasures. 
In this paper, we analyze the spectral behaviour of a variety 
of optical devices relevant to QKD, ranging from some single 
passive components to a complete QKD subsystem. In all 
these investigations, we also carefully assess the associated 
security risks from Trojan-horse attacks. The paper is 
organized as follows: in section II, we discuss a few concepts 
and ideas that define the Trojan-horse attack and also form the 
basis of its success or failure. In section III, we present the 
results of our experimental investigation into the spectral 
behaviour of two frequently-used components in practical 
QKD systems: a circulator and an isolator. Note that the latter 
is actually even a well-known countermeasure against Trojan-
horse attacks on one-way QKD systems [23, 24]. We then 
describe some simple spectral measurements that were 
performed on the receiver system in Clavis2 (Bob), in the 
quest of improving the attack presented in Ref. [21]. In 
particular, we also show the results of our estimation of the 
spectral sensitivity of single-photon avalanche diodes 
(SPADs) in the 1700 - 1800 nm range. These SPADs are used 
by Bob to detect the quantum signals from Alice. In section IV 
and V, we sum up our work, provide an outlook, and finally 
discuss some countermeasures.  
II. BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDEAS
As illustrated in Fig.1, back-reflections that carry 
information of the applied bases are measured by Eve, for 
instance using state discrimination methods [29], as and when 
they return to the attack apparatus. If Eve could indeed do this 
entire operation without alerting Alice and Bob, she could 
break the security of any prepare-and-measure protocol 
(including both discrete and continuous variable protocols) [1, 
30-32, 35]. However, as mentioned before, such vulnerability 
has been known [23, 24] for some time.  
Two common practical measures to prevent or catch 
Trojan-horse attacks in action are to add an isolator or install a 
‘watchdog’ detector, respectively, at the entrance of the Alice 
subsystem. While an ideal isolator would passively torpedo 
any Trojan-horse attack by a complete extinction of Eve’s 
pulses – no matter how bright – dispatched into Alice, an ideal 
watchdog or monitoring detector would actively raise an alarm 
whenever any unknown or non-designated optical signals 
arrive into Alice. 
However, while practical isolators have only a finite 
isolation, which may even be lower at wavelengths that are 
outside the ‘design’ wavelength bands, practical monitoring 
detectors have a vanishing responsivity outside a finite 
spectral range. In other words, there may exist a wavelength, 
or a set of wavelengths, at which an isolator can only partially 
stop a Trojan-horse pulse, or the response of the monitoring 
system is not sufficient to trigger the alarm. Additionally, if 
the back-reflection levels from one or more optical interfaces 
inside the QKD system at such wavelengths are also high, the 
risk of a successful Trojan-horse attack is naturally escalated. 
In the subsections below, we elaborate this risk further using 
some simple examples. 
A. Back-reflections and Eve’s photon budget 
In a Trojan-horse attack, Eve’s light goes back and forth 
through the attacked subsystem. Moreover, at least one of the 
onward Trojan-horse pulse or the back-reflected pulse must 
probe or pass through the basis selector, e.g., a phase 
modulator [21]. The onward and reverse paths (which may not 
be the same necessarily [19]) decide the insertion loss, and 
together with the back-reflection level, determine the total 
attenuation suffered by Eve’s pulse in the double pass. With 
the knowledge of these values, Eve can estimate the number of 
photons to expect on average (Eve), in the back-reflected pulse
of interest as it travels to her on the quantum channel. 
In the following, we explain the concept of Eve’s photon 
budget by means of a numerical example. We assume the 
attack wavelength to be λ ~ 1550 nm, a binary basis choice, 
and that Eve   4 suffices for accurately knowing the probed
choice of the basis. We also assume the source of the back-
reflection of interest to be an open fiber-optic interface, e.g., 
the glass-air interface of an unused port of a fiber coupler. 
This has actually been used for attacking a continuous variable 
QKD system [19]. For standard optical fiber components, a 
Fresnel reflection of around 4% (reflectivity ℛ  − 14 dB) is
obtained from such an interface. Let us assume that this 
coupler is located inside Alice (of a generic QKD system) in 
such a manner that the total insertion loss from the quantum 
channel to this coupler and back is 𝐼𝐿  − 46 dB. Given this,
the total attenuation suffered by Eve’s light can be calculated 
as ℛ + 𝐼𝐿  − 60 dB. Eve’s Trojan-horse pulse needs to have
FIG. 10 Schematic illustration of the Trojan-horse at-
tack (Jain et al., 2015). Eve attacks Alice by sending bright
Trojan-horse pulses to know Alice’s selected basis informa-
tion. This information is carried by the back-reflected pulses
coming out of Alice. [Figure reproduced from (Jain et al.,
2015)].
Another well-know hacking strategy is the Trojan-
horse attack (THA), as shown i Fig. 10, in which Eve
sends a prob li ht to Alice or Bob and reads their in-
formation from the backscattered probe light. In 2001,
Vakhitov et al. proposed the large pulse attack (Vakhi-
tov et al., 2001) and Kurtsiefer et al. analyzed the pos-
sibility of THA by detecting the detector fluorescence of
Si-based avalanche photodiodes (Kurtsiefer et al., 2001).
Gisin et al. studied the problem of THA in the QKD
implementations where light goes two ways (Gisin et al.,
2006). Later, Jain et al. performed a comprehensive
analysis of the risk of THA against typical components
in standard QKD systems (Jain et al., 2014, 2015). Re-
cently, the backflash photons caused by detection events
in single-photon detectors was exploited to realize the
detector-backflash attack (Pinheiro et al., 2018). A coun-
termeasure against the THA is to add proper isolations
and consider the leaking information in privacy amplifi-
cation, which will be reviewed in Section V.C.
Besides the above attacks, Lamas-Linares and Kurt-
siefer demonstrated that the timing information revealed
during public communicating can be exploited to attack
the entanglement-based QKD system (Lamas-Linares
and Kurtsiefer, 2007). In two-way QKD system such as
the “plug-and-play" structure, Sun et al. studied the im-
perfections of Faraday mirror and proposed the Faraday-
mirror attack (Sun et al., 2011); Jain et al. experimen-
tally demonstrated that the calibration routine of a com-
mercial “plug-and-play" system can be tricked into set-
ting a large detector efficiency mismatch, and proposed
an attack strategy on such a compromised system with
a QBER less than 7% (Jain et al., 2011). Moreover,
Li et al. (Li et al., 2011) studied the imperfection of a
practical beam splitter and demonstrated a wavelength-
dependent beam-splitter attack on top of a polarization-
coding QKD system. The detector dead-time issue was
widely studied in (Rogers et al., 2007) and demonstrated
in (Hen ing et al., 2011). Andun et al. an Makarov
et al. demonstrated the laser damage attack by using
a high-power laser to damage the SPDs (Bugge et al.,
2014; Makarov et al., 2016). Recently, Huang et al. show
that the decoy states can be distinguishable if they were
generated by modul ting the pump current of a semi-
conductor laser diod (Huang et al., 2018), and Wei et
al. exploited the efficiency mismatch in the polarization
degree of freedom to hack SNSPD (Wei et al., 2019a).
Most of the imperfections reviewed so far are in fiber-
based QKD systems. There are als quantum attacks re-
ported for free-space QKD systems (Chaiwongkhot et al.,
2019; Nauerth et al., 2009; Sajeed et al., 2015a). For in-
stance, imperfect encoding methods result in side chan-
nels from which encoded states are partially distinguish-
able (Nauerth et al., 2009). The imperfection due to
non-single-mode quantum signals is a crucial issue in free-
space QKD. Eve can exploit this imp rfecti n and launch
the spatial-mode attack against a free-space QKD sys-
tem. This problem has been carefully studied in (Chai-
wongkhot et al., 2019; Sajeed et al., 2015a), following
an earlier discussion on the origins of detection efficiency
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mismatch in (Fung et al., 2009). Besides DV-QKD, the
practical security of CV-QKD also deserves future inves-
tigations, which will be reviewed in Section VII.C.
More generally, as noted in (Curty and Lo, 2019), in
principle, there are simply too many side channels for
Alice and Bob to close. This is because Eve might , in
principle, attack Alice’s and Bob’s system via X-ray, neu-
trons, neutrinos or even gravitational waves. And, what-
ever detection systems Alice and Bob have will proba-
bly have limited ranges of responses. Moreover, classi-
cal post-processing units pose a serious threat to the se-
curity of QKD. Most QKD security framework assumes
without proofs that classical post processing units are se-
cure. However, in conventional security, it is well known
that hardware Trojans and software Trojans are com-
monly used to compromise the security of conventional
cryptographic system. It was proposed in (Curty and
Lo, 2019) to use redundancies in QKD units and classi-
cal post-processing units to achieve security through e.g.,
verifiable secret sharing.
V. SOURCE SECURITY
In this section, we review various approaches to re-
solve the security issues of practical sources. On one
hand, the imperfections in quantum state preparation,
including multi-photon components of laser, nonrandom-
ized phases, encoding flaws and so forth, need to be care-
fully quantified and taken into account in security anal-
ysis. In particular, we will discuss the decoy state QKD
protocol in more details. On the other hand, practical
countermeasures are required to prevent the Trojan horse
attacks on the source. Note that we focus on the BB84
protocol, but most of techniques can be extended to other
protocols.
A. Decoy-state method
Decoy-state method is a common way to combat with
source imperfection by introducing extra sources for bet-
ter channal characterization. In the decoy-state method,
the user randomly modify the source states during the
quantum stage; after that, he reveal which state is used
in each turn. Eve cannot modify her attack to different
source states, but in the postprocessing the users can es-
timate their parameters conditioned on that knowledge.
The decoy-state method is used mostly to bound the
multi-photon components in a practical photon source.
In practical photon sources, multi-photon components
are inevitable. As reviewed in Section IV.A.1, Eve can
split a multi-photon pulse and save one photon from it for
later hacking. Since Alice and Bob cannot tell whether
a detection comes from a single-photon component or
multi-photon component and Eve controls the channel,
they have to pessimistically assume all the multi-photon
states cause clicks with 100% efficiency. All the losses
come from the single-photon states. In order to reduce
the effects of multi-photon components, Alice has to use
very low intensity optical pulses. In the case of coherent
state photon source, it has been shown that the optimal
intensity used is close to the channel transmittance η
(Lütkenhaus, 2000; Ma, 2006),
µopt ≈ η, (38)
where η includes channel transmission and detection effi-
ciency. Then, final key rate will quadratically depend on
the transmittance η, R = O(η2).
Various protocols (Hwang, 2003; Inoue et al., 2002;
Scarani et al., 2004) have been proposed to over the key
rate limit caused by the PNS attacks, among which the
most effective one is the decoy state method (Hwang,
2003; Lo et al., 2005; Wang, 2005). In the decoy-state
QKD scheme, instead of using one intensity for encoding,
Alice employs a few additional intensities of optical pulses
(as decoy states) in order to monitor the transmittance
of different photon number components. After Bob de-
tects the signals, Alice announces the intensities she uses
for each pulse. With detection rate for decoy states, Al-
ice and Bob can bound tightly the number of detections
from single-photon components. If Eve simply changes
the transmittance for different photon number states as
adopting in the PNS attacks, she will inevitably change
the detection rates for signal and decoy states differently.
Without Alice’s intensity information ahead, Eve has to
let a significant amount of single-photon states passing
in order to maintain the ratio of detection rates among
signal and decoy states. The decoy state idea was first
proposed by Hwang (Hwang, 2003) who considered using
a strong decoy signal with intensity around 2 photons as
a decoy state.
The security proof of the decoy-state method is given
later in (Lo et al., 2005), where a photon number channel
model (Ma, 2008) is employed. With an infinite number
of decoy state, Alice and Bob can estimate the detections
from all photon number components accurately. After
adopting the GLLP security analysis, reviewed in Sec-
tion II.D.1, one can show that the optimal intensity of
optical pulses can be increased to O(1), which results in
a key rate having a linear dependence of transmittance,
O(η) (Lo et al., 2005). The decoy-state method signifi-
cantly booming the performance of practical QKD. The
schematic diagram of the decoy-state method is shown in
Fig. 11.
In the meantime, practical decoy-state methods with
only a vacuum and weak decoy states were proposed (Hoi-
Kwong Lo, 2004; Ma, 2004) and tight bounds were de-
rived later (Ma et al., 2005; Wang, 2005). In the origi-
nal security proof, continuous phase randomization is as-
sume to decohere phases between different photon num-
ber components. As discussed later in Section V.B.2,
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phase randomization is necessary but can be relaxed to
discrete phase randomization (Cao et al., 2015). In fact,
the uniformly discrete phase randomization with discrete
phase numberm = 10 can already achieve a good approx-
imation of continuous phase randomization.
1. Theory
For the source with different photon number com-
ponents, one can assume a photon number channel
model (Ma, 2008). The decoy state method is a to-
mography to the photon number channel model, provid-
ing tighter estimations on single photon component (Lo
et al., 2005). In the decoy state method, the source is op-
erated at different photon number distributions, leading
to different measurement outcome statistics. The com-
munication partners can estimate the channel parameters
of yield Yn and QBER en for each photon number com-
ponent. One crucial assumption in the decoy-state QKD
is that the signal state and decoy states are identical ex-
cept for their average photon numbers. This means after
Eve’s photon-number measurement, she has no way of
telling whether the resulted photon number state is orig-
inated from the signal state or decoy states. Hence, the
yield Yn and QBER en can depend on only the photon
number, n, but not which distribution (decoy or signal)
the state is from. That is,
Yn(signal) = Yn(decoy),
en(signal) = en(decoy).
(39)
The implementations of decoy state method can be di-
vided into active ones and passive ones. In the active
decoy state method, the user perpares the source signals
with different intensities to change the probability distri-
butions of each photon number component. A simple so-
lution for decoy state preparation, as shown in Fig. 11, is
to use an amplitude modulator (AM) to modulate the in-
tensities of each WCP to the desired intensity level. This
is indeed the implementations reported in most of decoy
state QKD experiments. Another solution for decoy state
implementation is to use multiple laser diodes of differ-
ent intensities to generate different states (Peng et al.,
2007). In the passive decoy state method, heralded sin-
gle photon source are often applied (Adachi et al., 2007;
Ma and Lo, 2008; Mauerer and Silberhorn, 2007). The
probability distribution is changed by observing different
measurement outcomes of the heralded photons.
A popular source for decoy state method is the phase-
randomized weak coherent state source, as shown in
Eq. (26). To apply the active decoy method, Alice ran-
domly adjusts the intensity µ of the coherent state, which
is related to different Poisson distribution Pµ(n). Alice
estimates the single photon yield Y1 and error e1 by solv-
ing the equation provided by the observed gain Qµ and
quantum bit error rate (QBER) Eµ related to different
intensity µ
Qµ =
∞∑
n=0
Pµ(n)Yn,
EµQµ =
∞∑
n=0
Pµ(n)enYn,
(40)
where Pµ(n) = µne−µ/n! for the coherent state case.
Following the GLLP security analysis, Eq. (20), the
key rate is given by
R ≥ −QµH(Eµ) +Q1[1−H(e1)], (41)
where Q1 = Y1µe−µ. Here, the gain Qµ and QBER Eµ
can be directly obtained from experiment, and the signal
intensity µ is set by Alice. With a tight estimation on
Y1 and e1 by solving the linear equations in the form of
Eq. (40), the key rate can be improved from O(η2) to
O(η).
In practice, only several different intensities are enough
to make an accurate estimation. The most popular prac-
tical decoy state method is vacuum and weak decoy state
method (Hoi-Kwong Lo, 2004; Ma, 2004). That is, Alice
randomly generates coherent states with three different
intensities {0, ν, µ}, where states with intensity µ is the
signal states for key generation, and states with intensity
ν < µ and vacuum state with intensity 0 is for parame-
ter estimation. The two parameters need to estimate in
Eq. (41) can be bounded by (Ma et al., 2005),
Y1 ≥ Y L1 =
µ
µν − ν2
(
Qνe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
Y0
)
e1 ≤ eU1 =
EνQνe
ν − e0Y0
Y L1 ν
.
(42)
A similar result is also derived in (Wang, 2005).
For finite-data size effect, Ma et al. took the first step
to analyze the statistical fluctuations using standard er-
ror analysis, which essentially assumes i.i.d. channel be-
havior (Ma et al., 2005). The idea is that instead of
directly using Qµ and Eµ obtained from the experiment
directly, one assumes these parameters fluctuates accord-
ing to a normal distribution. Then, in Eq. (42), one can
substitute the upper and lower bounds of Qµ and Eµ.
The failure probability for this estimation would link to
the number of standard deviations used for bounds.
The finite data size effect has been discussed in a more
rigorous manner in (Lim et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2017).
It turns out that the formulas used in the standard er-
ror analysis approach (Ma et al., 2005) can be directly
applied with a different value of failure probabilities in
parameter estimation, as presented in Table XIV.
Other than weak coherent state photon sources, one
can also use PDC source or thermal source, as reviewed in
Section III.B. As long as the photon number distribution
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FIG. 11 Schematic diagram of decoy-state QKD. In a decoy-state BB84 transmitter, the optical pulses are normally generated
with phase-randomized laser pulses. Decoy states are prepared using an amplitude modulator (AM). In the figure: (PM) phase
modulator for phase randomization, (PolM) polarization modulation for encoding, (F) optical filter and (I) optical isolator.
TABLE XIV The failure probability as a function of the fluc-
tuation deviations, measured by the number of standard de-
viations, (χ−EL[χ])/EL[χ] = (EU [χ]−χ)/EL[χ] = nσ, where
χ is counts in experiment. Here, εG, ε∞, ε10000, and ε70, re-
spectively, denote failure probabilities for the bounds in the
Gaussian approximate analysis, the rigourous method with
large data size limit, and a data size of 10000 and 70. [A
similar table is also presented in (Zhang et al., 2017)]
Deviation εG ε∞ ε10000 ε70
2σ 10−1.34 10−0.57 10−0.57 10−0.57
3σ 10−2.57 10−1.65 10−1.65 10−1.54
4σ 10−4.20 10−3.17 10−3.17 10−2.65
5σ 10−6.24 10−5.13 10−5.09 10−3.92
6σ 10−8.70 10−7.52 10−7.43 10−5.36
7σ 10−11.59 10−10.34 10−10.13 10−6.95
8σ 10−14.91 10−13.60 10−13.18 10−8.67
9σ 10−18.65 10−17.29 10−16.60 10−10.50
10σ 10−22.82 10−21.41 10−20.36 10−12.38
of the source is different from Poisson distribution, one
can employ the passive decoy state scheme (Adachi et al.,
2007; Ma and Lo, 2008), where Alice splits the pulses
with a beam splitter, detects one arm as triggers, and
uses the other arm for QKD encoding. Conditioned on
the detection of triggering signals, the photon number
distribution of the encoding arm is different. Alice can
announce her local detection after Bob’s detection. Then,
they can have linear gains for photon pulses with different
(conditional) photon number distributions for the decoy-
state method analysis. It turns out that even with phase
randomized coherent states, one can employ the passive
decoy state method (Curty et al., 2010).
2. Experiment
The decoy state methods have been widely imple-
mented in different QKD systems. The decoy-state ex-
periments are summarized in Table II. Fig. 12 shows the
four initial decoy-state QKD experiments. Zhao et al.
reported decoy state experiments (Zhao et al., 2006a,b)
up to 60-km fiber on top of a commercial plug-and-
play QKD system; Peng et al. (Peng et al., 2007) im-
plemented decoy-state QKD over 102-km fiber using a
one-way polarization-encoding QKD system; Rosenberg
et al. (Rosenberg et al., 2007) implemented decoy-state
QKD over 107-km fiber using a one-way phase-encoding
QKD system; Schmitt-Manderbach et al. achieved 144
km decoy state QKD in free space (Schmitt-Manderbach
et al., 2007). These experiments demonstrated that de-
coy state BB84 was secure and feasible under real-world
conditions.
Since then, more and more experimental efforts have
been made to QKD deployments in labs and field tests.
In 2007, Yuan et al. realized a stabilized one-way phase-
encoding decoy state QKD system (Yuan et al., 2007).
Later, Dixon et al. implemented decoy state QKD with a
high clock rate of 1 GHz (Dixon et al., 2008) and Liu et
al. extended decoy state QKD to long distance of 200-km
fiber (Liu et al., 2010). Importantly, a number of field
QKD networks with the decoy-state implementation have
been built in Europe (Peev et al., 2009), Japan (Sasaki
et al., 2011), China (Chen et al., 2009, 2010; Wang et al.,
2010) and so forth. An illustration of the Tokyo QKD
network is shown in Fig. 13.
In the mean time, Wang et al. experimentally imple-
mented decoy state with a PDC source (Wang et al.,
2008). Also, the passive decoy-state method has also
been demonstrated (Sun et al., 2014). Recently, the
decoy state experiment has been extended to a record-
breaking distance of 1,200 km in free space (Liao et al.,
2017a) and 421 km in ultra low-loss optical fiber (Boaron
et al., 2018). Due to its convenient implementation
and remarkable enhancement on performance, the decoy-
state method becomes a standard technique in current
QKD implementations.
B. Source flaws
1. Basis-dependent source
In practice, there is often some difference between ρx
and ρz, i.e., Eq. (14) might not be fulfilled. Then, in the
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FIG. 12 (Color online) Decoy state QKD experiments. a, Experiment on a commercial plug-and-play QKD system (Zhao et al.,
2006b). CA, compensating AOM; CG, compensating generator; DA, decoy AOM; DG, decoy generator; LD, laser diode; φ,
phase modulator; PD, classical photo detector; DL, delay line; FM, faraday mirror. b, Phase-encoding experiment (Rosenberg
et al., 2007). DFB, distributed feedback laser; VOA, variable optical attenuator; AM, amplitude modulator; LP, linear polarizer.
c, Polarization-encoding experiment (Peng et al., 2007). FCN, fiber coupling network; FF, fiber filter; EPC, electric polarization
controller; DAC, digital-to-analog converter. d, Free-space experiment (Schmitt-Manderbach et al., 2007). BS, beam splitter;
PBS, polarizing beam splitter; HWP, half-wave plate; APD, avalanche photo diode. [Figures reproduced from (Peng et al.,
2007; Rosenberg et al., 2007; Schmitt-Manderbach et al., 2007; Zhao et al., 2006b)].
worst case scenario, we should assume Eve is capable of
distinguishing the basis choice and hence she can attack
two basis states separately. This kind of source is called
basis-dependent source. Obviously, the more state de-
pendence on the basis, the easier for Eve to distinguish
the bases and hence a lower key rate.
Without loss of generality, we take Z-basis as example.
The general Shor-Preskill’s key rate formula is (Shor and
Preskill, 2000)
r ≥ 1−H(eZ)−H(epZ), (43)
where epZ is the Z-basis phase error rate, defined in
Eq. (7).
For a basis-dependent source, epZ 6= eX since ρZ 6= ρX .
However, if ρX is close to ρZ , we can still bound e
p
Z
from measured eX . In the GLLP security analysis frame-
work (Gottesman et al., 2004), the basis dependence is
quantified by a bias,
∆ =
1− F (ρX , ρZ)
2
, (44)
where F (ρX , ρZ) =
√√
ρZρX
√
ρZ is the fidelity between
the two states. Given this bias, the phase error rate used
in the key rate formula can be bounded by (Koashi, 2009;
Lo and Preskill, 2007),
epz ≤ ebj + 4∆(1−∆)(1− 2ebx)
+4(1− 2∆)
√
∆(1−∆)ebx(1− ebx).
(45)
For the practical photon sources presented in Section
III.B, Alice and Bob have more information than the
bias in Eq. (44). For example, in principle, they can
measure the photon number n, with which they can tag
each quantum signal. Then, in phase error correction
of entanglement distillation process, which would be re-
duced to privacy amplification for prepare-and-measure
schemes, they could take advantage of these tagging.
With tagging, the GLLP key rate formula can be written
as (Gottesman et al., 2004),
r ≥ −H(E) + (1−∆)[1−H(epz)], (46)
where E is the total QBER, ∆ is the ratio of tagged
signals, and epz is the phase error rate of the untagged
signals. Here, we use the same notation of the bias ∆ in
Eq. (44).
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FIG. 13 (Color online) Architecture of the Tokyo QKD Net-
work (Sasaki et al., 2011). [Figure reproduced from (Sasaki
et al., 2011)].
2. Nonrandom phase
A general example of source flaw is to use the weak co-
herent states with nonrandom phases to encode the basis
and key information (Lo and Preskill, 2007). Their dif-
ference is treated as source flaw, i.e, a basis-dependence
of the source. The encoded state |ψβκ〉B is
|ψβκ〉B = |α〉R
∣∣∣αeipi(κ+ 12β)〉
S
, (47)
where α is constant and µ = 2|α|2 is the intensity. In
this case, the basis dependence ∆ is
∆ =
1
2
(
1− eµ/2(cos(µ/2) + sin(µ/2))
)
= µ/8 +O(µ3).
(48)
Note that in the practical QKD experiment, we will
post-select the clicked signals. In this case, to calculate
the basis dependence, we have to take the channel trans-
mittance η into account. In a worst-case scenario, the
channel loss is caused by Eve’s selection on the trans-
mitted signals. To clarify this, we can consider Eve per-
forms a unambiguous state discrimintation (USD) attack
(Dušek et al., 2000), where Eve performs USD to discrim-
inate ρX and ρZ . If the discrimination is successful, Eve
can learn the basis and key, then he generates the same
state ρβκ, and sends it to Bob; if the discrimination fails,
Eve partially blocks the signal as loss. In this case, the
basis dependence ∆′ of left signals will be amplified by η
∆′ = ∆/(ηµ) ≈ µ/(8η). (49)
From Eqs. (43), (45),and (49), we can calculate the
key rate. However, the achievable key generation rate
scales only quadratically with the transmittance η in the
channel, i.e., r = O(η2). This question can be poten-
tially solved using the scheme of discrete phase random-
ization (Cao et al., 2015).
3. Encoding flaws
Another example of source flaw is the encoding flaws in
the phase and polarization encoding due to the device im-
perfections in the encoding devices. This will also make
the source basis-dependent. Although GLLP allows the
security proof to consider th encoding flaws, the key rate
drops dramatically (Gottesman et al., 2004). This is be-
cause GLLP has a pessimistic consideration by assuming
that the encoding flaws are in arbitrary dimensions. To
address this issue, a loss-tolerant protocol was proposed
in (Tamaki et al., 2014), which makes QKD tolerable to
channel loss in the presence of source flaws (Yin et al.,
2014).
On the basis of the assumption that the single-photon
components of the states prepared by Alice remain inside
a two-dimensional Hilbert space, it was shown that Eve
cannot enhance state preparation flaws by exploiting the
channel loss and Eve’s information can be bounded by the
rejected data analysis. The intuition for the security of
loss-tolerant QKD protocol (Tamaki et al., 2014) can be
understood in the following manner. By assuming that
the state prepared by Alice is a qubit, it becomes impos-
sible for Eve to perform an unambiguous state discrimi-
nation (USD) attack. Indeed, in order for Eve to perform
a USD attack, the states prepared by Alice must be lin-
early independent; but by having three or more states in
a two-dimensional space, in general the set of states pre-
pared by Alice is linearly dependent, thus making USD
impossible. The above loss-tolerant protocol has been
further developed and demonstrated experimentally for
decoy-state BB84 (Boaron et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2015b)
and MDI-QKD (Tang et al., 2016a).
C. Leaky source
As discussed in Section IV.C, the source is vulnerable
under the Trojan-horse attack (THA). In particular, Eve
could inject bright light pulses into Alice’s transmitter
and then measure the back-reflected light to extract in-
formation about Alice’s state preparation process. This
problem has been analyzed in (Lucamarini et al., 2015).
The authors evaluated the security of a QKD system in
the presence of information leakage from Alice’s phase
modulator (PM), which is used to encode the bit and
basis information of the generated signals. A key obser-
vation is that, the joint state of Alice’s transmitted sig-
nals and Eve’s back-reflected light from her THA is not
basis-independent but it depends on Alice’s basis choice.
36
The security of the system can be analyzed by quanti-
fying Eve’s information and considering this information
in privacy amplification, based on the techniques intro-
duced in (Lo and Preskill, 2007). Recently, these semi-
nal results have been generalized to prove the security of
decoy-state QKD in the presence of arbitrary information
leakage from both the PM and the intensity modulator
(IM) (Tamaki et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2018c). Here
the IM is normally used to select the intensity setting
for each emitted signal. Consequently, it is possible to
quantify the amount of device isolation, against THA, so
as to achieve a certain performance with a realistic leaky
QKD system.
VI. DETECTION SECURITY
In this section, we review the various approaches to
address the detection security of practical QKD. We will
review the MDI-QKD protocol and its extensions in more
details.
A. Countermeasures against detection attacks
Many approaches have been proposed to defeat the at-
tacks at detection. The first one is security patch. That
is, once one discovers a new type of attack, a correspond-
ing countermeasure against this attack can be proposed
and realized in an existing QKD system. This approach
usually only requires modifying the software or the hard-
ware of a current system. For instance, the time-shift
attack introduced in the previous section can be avoided
by simply shifting the gating window of the detectors at
random (Qi et al., 2007a). The detector blinding attack
could, in principle, be avoided by monitoring the detec-
tor’s photocurrent for anomalously high values (da Silva
et al., 2012; Yuan et al., 2011) or by randomly varying the
detector efficiency (Lim et al., 2015). Although security
patch can defeat certain attacks, the patched counter-
measures themselves might open other loopholes. This
could as a result, introduce one more layer of security
risk (Huang et al., 2016a; Qian et al., 2019; Sajeed et al.,
2015b). Furthermore, the major issue associate with the
security patch is that they only prevent the known at-
tacks. For potential and unknown attacks, the counter-
measures may fail. Therefore, security patch is only ad-
hoc, which abandons the information-theoretic security
framework of QKD.
The second approach is to fully characterize the de-
vices using in a QKD system and precisely describe the
devices in mathematical models. Then the models can
be included in the security proof to estimate the real se-
cure key rate based on an imperfect setup. A well-known
example is the GLLP security proof (Gottesman et al.,
2004). While this approach seems straightforward, de-
veloping models to fully match the practical behavior of
various QKD devices is rarely possible because the com-
ponents are complex. Even so, there are several ongoing
theoretical efforts to consider as many imperfections as
possible into the security proof (Fung et al., 2009; Lu-
camarini et al., 2015; Marøy et al., 2010; Tamaki et al.,
2014, 2016). Nevertheless, this approach is limited by our
understanding of the devices and a complete knowledge
of the devices is rather challenging. Hence full character-
ization is still ad-hoc.
The third approach is device-independent QKD (DI-
QKD), which will be reviewed in Section VIII.A. Note
that there are also proposals for semi-device-independent
QKD, where one party’s measurements are fully charac-
terized while the other’s are unknown (Branciard et al.,
2012; Pawłowski and Brunner, 2011; Smith et al., 2012).
The final approach is MDI-QKD protocol, which closes
all detection attacks and is practical with current tech-
nology. In below, we will review MDI-QKD in detail.
B. Measurement-device-independent scheme
MDI-QKD generates secret keys based on the “time-
reversed" entanglement protocol and leaves all the single
photon detections to a public untrusted relay (Eve).
1. Time-reversed EPR QKD
The idea of measurement-device-independent (MDI)
is inspired by the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) based
QKD protocol (Bennett et al., 1992c; Ekert, 1991). This
is illustrated in Fig. 14 (Biham et al., 1996). In the initial
EPR-based protocol (Fig. 14a), Alice and Bob individu-
ally prepare an EPR pair at each side and send one pho-
ton from each pair to an untrusted center party, Charles.
Charles then performs a Bell state measurement (BSM)
for entanglement swapping. The measurement result is
announced. Once the BSM is finished, Alice and Bob
measure the other photon of the EPR pairs locally by
choosing between the X and Z basis randomly. Com-
paring a subset of their measurement results allows Alice
and Bob to know whether Charles is honest. Then Alice
and Bob can generate the secret by using the BBM92
protocol (Bennett et al., 1992c).
Note that the EPR protocol can also work in a time-
reversal version, as shown in Fig. 14b. That is, Alice
and Bob can measure their local photons first, instead of
waiting for Charles’ measurement results. This order of
preparation and measurement is equivalent to that of the
prepare-and-measurement QKD scheme, in which Alice
and Bob prepare BB84 states and send them to Charles
to perform the BSM. After that, the Charles’ honesty
can be checked by comparing a part of Alice’s and Bob’s
results. Importantly, Charles’ BSM is only used to check
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FIG. 14 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) based QKD proto-
col (Biham et al., 1996). One particle of each EPR correlated
pair, denoted by dashed lines, is sent to the center, who per-
forms a Bell state measurement (BSM). The second particles
are sent to Alice and Bob, respectively, who project them
onto the BB84 states. a, Original EPR QKD. The first mea-
surement is done by the center and the particles arriving at
Alice and Bob are therefore in the Bell state, which can be
used to do QKD as in the EPR based protocol (Ekert, 1991).
b, Time-reversed EPR QKD. The first measurement is per-
formed by Alice and Bob and each particle sent to the center
is therefore in one of the BB84 states, which forms the con-
cept behind MDI-QKD (Lo et al., 2012). [Figure reproduced
from (Biham et al., 1996)].
the parity of Alice’s and Bob’s bits, and thus, it does not
reveal any information about the individual bit values.
This time-reversal EPR protocol forms the main concept
behind MDI-QKD.
This time-reversed EPR QKD protocol has been first
proposed in (Biham et al., 1996). Later, Inamori pro-
vided a security proof (Inamori, 2002). Nevertheless,
these two important works offered very limited perfor-
mance and, therefore, they have been largely forgotten
by the QKD community. For instance, the scheme in (Bi-
ham et al., 1996) requires perfect single-photon sources
and long-term quantum memories, which renders it un-
practical with current technology. Inamori’s scheme (In-
amori, 2002) uses practical weak coherent pulses (WCPs)
but it does not include decoy states, since it was pro-
posed long before the advent of the decoy-state protocol.
Moreover, the two early papers (Biham et al., 1996; In-
amori, 2002) were not specifically considering the side
channel problem in QKD at all. In 2012, Braunstein
and Pirandola performed a general security analysis of
the time-reversed EPR QKD approach (Braunstein and
Pirandola, 2012) and proved that detector side-channel
attacks can be eliminated by using teleportation where
any incoming quantum signals are excluded from access
to the detectors. Note that the idea of using telepor-
tation for the specific purpose of removing side channels
was first discussed in footnote 21 of (Lo and Chau, 1999).
2. MDI-QKD protocol
Singlet state
∣∣ψ−〉 Triplet state ∣∣ψ+〉
Coincident clicks D1H & D2V or D1H & D1V or
D2H & D1V D2H & D2V
Rectilinear basis Bit flip Bit flip
Diagonal basis Bit flip –
TABLE XV Post-selection for MDI-QKD (Lo et al., 2012).
Alice and Bob post-select the events where the relay outputs a
successful result and they use the same basis in their transmis-
sion. Moreover, either Alice or Bob flips her/his bits, except
for the cases where both of them select the diagonal basis and
the relay outputs a triplet
The MDI-QKD proposal (Lo et al., 2012) [see
also (Braunstein and Pirandola, 2012)] builds on the
time-reversed EPR QKD. In particular, the main mer-
its of the proposal, introduced by Lo, Curty and Qi (Lo
et al., 2012), are twofold: first, it identified the impor-
tance of the results in (Biham et al., 1996; Inamori, 2002)
to remove all detector side-channels from QKD imple-
mentations; second, it significantly improved the system
performance with practical signals by including decoy
states. The protocol can be summarized in four steps:
1. Alice and Bob randomly and individually prepare
one of four BB84 states using phase-randomized
WCPs together with decoy signals. Then they send
the states to an untrusted party, Charles.
2. An honest Charles performs a BSM that makes Al-
ice’s and Bob’s states interfere with each other, gen-
erating a Bell state. An example of a BSM imple-
mentation with linear optics in shown in Fig. 15:
Charles interferes the incoming pulses at a 50:50
beam-splitter (BS), which has on each end a po-
larizing beam-splitter (PBS) that projects the pho-
tons into either horizontal (H) or vertical (V ) po-
larization states. A “click” in the single-photon
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FIG. 15 Schematic diagram of MDI-QKD proposed in (Lo et al., 2012). Alice and Bob prepare BB84 polarization states using a
decoy-state BB84 transmitter, same as the one illustrated in Fig. 11. They send BB84 states to an untrusted relay Charles/Eve.
The relay is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement (BSM) that projects Alice’s and Bob’s signals into a Bell state.
detectors D1H and D2V, or in D1V and D2H, in-
dicates a projection into the singlet state |ψ−〉 =
(|HV 〉−|V H〉)/√2, while a “click” inD1H andD1V,
or in D2H and D2V, implies a projection into the
triplet state |ψ+〉 = (|HV 〉 + |V H〉)/√2. Other
detection patterns are considered unsuccessful.
3. Whether Charles is honest or not, he announces the
outcome of his claimed BSM using a classical pub-
lic channel when he claims to obtain a successful
measurement.
4. Alice and Bob keep the data that correspond to
Charles’ successful measurement events and discard
the rest. Next, similar to the sifting in BB84 proto-
col, Alice and Bob announce their basis choices for
sifting the events and keep the events using same
bases. Based on Charles’ measurement result, Al-
ice flips part of her bits to guarantee the correct
correlation with those of Bob. The post-selection
strategy is illustrated in Table XV. Finally, they
use the decoy-state method to estimate the gain
and QBER of the single-photon contributions.
In MDI-QKD, both Alice and Bob are senders, and
they transmit signals to an untrusted third party, Eve,
who is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement
(BSM). Since the BSM is only used to post-select en-
tanglement, it can be treated as an entirely black box.
Hence, MDI-QKD can remove all detection side-channels.
The assumption in MDI-QKD is that the source should
be trusted. The security assumptions of MDI-QKD,
together with DI-QKD (see Section VIII.A), are sum-
marized in Table XVI. A comparison of practical secu-
rity between MDI-QKD and DI-QKD, as commented by
Charles H. Bennett in QCrypt 201818, is summarized in
Box VI.B.2.
18 See slide 6 of Charles H. Bennett’s talk in Lightning Talks session
of QCrypt 2018: http://2018.qcrypt.net/
Box VI.B.2: A security remark about MDI-QKD
and DI-QKD by Charles H. Bennett.
MDI-QKD at first sounds weaker than DI-QKD,
but in fact it is stronger. In MDI-QKD, Eve’s un-
trusted device remains outside Alice’s and Bob’s
trusted enclosures. They need only trust them-
selves not to have inadvertently created a side
channel to Eve through incompetent design of
their do-it-yourself (DIY) light sources. By con-
trast, in DI-QKD they must trust Eve not to have
deliberately created side channels from the un-
trusted devices to herself.
DI-QKD MDI-QKD
True random number generators Yes Yes
Trusted classical post-processing Yes Yes
Authenticated classical channel Yes Yes
No unwanted information leakage
from the measurement unit Yes No
Characterized source No Yes
TABLE XVI Security assumptions in DI-QKD and MDI-
QKD. While DI-QKD has the advantage of being applica-
ble to an uncharacterized source, it demands no unwanted
information leakage from the measurement unit. MDI-QKD
applies to any measurement units. This means that the mea-
surement unit in MDI-QKD can be an entire black-box, pur-
chased from untrusted vendors.
3. Theoretical developments
The decoy-state analysis is essential for MDI-QKD.
The analysis is different from that of conventional decoy-
state BB84 in that now both Alice and Bob send decoy
signals to a common receiver (instead of only Alice send-
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ing decoy signals to Bob), which makes the mathematics
slightly more complex. Fortunately, it has been shown
that it is enough to obtain a tight estimation if Alice and
Bob employ just a few decoy settings each. The authors
of (Ma et al., 2012) and (Wang, 2013), respectively, pro-
posed a numerical method based on linear programming
and an analytical approach based on Gaussian elimina-
tion. Both approaches assume that Alice and Bob can
prepare a vacuum intensity. Following the similar an-
alytical line, the authors of (Xu et al., 2013a) studied
the situation where none of the two decoy intensities are
vacuum19. A full parameter optimization method was
proposed in (Xu et al., 2014). Soon after, Yu et al pro-
posed to use joint constraints for a better key rate (Yu
et al., 2015), and Zhou et al. (Zhou et al., 2016) proposed
a four-intensity method, in which the key generation is
conducted in Z basis and the decoy analysis is performed
only inX basis. By doing so, the four-intensity method is
efficient in the case of short data size. Recently, the four-
intensity method was extend to seven-intensity method
which can substantially enhance the key rate for MDI-
QKD over asymmetric channels (Wang et al., 2018d).
All these results provide experimentalists a clear path
to implement MDI-QKD with a finite number of decoy
states.
For finite-key analysis, the authors of (Ma et al., 2012)
provided an analysis that assumes a Gaussian distribu-
tion for the statistical fluctuations. Remarkably, Curty et
al. (Curty et al., 2014) presented a rigorous finite-key se-
curity proof against general attacks by using min-entropy
analysis and Chernoff bound. In addition, this result
satisfies the composable security definition. All these re-
sults confirm the feasibility of long-distance implemen-
tations of MDI-QKD within a reasonable time-frame of
signal transmission. Simulations of the secret key rates
with different kinds of decoy-state methods and finite-key
analysis methods is shown in Fig. 16.
Other practical aspects were also extensively analyzed
in theory. Besides polarization encoding in the original
MDI-QKD protocol (Lo et al., 2012), alternative schemes
including phase encoding (Tamaki et al., 2012) and time-
bin encoding (Ma and Razavi, 2012) were proposed and
analyzed. To extend the transmission distance further,
one could include quantum memories (Abruzzo et al.,
2014; Panayi et al., 2014), entanglement sources (Xu
et al., 2013b) or adaptive operations (Azuma et al.,
2015b). Moreover, a key security assumption in MDI-
QKD is the source should be trusted. Recently, there
have been efforts to prove the security of MDI-QKD when
Alice’s and Bob’s encoding devices are flawed (Tamaki
et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2015b), or when their appa-
ratuses are not fully characterized (Yin et al., 2014).
19 A vacuum state is normally hard to realize in practice due to the
finite extinction ratio of a practical intensity modulator
Furthermore, a plug-play type of MDI-QKD was pro-
posed in (Choi et al., 2016; Xu, 2015) and experimentally
demonstrated in (Tang et al., 2016a).
4. Experimental developments
Table III summarizes the MDI-QKD experiments af-
ter its invention. The main experimental challenge of
MDI-QKD is to perform a high-visibility two-photon in-
terference between photons from two (Alice’s and Bob’s)
independent laser sources (Lo et al., 2012), which is not
required in conventional QKD schemes. To do so, Alice’s
photons should be indistinguishable from those of Bob.
Importantly, if one implements MDI-QKD over telecom
fibres, it is necessary to include feedback controls to com-
pensate the time-dependent polarization rotations and
propagation delays caused by the two separated fibres.
Note that in standard BB84 QKD systems, the require-
ment of compensating polarization rotations and prop-
agation delays can be relaxed by using phase encoding,
because the two optical pulses, which interfere with each
other at the receiver’s end, pass through the same optical
fibre and thus experience the same polarisation rotation
and phase change. Therefore, one can achieve high in-
terference visibility without performing any polarization
control. Nevertheless, this advantage of phase encoding
(in comparison to other encoding schemes) cannot be di-
rectly translated to MDI-QKD, because the two pulses
pass through two independent quantum channels.
In 2013, several groups performed independent exper-
imental study for MDI-QKD. Liu et al. (Liu et al., 2013)
reported the first demonstration of MDI-QKD with ran-
dom modulation for encoding states and decoy states
over 50 km fiber. Simultaneously, Rubenok et al. were
the first to demonstrate the feasibility of high-visibility
two-photon interference between two independent lasers,
passing through separate field-deployed fibres in a real
world environment (Rubenok et al., 2013). Later, Fer-
reira da Silva et al. observed a similar interference using
polarization encoding in the lab (Ferreira da Silva et al.,
2013) and Tang et al. reported a full demonstration of
polarization encoding MDI-QKD with random modula-
tion of encoding states and decoy states (Tang et al.,
2014b). All these four initial experiments, when taken
together, complete the cycle needed to demonstrate the
feasibility of MDI-QKD using off-the-shelf optoelectronic
devices. Their experiment diagrams are illustrated in
Fig. 17.
MDI-QKD is attractive not only because of its security
against detection attacks, but also due to its practical-
ity. It can resist high channel loss and reach long dis-
tance. Tang et al., implemented MDI-QKD over 200 km
fiber (Tang et al., 2014a) and in field environment (Tang
et al., 2015) by increasing the system clock rate from 1
MHz to 75 MHz, by developing an automatic feedback
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FIG. 16 (Color online) Simulation and experimental secret rates of MDI-QKD demonstrated in (Comandar et al., 2016; Yin
et al., 2016). a, 404-km MDI-QKD (Yin et al., 2016). The experimental results (symbols) agree well with the theoretical
simulations (solid lines). The dotted lines from upper to bottom show, respectively, the simulations for the balanced-basis
passive BB84 protocol using ideal single-photon (SP) sources, the practical SP without the decoy-state method, the WCS with
the decoy-state method, and the results of (Tang et al., 2014a). b, 1-GHz MDI-QKD (Comandar et al., 2016). Filled squares
refer to key rates without the finite-size analysis. The star is the key rate obtained using two 25-km spools of fibre. The
filled and open dots represent key rates with the finite-size analysis. The finite-size distillation methods are (1) standard error
analysis (Ma et al., 2012), and (2) composable security analysis (Curty et al., 2014). The dashed lines are simulations of the
key rate for two different detector temperatures. [Figures reproduced from (Comandar et al., 2016; Yin et al., 2016)].
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FIG. 17 (Color online) The four initial MDI-QKD experiments. a, Proof-of-principle MDI-QKD with time-bin encod-
ing (Rubenok et al., 2013). b, Full MDI-QKD implementation with random modulations of states and decoy intensities
based on time-bin encoding (Liu et al., 2013). c, Proof-of-principle MDI-QKD with polarization encoding (Ferreira da Silva
et al., 2013). d, Full MDI-QKD with random modulations of states and decoy intensities based on polarization encoding (Tang
et al., 2014b). [Figures reproduced from (Liu et al., 2013; Rubenok et al., 2013; Ferreira da Silva et al., 2013; Tang et al.,
2014b)].
system, and utilizing superconducting single photon de-
tectors (SNSPDs).
In 2016, two millstone MDI-QKD experiments that
were subsequently reported. In the first one, Yin
et al., extended the MDI-QKD distance to a record-
breaking distance of 404 km by optimizing the implemen-
tation parameters and using a ultra-low loss fiber (0.16
dB/km) (Yin et al., 2016). Importantly, the key rate
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achieved in the experiment at 100 km is around 3 kbps,
which is sufficient for one-time-pad encoding of voice mes-
sage. The results demonstrated in (Yin et al., 2016) are
shown in Fig. 16a. In the second one, Comandar et al.,
increased the system clock rate of MDI-QKD to 1 GHz
by exploiting the technique of optical seed lasers (Co-
mandar et al., 2016). The 1 GHz system demonstrated
the feasibility for MDI-QKD to reach 1 Mbps key rate.
The achieved secret rates in (Comandar et al., 2016) are
shown in Fig. 16b.
Besides long distance and high rate, several research
groups have analyzed the practical aspects in the im-
plementation of MDI-QKD. For instance, Valivarthi et
al., analyzed the trade-offs among complexity, cost, and
system performance associated with the implementation
of MDI-QKD (Valivarthi et al., 2015) and implemented
a cost-effective system (Valivarthi et al., 2017). Wang
et al., demonstrated a reference-frame-independent MDI-
QKD that requires no phase reference between Alice and
Bob (Wang et al., 2015a, 2017a) and this scheme was
recently improved to a clock rate of 50 MHz by Liu et
al. (Liu et al., 2018a). Tang et al., demonstrated MDI-
QKD with source flaws (Tang et al., 2016a). Roberts
et al., reported a reconfigurable system to switch be-
tween QKD and MDI-QKD (Roberts et al., 2017). Aside
from the MDI-QKD demonstration with WCP sources,
Kaneda et al. demonstrated MDI-QKD using heralded
single-photon source (Kaneda et al., 2017). Furthermore,
a continuous-variable version of MDI-QKD was also pro-
posed and studied (Pirandola et al., 2015), which will be
reviewed in Section VII.
With all the above experimental efforts, MDI-QKD is
ready for the applications in the future quantum net-
work. Particularly, MDI-QKD is well suited to construct
a centric star-type QKD network even with untrusted
relays. Indeed, Tang et al., performed the first imple-
mentation of a field MDI-QKD network (Tang et al.,
2016b), which has four nodes with one untrusted relay
node and three-user nodes. Note that if the central relay
is trusted, one can reconfigure the MDI-QKD network to
allow many quantum communication protocols (Roberts
et al., 2017). Moreover, high-rate MDI-QKD over asym-
metric fiber channels was demonstrated recently in (Liu
et al., 2019a), based on the theoretical proposal in (Wang
et al., 2018d). The asymmetric MDI-QKD is valuable to
practical metropolitan network settings, where the chan-
nel losses are naturally asymmetric and the user nodes
could be dynamically added or deleted. Furthermore,
Wei et al., have implemented the first chip-based MDI-
QKD at 1.25 GHz clock rate (Wei et al., 2019b). This is
important to develop a low-cost and secure quantum net-
work, where the expensive devices such as single-photon
detectors can be placed in the central untrusted relay and
each user requires only a simple Si chip.
C. Twin-field QKD
Fundamental bound (Takeoka et al., 2014) and secret
key capacity (SKC) (Pirandola et al., 2017) have been
obtained for the secure key rate vs distance of QKD. It
was proven that, in the absence of relays, the key rate
basically scales linearly with transmittance O(η), where
η is the transmittance of the channel between Alice and
Bob. This is called the linear bound (of the secret key
rate of a lossy quantum channel). There are tremendous
research interests towards developing a feasible scheme,
known as quantum repeater (Sangouard et al., 2011), to
overcome the fundamental rate-distance limit. However,
the deployment of quantum repeater is still beyond cur-
rent technology.
Remarkably, Lucamarini et al. (Lucamarini et al.,
2018) have proposed a novel phase-encoding MDI-QKD
protocol, called twin-field QKD (TF-QKD), which shows
the possibility to overcome the SKC. In TF-QKD (see
Fig. 18), weak optical pulses are generated by two phase-
locked laser sources, which are phase-randomized and
then phase-encoded with secret bits and bases. The
pulses are sent to Charlie for interference on a beam split-
ter; depending on which detector clicks, Charlie can in-
fer whether the secret bits of the users (Alice and Bob)
are equal or different, but cannot learn their absolute
values. TF-QKD essentially uses single-photon interfer-
ence (Duan et al., 2001), and the implementation requires
only standard optical elements without the requirement
of quantum memory (Sangouard et al., 2011). The key
goal of TF-QKD protocol is to achieve a quadratic im-
provement (i.e., scaling toO(√η) to key rate as a function
of channel transmittance. Unfortunately, in the original
paper (Lucamarini et al., 2018), such a quadratic im-
provement was only proven for a restricted class of at-
tacks by Eve.
Following the TF-QKD scheme (Lucamarini et al.,
2018), Ma et al. (Ma et al., 2018) proposed a protocol
named phase-matching QKD (PM-QKD) and proved its
unconditional security, inspired by the previous phase-
encoding MDI-QKD protocol (Tamaki et al., 2012), and
the MDI version of the Bennett1992 protocol (Ferenczi,
2013). PM-QKD employs coherent states as information
carriers directly and uses the decoy state method in an
indirect way. In a sense, PM-QKD adopts a (discrete-
modulation) continuous-variable encoding and discrete-
variable single-photon detection. The performance of
PM-QKD is shown in Figure 19. One can clearly see that
its key rate can go beyond the linear SKC with certain
realistic parameter settings.
On the other hand, with the BB84-type two-basis anal-
ysis, Tamaki et al. (Tamaki et al., 2018) proposed a
modified X/Y -basis protocol, and Wang et al. (Wang
et al., 2018e) proposed an X/Z-basis protocol, where the
single-photon states are used regarded as the informa-
tion carrier. Afterwards, the simplified coherent-state-
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based protocols without phase-randomization on the key
generation mode have been proposed (Cui et al., 2019;
Curty et al., 2019; Lin and Lütkenhaus, 2018) and an-
alyzed in the infinite data size case. Later on, Maeda
et al. (Maeda et al., 2019) introduce an efficient param-
eter estimation method for the PM-QKD protocol and
complete the finite-size analysis. All these recent theory
works make the new TF-type MDI-QKD protocols im-
portant for the deployment of QKD over long distances.
Charlie
Alice Bob
R
N
G
P
a
M
a
P
b
M
b
G
a
G
b
D0 D1 PM
LS
IM
VOA
R
N
GPM
LS
IM
VOA
PM
FIG. 18 Schematic diagram of TF-QKD (Lucamarini et al.,
2018). The light sources (LSs) at Alice’s and Bob’s stations
generate pulses that are varied randomly by intensity modula-
tors (IMs) to implement the decoy-state method. Phase mod-
ulators (PMs) are combined with random number generators
(RNGs) to encode each light pulse with phases, which include
bit and basis information as well as the random phases. The
variable optical attenuators (VOAs) set the average output in-
tensity of the pulses to bright (classical regime) or dim (quan-
tum regime). The pulses travel along independent channels
to then interfere on Charlie’s beam splitter and be detected
by the single-photon detectors D0 and D1. Charlie uses the
bright pulses in the classical regime and the phase modulator
in his station to phase-align the dim pulses that are emitted
in the quantum regime, which provide the bits of the key.
[Figure adopted from (Lucamarini et al., 2018).]
FIG. 19 Key rate of PM-QKD comparing to the theoret-
ical SKC (Pirandola et al., 2017) and other protocols (Ma
et al., 2018). The key rate is shown to surpass the linear key
rate bound when the communication distance l > 230 km.
The simulation uses realistic parameters: detector efficiency
14.5%, dark count rate 7.2× 10−8, error correction efficiency
1.15, channel misalignment error 1.5% and number of phase
slices 16. [Figure reprinted from (Ma et al., 2018).]
Interestingly, the security of PM-QKD, different from
the usual BB84-type two-basis protocol, is closely related
to the symmetry of source state with respect to the en-
coding operation. To clearly establish the correlation be-
tween encoding symmetry and privacy, Zeng et al (Zeng
et al., 2019) establish a symmetry-based security proof
method for a general type of MDI-QKD protocols. For
these MDI-QKD protocols, there exist symmetric source
states, which promise perfect privacy, i.e., with no infor-
mation leakage. Therefore, for a generic source state in-
put, the privacy of the protocol only depends on the ratio
of the symmetric component contained in it, irrelevant of
the channel noise. As a result, this symmetry-based se-
curity proof allows higher error tolerance compared with
the original complementarity-based proof. For example,
PM-QKD is proved to be able to yield positive key even
with high bit error rate up to 50% and surpassing the lin-
ear key rate bound even with bit error rate of 13% (Zeng
et al., 2019).
From a technical point of view, the replacement of
two-photon detection to single-photon detection is the
key reason for the quadratic improvement, but single-
photon interference with two remote independent lasers
requires subwavelength-order phase stability for optical
channels (Duan et al., 2001), which is more demanding in
long-distance communication than achieving two-photon
interference which does not require phase stability be-
tween the two photons. Nonetheless, TF-QKD protocols
are expected to be feasible with the current techniques
of active phase randomization, optical phase-locking and
so forth. Indeed, in 2019, four research groups have re-
ported the experimental demonstrations on the feasibility
of TF-QKD respectively (Liu et al., 2019b; Minder et al.,
2019; Wang et al., 2019a; Zhong et al., 2019). Very re-
cently, the PM-QKD experiment has been realized with
the random modulations and the consideration of finite-
key effect (Fang et al., 2019), whose key rate surpass the
linear key rate bound via 302 km and 402 km commercial
fibre; through a 502 km ultra-low loss fibre with 87.1 dB
total loss, PM-QKD can yield key rate of 0.118 bps with
unconditional security. By using the ultra-stable cav-
ity and optical phase lacking, the sending-or-not-sending
version of TF-QKD protocol was demonstrated over 509
km ultra-low loss fibre (Chen et al., 2019), where the
achieved secure key rate is even higher than that a tra-
ditional QKD protocol running with a perfect repeater-
less QKD device. A proof-of-principle experiment has
demonstrated TF-QKD over optical channels with asym-
metric losses (Zhong et al., 2020). Table IV summarizes
the recent TF-QKD experiments.
VII. CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE QKD
Broadly speaking, QKD can be divided into two
classes, namely discrete variable (DV) or continuous vari-
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able (CV). Different from DV or qubit-based QKD, the
secret keys in CV-QKD are encoded in quadratures of
the quantized electromagnetic field and decoded by co-
herent detections (Weedbrook et al., 2012). Coherent de-
tection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-
cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility
with existing telecom equipment and high detection ef-
ficiencies without the requirement of cooling. CV-QKD
protocols can be divided into several categories, accord-
ing to the prepared state of coherent (Grosshans and
Grangier, 2002) or squeezed state (Hillery, 2000), the
modulation schemes of Gaussian (Cerf et al., 2001) or
discrete modulations (Hillery, 2000; Ralph, 1999a; Reid,
2000a), the detection schemes of homodyne (Grosshans
and Grangier, 2002) or heterodyne detections (Weed-
brook et al., 2004), the error correction schemes of direct
or reverse reconciliations (Grosshans et al., 2003), and so
forth.
In this section, we will primarily review the sim-
plest and the most widely developed CV-QKD proto-
col – Gaussian-modulated coherent state (GMCS) pro-
tocol (Grosshans and Grangier, 2002; Grosshans et al.,
2003) – which is believed as the core of today’s implemen-
tations. We will briefly discuss the security analysis and
experimental developments of CV-QKD, together with a
focus on the practical security aspects in its implemen-
tations, including the side channels and the advanced
countermeasures. We will not cover too much about
other CV-QKD protocols (Pirandola et al., 2008; Silber-
horn et al., 2002; Usenko and Grosshans, 2015; Weed-
brook et al., 2010a), which can be found in an earlier re-
view (Weedbrook et al., 2012). We also refer the readers
to two recent CV-QKD reviews for the security analysis
and practical issues (Diamanti and Leverrier, 2015), the
issues of trusted noise (Usenko and Filip, 2016) and the
models of implementation and noise (Laudenbach et al.,
2018).
A. Protocol and security
1. Gaussian-modulated protocol
The first Gaussian (continuous) modulated protocol
ia a Gaussian-modulated squeezed state protocol (Cerf
et al., 2001), where the key is encrypted in the displace-
ment of a squeezed state. The random choice of the di-
rection to squeeze is similar to the basis choice in the
BB84 protocol. The squeeze state protocol was later
extended to GMCS protocols (Grosshans and Grang-
ier, 2002; Grosshans et al., 2003) since coherent states
are easier to prepare in practice. We summarize the
prepare-and-measure version of a general GMCS protocol
in Box VII.A.1. A difference from a DV-QKD protocol is
that, in a coherent state protocol, the key information of
both ’basis’ is encrypted into the prepared state simulta-
neously per channel use. Therefore, Bob’s measurement
can be correlated with Alice’s key in either basis or both
bases.
Box VII.A.1: GMCS QKD protocol.
(1) Alice produces two random numbers xA and
pA from random numbers following a Gaussian
distribution with a variance of VAN0, where N0 is
the vacuum noise unit.
(2) Alice prepares a coherent state |xA + ipA〉 and
sends it to Bob through an untrusted quantum
channel.
(3) Bob chooses homodyne (heterodyne) detec-
tion to measure X and P randomly (simultane-
ously) and obtains the outcomes xB and pB .
(4) After repeating the above process N times,
Alice and Bob sift the measurement results by a
classical channel, and obtain N pairs of raw key,
i.e, the correlated Gaussian variables, in the ho-
modyne detection protocol (2N pairs in hetero-
dyne detection protocol).
(5) Alice and Bob perform the postprocessing on
the raw key including parameter estimation, error
correction and privacy amplification.
In GMCS protocol (Grosshans and Grangier, 2002;
Grosshans et al., 2003), the source is a mixture of co-
herent state |αj〉 = |xj + ipj〉 with quadrature compo-
nents xj and pj as the realizations for two i.i.d. random
variables X and P . These two random variables obey the
same zero-centred Gaussian distributionN (0, Vm), where
Vm is the modulated variance. The total variance of the
Gaussian modulated source is V = Vs + Vm, where Vs
is the intrinsic quadrature uncertainty of coherent state.
Another type of GMCS scheme is coherent-state source
mixed with trusted thermal noise (Weedbrook et al.,
2010b) whose total variance is V = Vs+Vm+Vth with an
additional thermal variance Vth. This type of protocol is
also widely used due to its low cost in state preparation
together with the feasibility for QKD in the wavelength
longer than optical band. The decoding process is based
on coherent detection measuring quadratures of optical
fields. For CV-QKD schemes, coherent detection can be
classified into homodyne detection and heterodyne detec-
tion, measuring quadratures of optical fields (Weedbrook
et al., 2012).
Note that the coherent state protocol with homodyne
detection can be modified to a no-switching protocol us-
ing heterodyne detection, which enables the communica-
tion partners to extract secure key from both quadrature
measurements (Weedbrook et al., 2004). Post-selection
(Silberhorn et al., 2002) and two-way communication (Pi-
randola et al., 2008) can also be applied to improve the
performance. So far, the GMCS protocol is believed to be
the best understood protocol in terms of security and im-
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plementation. Its implementation is also relatively sim-
ple, as it requires only standard technology in telecom-
munication.
2. Discrete modulated protocol
Besides Gaussian-modulated protocol, there exists a
different type of protocol using discrete modulation. Here
the key is encoded into the random phases of coherent
states, and the source is a N -discrete randomized coher-
ent state mixture. In fact, discrete modulated protocol
was proposed earlier than Gaussian modulated protocol
(Hiroshima, 2006; Ralph, 1999b; Reid, 2000b). However,
due to its non-Gaussian nature, a complete security proof
of discrete modulated protocol that gives a good key rate
in practice is challenging. In a discrete modulated pro-
tocol, Alice prepares an alphabet of N coherent states
|αk〉 =
∣∣|α|ei2kpi/N〉, where k is the secret key. Bob uses
either homodyne or heterodyne detection to estimate k.
Discrete modulated protocol is more practical, because
(i) a real Gaussian modulation can never be perfectly im-
plemented, and (ii) it can simplify the crucial step of error
correction. Early proofs of discrete modulated protocol
restrict attacks to be a linear quantum channel between
Alice and Bob (Leverrier and Grangier, 2009). Though
there are proofs for specific protocols where N = 2 (Zhao
et al., 2009) or N = 3 (Brádler and Weedbrook, 2018),
the key rate is quite pessimistic and cannot be general-
ized into multiple state cases.
Recently, the numerical method of security analysis
has been proposed (Coles et al., 2016), where the se-
curity analysis is transformed into a convex optimization
problem with the constraints that the statistics of certain
observable should be compatible with experimental data.
Following this line, there are two independent works an-
alyzing the asymptotic security of the quadrature-phase-
shift-keying (QPSK) protocol (Ghorai et al., 2019; Lin
et al., 2019), i.e., N = 4. With a photon number cut-off
assumption on Bob’s side, it is feasible to compute the
target function and constraints as a function of Alice and
Bob’s two-mode state. Such a photon number cut-off as-
sumption is valid since composable security proofs of CV-
QKD usually require a projection onto a low-dimensional
subspace of the Fock space, via some energy test (Renner
and Cirac, 2009). These proofs can be generalized to mul-
tiple state cases, showing that the key rate converges to
Gaussian modulated protocols when N →∞. Moreover,
another security proof was reported lately by applying
entropic continuity bounds and approximating a com-
plex Gaussian probability distribution with a finite-size
Gauss-Hermite constellation (Kaur et al., 2019). Cur-
rently, to generalize those existing security proofs to the
finite-size case remains an important open question.
3. Security analysis
Intuitively, the security of coherent state protocol
comes from the fact that coherent states are non-
orthogonal, which ensures the no-cloning theorem. To
rigorously analyze the security, it is convenient to con-
sider an entanglement-based protocol. Alice prepares an
two-mode EPR state |EPR〉AA′ . She keeps one mode A
in her lab and sends the other mode A′ to Bob through
a noisy channel EA′→B . Alice performs heterodyne de-
tection on her mode and gets a coherent state output,
which is identical to preparing a coherent state to Bob
from Eve’s point of view. We assume the worst case sce-
nario where Eve holds a purification of ρAB , then the
tripartite state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve is given by
ρABE = (idA ⊗ UA′→BE(|EPR〉 〈EPR|AA′)), (50)
where idA denotes the identity map on Alice’s mode A
and UA′→BE is an isometry. Alice and Bob’s secure in-
formation under collective attack in asymptotic limit, for
reverse reconciliation, is given by the Devetak-Winter for-
mula (Devetak and Winter, 2005),
K = I(A : B)− supχ(B : E), (51)
where χ(B : E) is the Holevo bound (Holevo, 1973). The
supremum is computed over all possible quantum chan-
nels compatible with the statistics obtained in the pa-
rameter estimation step in implementation. The secure
key can be distilled as long as Alice and Bob’s mutual
information is larger than the maximum of Bob’s classi-
cal information accessible to Eve through the quantum
channel between Bob and Eve.
Specifically, in the parameter estimation step, Alice
and Bob exchange the statistics calculated from a subset
of the sifted raw key, and estimate the covariance matrix
of the two-mode state share by them,
γAB =
(
VAI2 Zσz
Zσz VBI2
)
(52)
where VA and VB are the variance of the quadratures,
I2 is the two-dimensional identity matrix, and Z is the
covariance calculated by the experimental data.
Thanks to the Gaussian optimality proved in (García-
Patrón and Cerf, 2006; Navascués et al., 2006; Wolf et al.,
2006), the optimal collective attack Eve can implement
is the one based on Gaussian operations, which result
in a two-mode Gaussian state. Owing to the one-to-one
correspondence between Gaussian states and covariance
matrix, we can directly calculate the secure key rate un-
der collective attack by the covariance matrix. Suppose
the optimal attack is characterized by a Gaussian chan-
nel of transmittance T and excess noise ξ, then there will
be the following relations
VB = T (VA + ξ)
Z =
√
T (V 2A − 1).
(53)
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And the mutual information between Alice and Bob is
given by
I(A : B) =
ω
2
log
V + ξ
ξ + 1
, (54)
where ω = 1, 2 corresponds to Bob’s homodyne detec-
tion and heterodyne detection, respectively. The Holevo
bound is calculated by
χ(B : E) = S(E)− S(E|b) = S(AB)− S(E|b), (55)
where the second equation is because Eve holds a purifi-
cation of ρAB and b is Bob’s measurement result. Both
S(AB) and S(E|b) can be calculated from the corre-
sponding covariance matrix γAB and γE|b (Grosshans,
2005; Navascués and Acín, 2005). The form of V (E|b)
depends on homodyne detection or heterodyne detection
that Bob performs. Notice that to obtain a secret key,
the two important parameters are the transmittance T
and excess noise ξ, which should be carefully estimated
in the parameter estimation step.
The above security analysis is restricted to collective
attacks in the asymptotic limit of infinitely long keys.
On one hand, one needs to generalize the collective at-
tacks to coherent (or general) attacks, which is a chal-
lenging problem in CV-QKD. Fortunately, it turns out
that collective attacks are as efficient as coherent attacks
assuming the permutation symmetry of the classical post-
processing (Renner and Cirac, 2009). The phase-space
symmetries and the postselection technique (Christandl
et al., 2009) can also be exploited to perform a reduction
from general to collective attacks (Leverrier et al., 2013).
Recently, a new type of Gaussian de Finetti reduction
was proposed which confirms the belief that proving the
security against Gaussian collective attacks in CV-QKD
is sufficient obtain the security against coherent attacks
(Leverrier, 2017).
On the other hand, the security analysis should be ex-
tend to finite-key case. The finite-key rate will have a
deviation from the asymptotic limit, which is due to the
statistical fluctuations in parameter estimation. More-
over, other deviations arise when we assume Gaussian
attacks and consider collective attacks instead of coherent
attacks. These issues were well addressed in the litera-
tures (Furrer et al., 2012; Leverrier, 2015; Leverrier et al.,
2013). Based on postselection technique (Christandl
et al., 2009), the security of GMCS CV-QKD was proven
against general attacks in the finite-size regime (Lever-
rier et al., 2013), but the security proof is not compos-
able. For composable security proof, Furrer et al. pro-
vide the first proof for CV-QKD with squeezed states
using the entropic uncertainty principle (Furrer et al.,
2012), whereas the analysis is only moderately tolerant
to loss. For coherent-state protocols, Leverrier gives the
first composable security proof against only collective at-
tacks (Leverrier, 2015), and proposes a new type of Gaus-
sian de Finetti reduction which shows the potential for
finite-key security with small data sizes (Leverrier, 2017).
Nevertheless, the current proof techniques for compos-
able security against coherent attacks still require rather
large block sizes, e.g., > 1013 (Leverrier, 2017). The com-
posable security of CV-QKD against coherent (or gen-
eral) attacks in a realistic finite-size regime remains an
outstanding open issue for the future study of improved
proof techniques.
Beside coherent state, the squeezed state protocol has
also been widely studied for CV-QKD. In a squeezed
state protocol (Cerf et al., 2001; Hillery, 2000), Alice
squeezes the X quadrature of a vacuum state and dis-
places it by an amount a, which follows a Gaussian dis-
tribution of variance VA. Then she adds a random phase
of 0 or pi/2 on it, which is equivalent to randomly choos-
ing a direction to squeeze. Finally she randomly dis-
places the output state along the other direction (not the
squeezing direction) following another Gaussian variable
of variance V . The two variance VA and V should satisfy
VA + V
−1 = V such that Eve cannot distinguish which
quadrature is squeezed. Bob randomly measures X or P
quadrature. Alice and Bob perform the postprocessing
after a certain rounds of measurements. The squeezed
state protocol is more similar to the DV-QKD protocols
than the coherent state protocol. Its security is based on
an entropic uncertainty principle (Cerf et al., 2001). The
composable security of finite size analyses have also been
given in (Furrer, 2014; Furrer et al., 2012), together with
experimental verifications (Gehring et al., 2015).
B. Experimental developments
AFGB1 =  AFG 	AFG;B1T	AFG;B1 B1 
which is obtained by rearranging the lines and columns of
the matrix describing the system AB1FG see Fig. 1,
AB1FG = Y
TAB  F0G
EPRY , 10
where Y = 1A SBF0
BF
 1G. This matrix is obtained by apply-
ing onto systems B and F0 a beam splitter transformation
SBF0
BS  that models the efficiency  of Bob’s detector, where
F0 is the thermal state that models the electronic noise of the
detector vel. A long but straightforward calculation shows
that the symplectic eigenvalues 3,4 are given by
3,4
2
=
1
2
C ± C2 − 4D , 11
where C=
VB+TV+line+Ahom
TV+tot
and D=B V+
Bhom
TV+tot
while the last
symplectic eigenvalue is simply 5=1. The Holevo informa-
tion bound then reads
BE = G1 − 12  + G2 − 12  − G3 − 12  − G4 − 12 
12
and the Holevo “raw” key rate, proven secure against collec-
tive attacks, reads IHolevo= IAB−BE.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE
QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
A. Experimental setup
The experimental setup for the CVQKD experiments that
we have performed is shown in Fig. 2. It is a coherent-state
QKD setup, operating at 1550 nm and consisting entirely of
standard fiber optics and telecommunication components. Al-
ice uses a laser diode, pulsed with a repetition rate of
500 kHz, to generate pulses with a width of 100 ns. Using a
highly asymmetric fiber-optic coupler, these pulses are split
into a strong phase reference, the local oscillator LO, con-
taining typically 109 photons per pulse, and a weak signal.
The signal pulses are displaced in the complex plane, with
arbitrary amplitude and phase, randomly chosen from a two-
dimensional Gaussian distribution centered at zero and with
an adjustable variance VAN0. The selected amplitude and
phase values are set by computer-driven electro-optics am-
plitude and phase modulators placed in the signal path. Fi-
nally, after part of the signal is removed for synchronization
and system characterization purposes see Sec. III B for de-
tails, Alice’s desired modulation variance is adjusted with a
second amplitude modulator and a variable attenuator.
To avoid any polarization and phase drifts that may occur
between the signal and LO over long-distance transmissions,
and thus an incurred additional noise, both signal and LO
pulses need to travel in the same optical fiber. Because of the
simplicity of the corresponding setup, we have opted for
time multiplexing, which is implemented by delaying the LO
using an 80 m fiber in its path and then combining the signal
and LO pulses at the output of Alice’s setup, as shown in Fig.
2. Subsequently, the signal and LO pulses, separated by
400 ns, are sent to Bob via the quantum channel, which is a
standard single-mode optical fiber coil.
Bob passively demultiplexes the signal and LO using a
90/10 fiber-optic coupler, thus introducing a 10% loss in the
signal. Then, Bob selects the quadrature to be measured by
adjusting the measurement phase with a computer-driven
phase modulator placed in the LO path. Another 80 m delay
line, placed now in the signal path, results in the signal and
LO pulses overlapping at the output beamsplitter of the in-
terferometer. To ensure a good interference contrast, the path
difference between the signal and LO has to be adjusted to
less than a centimeter. The selected quadrature measurement
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FIG. 2. Color online Experimental setup for CVQKD.
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FIG. 20 An illustration of the implementation of GMCS CV-
QKD. [Figure reproduced from (Lodewyck et al., 2007)].
The widely imple ented CV-QKD protoco is
the GMCS protocol (Grosshans and Grangier, 2002;
Grosshans et al., 2003) (see Box VII.A.1) due to its sim-
plicity in preparatio , dul tion and detection of co-
herent states. An illustration of the implementation is
shown in Fig. 20 (Lodewyck et al., 2007). Alice e ploys
a laser diode to generate op ical pulses, each of which
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is split into signal and local oscillator (LO) by a fiber-
optic coupler. The signal pulses are modulated in am-
plitude and phase according to a Gaussian distribution,
and attenuated to the desired modulation variance with
a variable attenuator. The LO is time delayed and then
combined with the signal at Alice’s output. Bob pas-
sively demultiplexes the signal and LO using a coupler
and then performs the measurement using a shot-noise-
limited homodyne detector. Bob can select the quadra-
ture to be measured by adjusting the measurement phase
with a phase modulator placed in the LO path. An ad-
vanced feature of this implementation is that it consists
entirely of standard fiber optics and telecommunication
components.
Reverse reconciliation was introduced to the GMCS
protocol in 2003 (Grosshans et al., 2003), which allows
GMCS to beat the 3-dB loss limit. Moreover, a free-space
experiment at visible light wavelength was also performed
there. With telecom wavelength, GMCS was performed
over practical distance of optical fibers (of 25km and 5km
respectively) in (Lodewyck et al., 2007; Qi et al., 2007b).
Meanwhile, the heterodyne detection (Lance et al., 2005)
and Gaussian post-selection (Symul et al., 2007) were also
demonstrated. Later, the feasibility of GMCS CV-QKD
was also extensively tested in field environments (Fos-
sier et al., 2009). The secure distance was substan-
tially extended to 80 km based on the improved effi-
ciency of the post-processing techniques (Jouguet et al.,
2013b). By controlling the excess noise, the distance
was further extended to 100 km standard fiber (Huang
et al., 2016c). Recently, state-of-the-art CV-QKD imple-
mentations were sequentially reported, such as high-rate
demonstrations with a secret key rate up to 3.14 Mbits/s
in the asymptotic limit over 25-km fiber (Wang et al.,
2018b), a 4-node field network (Huang et al., 2016b),
a field test over 50-km commercial fiber (Zhang et al.,
2019c), a long-distance CV-QKD over about 200-km ul-
tralow loss fiber (Zhang et al., 2020), a Si photonic chip-
based CV-QKD implementation (Zhang et al., 2019a)
and so forth. Although we focus on the GMCS im-
plementations, we note several other important exper-
iments, such as the squeezed-state protocols (Gehring
et al., 2015) and a CV-QKD experiment with entangled
states over 50-km fiber (Wang et al., 2018a). Some recent
developments of CV-QKD are shown in Table V.
From a practical point of view, CV-QKD presents the
key advantage that it only requires standard telecom-
munication technology which is compatible with clas-
sical optical communications, i.e., it uses the coherent
detection techniques instead of single-photon detection
technology as required in DV-QKD. Moreover, the LO
in CV-QKD can serve as a built-in single mode filter,
which makes it naturally resistant against background
noises (Qi et al., 2010). This is particularly useful in the
practical situations, including the coexistence of QKD
with classical channels via DWDM (Kumar et al., 2015b;
Qi et al., 2010), the daylight free-space CV quantum com-
munication (Heim et al., 2014; Peuntinger et al., 2014;
Vasylyev et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2019b). Nonethe-
less, CV-QKD systems are in general sensitive to losses,
which restricts the secure distance, normally below 100
km fiber (Jouguet et al., 2013b). However, in theory,
CV-QKD may provide higher key rates than DV-QKD
at relatively short distances because of its high dimen-
sionality (Jouguet et al., 2014), while the exact rate in
terms of bits/s depends on the technology of real imple-
mentation. High-rate CV-QKD requires high-speed and
real-time implementations of several challenging tech-
niques (Wang et al., 2018b), such as low-noise homodye
detector, efficient error correction codes, precise parame-
ter estimation etc. Also, the composable security proofs
against general attacks still require a very large block
sizes to allow a positive key in the finite-key regime (Lev-
errier, 2015), which cascades a challenge on the stability
of the system. These issues are important subjects for
future research.
C. Quantum hacking and countermeasures
Similar to DV-QKD, the implementations of CV-QKD
also suffer from side channels. On the source part, the
Trojan horse attacks can probe Alice’s modulators in CV-
QKD systems (Jain et al., 2014). Similar to DV-QKD, a
countermeasure is to put an optical isolator and a mon-
itoring detector at the output of Alice’s setup. The im-
perfections in state preparation may also cause an in-
crease of the excess noise and misestimate of the channel
loss (Liu et al., 2017). On the detection part, the wave-
length dependence of the beam splitter can be exploited
by Eve to hack CV-QKD based on heterodyne detec-
tion (Huang et al., 2013; Ma et al., 2013c). Qin et al.
demonstrated the detector saturation attack (Qin et al.,
2016) and blinding attack (Qin et al., 2018) against ho-
modyne detectors in CV-QKD by exploiting the nonlin-
ear behavior of coherent detectors. A wavelength filter is
effective against the first attack, and a proper monitor at
detection may counter the second attack. A more general
solution is to perform the real-time shot noise measure-
ment as analyzed in (Kunz-Jacques and Jouguet, 2015;
Zhang et al., 2019d).
To completely remove the detection attacks, a CV ver-
sion of MDI-QKD was proposed (Pirandola et al., 2015).
See also (Li et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2014) for a security
analysis against restricted attacks. The concept is simi-
lar to the MDI-QKD protocol discussed in Section VI.B,
but here Alice and Bob prepare coherent states with a
Gaussian modulation and send them to Charlie. Charlie
then mixes them on a balanced beam splitter, measures
a different quadrature for both output modes and pub-
licly announces his measurement results. The security
of CV MDI-QKD can be analyzed by considering the
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entanglement-based version of the protocol (Lupo et al.,
2018). A proof-of-principle CV MDI-QKD experiment
was demonstrated in free space with advanced detection
techniques in 2015 (Pirandola et al., 2015). Nonethe-
less, afull implementation with practical lengths of opti-
cal fibers is still a great challenge which has not been re-
ported in the literature yet, partly because of the require-
ment of high-efficiency detection (Xu et al., 2015a). Even
so, CV MDI-QKD has the potential to provide slightly
higher key rates, and it might be interesting for network
communication over relatively short distances (Pirandola
et al., 2015).
Besides, an additional threat for CV-QKD is the trans-
mission of LO, which can be manipulated by Eve. The
attacks by controlling the transmitted LO were proposed
in (Ma et al., 2013b). Eve can also exploit a subtle
link between the local oscillator calibration procedure
and the clock generation procedure employed in practi-
cal setups (Jouguet et al., 2013a). A countermeasure for
the LO attacks consists of implementing a rigorous and
robust real-time measurement of the shot noise (Kunz-
Jacques and Jouguet, 2015; Zhang et al., 2019d). A bet-
ter solution is the locally LO (LLO) CV-QKD scheme (Qi
et al., 2015; Soh et al., 2015) (see Fig. 21), which can com-
pletely avoid the transmission of the LO through the inse-
cure channel. In this scheme, Bob uses a second, indepen-
dent laser to produce LO pulses locally for the coherent
detection. A challenge here is how to effectively establish
a reliable phase reference between Alice’s and Bob’s inde-
pendent lasers, which require a careful synchronization of
the frequencies and phases. This can be achieved by send-
ing the reference or pilot-aided pulse along with the signal
pulse from Alice. Bob can use his LO pulse to perform
coherent detection for the reference pulse to estimate the
relative phase between Alice’s and Bob’s lasers. A phase
correction can thus be established on Alice and Bob’s sig-
nal data in order to generate the secret key. Due to the
enhanced security of LLO CV-QKD, there has been great
attention in this scheme. In 2015, three groups have in-
dependently demonstrated LLO CV-QKD (Huang et al.,
2015a; Qi et al., 2015; Soh et al., 2015). These experi-
ments are shown in Fig. 21. Afterwards, a LLO CV-QKD
experiment with pilot and quantum signals multiplexed
in the frequency domain was reported in (Kleis et al.,
2017), a comprehensive framework to model the perfor-
mance of LLO CV-QKD was reported in (Marie and Al-
léaume, 2017), a pilot-assisted coherent intradyne recep-
tion methodology for LLO CV-QKD was proposed and
demonstrated in (Laudenbach et al., 2017), and a high
rate LLO CV-QKD was demonstrated in (Wang et al.,
2018b).
a
b
c
FIG. 21 (Color online) Initial local LO (LLO) CV-QKD ex-
periments. a, LLO CV-QKD experiment with the pilot-aided
feedforward data recovery scheme using commercial off-the-
shelf devices (Qi et al., 2015). b, LLO CV-QKD experiment
with self reference (Soh et al., 2015). c, A high-speed LLO
CV-QKD experiment (Huang et al., 2015a). [Figures repro-
duced from (Huang et al., 2015a; Qi et al., 2015; Soh et al.,
2015)].
VIII. OTHER QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS
A. Device-independent QKD
A QKD protocol is device-independent if its secu-
rity does not rely on trusting that the quantum devices
used are truthful. A schematic illustration of device-
independent QKD (DI-QKD) is shown in Fig. 22. DI-
QKD (Acín et al., 2007; Barrett et al., 2005; Mayers and
Yao, 1998) (hinted earlier by Ekert (Ekert, 1991)) re-
laxes all modelling assumptions about the quantum de-
vices and allows the users to do QKD with uncharaterized
devices. DI-QKD performs self-testing of the underlying
devices, i.e., the devices cannot pass the test unless they
carry out the QKD protocol securely. As a result, as
long as certain necessary assumptions are satisfied, one
can prove the security of DI-QKD based solely on a Bell
nonlocal behaviour, typically the violation of a Bell’s in-
equality, which certifies the presence of quantum correla-
tions in a self-testing manner. Table XVI lists a summary
of the necessary assumptions of DI-QKD (Pironio et al.,
2009). The security proofs have required the assump-
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tion that the devices have no memory between trials, or
that each party has many, strictly isolated devices (Acín
et al., 2007; Barrett et al., 2005; Masanes et al., 2011;
Pironio et al., 2009). If the devices have memory or the
devices are reused, DI-QKD will suffer from the memory
attacks (Barrett et al., 2013) and covert channels (Curty
and Lo, 2019).
BobAlice
Black box
XA
{0,1,-}
XB
{0,1,-}Entanglement
Source Black box
FIG. 22 Schematic diagram of DI-QKD (Acín et al., 2007;
Mayers and Yao, 1998). Entangled photon pairs are dis-
tributed to Alice and Bob, who are supposed to perform some
measurements. Alice and Bob see their quantum devices as
black boxes producing classical outputs, as a function of clas-
sical inputs XA and XB . From the observed statistics, and
without making any assumptions on the internal working of
the devices, they should be able to conclude whether they
establish a secret key. Alice and Bob assume giving the un-
trusted quantum devices tests that cannot be passed unless
they carry out the QKD protocol securely, which can be check
via the violation of a Bell’s inequality (Pironio et al., 2009).
The security proof for DI-QKD is a challenging task,
because in DI-QKD, both the quantum state (generated
by the source) and the measurement operators (by the
detection devices) are untrusted or under Eve’s control.
Fortunately, recent theory efforts have significantly ad-
vanced the developments of DI-QKD to be possible in
a large quantum system (Reichardt et al., 2013), secure
for a large class of protocols by independent measure-
ments (Masanes et al., 2011), secure against general at-
tacks (Miller and Shi, 2016; Vazirani and Vidick, 2014)
and robust against noise (Arnon-Friedman et al., 2018).
In the asymptotic case against collective attacks, the key
rate formula can be expressed as a function of the Bell vi-
olation value. For a protocol where Alice and Bob carry
out a CHSH-type Bell test for self-testing privacy, the
key rate formula can be given by (Pironio et al., 2009),
r ≥ 1− h(E)− h
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
, (56)
where the quantum bit error rate E determines the
amount of randomness consumed for error correction,
and the violation value S of the CHSH inequality de-
termines the amount of randomness for privacy amplifi-
cation.
Though DI-QKD is remarkable in theory, unfortu-
nately, it is hard to realize with current technology, be-
cause it needs almost perfect efficiency of single-photon
detection (Masanes et al., 2011). In experiments, how-
ever, the emitted photons may not be detected due to
the losses in the transmission or the limited detection
efficiency of imperfect detectors. In addition, a faithful
realization of DI-QKD requires that the Bell inequality is
violated under the following two conditions: (i) The mea-
surement settings are not correlated with the devices; (ii)
The devices observe a no-signalling behaviour in generat-
ing the outcomes. To meet these conditions, a so-called
loophole-free Bell test normally needs to be carried out.
A key problem in a loophole-free Bell test is the limited
detection efficiency which is referred to as efficiency loop-
hole (Pearle, 1970). It has been proved that for the sim-
plest bipartite Bell inequalities with binary inputs and
outputs, a detector efficiency of at least 2/3 is necessary
for a faithful Bell inequality violation (Eberhard, 1993).
For the purpose of DI-QKD, a much higher efficiency is
needed due to the requirement of information reconcilia-
tion. To guarantee the no-signalling behaviour between
devices, i.e., the locality loophole, a space-like separated
measurement set-up can be implemented (Aspect, 1975).
The requirement of uncorrelated inputs is referred to as
the free-will loophole, which cannot be closed completely.
Nonetheless, practical QRNGs can be used to overcome
the problem to some extent.
Recently, an exciting news is that researchers have
demonstrated the Bell’s inequality which simultaneously
closed the locality loophole and the detection loophole
in the same experiment (Giustina et al., 2015; Hensen
et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2018b; Rosenfeld et al., 2017;
Shalm et al., 2015). This is a milestone result towards the
realization of DI-QKD. In future, the advanced technolo-
gies might make DI-QKD more practical, and ideas such
as qubit amplification (Gisin et al., 2010) might also be
proved useful to increase the key rate and distance of DI-
QKD, though the key rate might be relatively low (Curty
and Moroder, 2011; Seshadreesan et al., 2016). Recent
theoretical progresses have proposed the two-way classi-
cal communication to enhance the noise tolerance (Tan
et al., 2020), and provided the detailed analysis towards
the realization of DI-QKD (Murta et al., 2019). Overall,
we do believe that DI-QKD is an important subject for
future research.
B. Some New QKD implementations
Besides the efforts in the security with imperfect de-
vices, quite a few new QKD protocols have been pro-
posed and implemented during the past ten years, which
are summarized in Table VII.
1. Round-robin DPS QKD
In general, there exists a threshold of the error rate for
each scheme, above which no secure key can be gener-
ated. This threshold puts a restriction on the environ-
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ment noises. Especially, in the key rate formula, the bit
error can be directly computed from the experimental
data, whereas the phase error needs to be estimated or
bounded. In the BB84 protocol with strong symmetries,
both error rate are approximately the same in the long
key length limit. In other protocols, normally there is a
relation between the two error rates. In the end, when the
bit error rate goes beyond some threshold level, no secure
key can be generated. For example, BB84 cannot tolerate
error rates beyond 25% considering a simple intercept-
and-resend attack (Bennett and Brassard, 1984). This
threshold puts a stringent requirement on the system en-
vironment, which makes some practical implementations
challenging.
Round-robin differential phase shifted (RRDPS) QKD,
proposed by Sasaki, Yamamoto and Koashi (Sasaki et al.,
2014) in 2014, essentially removes this restriction and
can in principle tolerate more environment disturbance.
In this protocol, Eve’s information can be bounded only
by user’s certain experiment parameters other than the
error rates. In particular, the phase error rate ep is deter-
mined by the user’s own settings rather than the channel
performance, which makes the protocol fundamentally
interesting and tolerate more errors.
In the RRDPS QKD protocol, the sender Alice puts a
random phase, chosen from {0, pi}, on each of L pulses,
with an average photon number of µ in such an L-pulse
signal. Upon receiving the block, the receiver Bob imple-
ments a single-photon interference with an Mach-Zehnder
interferometer (MZI), as shown in Fig. 23a. Bob can ran-
domly adjust the length difference of the two arms of the
MZI. After obtaining a detection click, Bob first identi-
fies which two pulses interfere and then announces the
corresponding indices i, j to Alice. Alice can derive the
relative phase between the two pulses as the raw key,
and Bob can record the raw key from the measurement
results. The phase error rate depends only on the num-
ber of photons in the L-pulse signal and L, not the bit
error rate. By setting a larger L, the phase error tends
to 0, and the scheme can tolerate a higher bit error rate.
Triggered by the original protocol, an alternative pas-
sive type of RRDPS QKD is proposed by Guan et al.
(Guan et al., 2015). As is shown in Fig. 23b, when Bob
receives a block from Alice, he prepares a local L-pulse
reference in plain phases, i.e., all phases are encoded at
phase 0. This L-pulse reference interferes with the L-
pulse signal sent by Alice on a beam splitter. For each
block, Bob records the status of his two detectors with
time stamps, i and j. If Bob’s reference is in phase with
Alice’s signal, i.e. Bob has a phase reference, the whole
setup is essentially a huge Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
Any detection signal at time slot i will tell the phase
difference between i and the phase reference. Then the
encoding bit value can be figured out by Bob. If the
phase Bob’s reference is random relative to Alice’s signal,
the interference is a Hong-Ou-Mandel type interference
(Hong et al., 1987) instead of a MZI. Bob post-selects
the block where there are exactly two detections and an-
nounces their positions i and j (if i = j, the detection
result is discarded). The raw key is the relative phase
between these two pulses in the L-pulse signal. Alice can
derive this phase difference from her record. While Bob
can infer the bit value depending on that the coincidence
happens between two different detectors or one detector
at two different time slots. The security proofs of the two
protocols are beyond the scope of the paper and we re-
fer the readers to the original papers (Guan et al., 2015;
Sasaki et al., 2014).
a
b
FIG. 23 a, The original RRDPS scheme (Sasaki et al., 2014).
VDL means variable delay line. Bob splits the received sig-
nals into two paths and applies a variable delay r to one of
the paths. A click at ith place will indicate an interference
between the pulses i and j = i + r. b, The passive RRDPS
scheme. Bob uses a local laser to generate an L-pulse refer-
ence, which interferes with Alice’s L-pulse signal. Bob then
records the coincidence clicks. [Figure reproduced from (Guan
et al., 2015)].
The first published experimental result is based on
the passive protocol (Guan et al., 2015), as shown in
Fig. 24a. Comparing to the original protocol, the pas-
sive one avoids randomly adjusting the length difference
of the MZI. Based on the current technology, the main
adjust-delay method is to utilize optical switches, which
cannot provide both high speed and low insertion loss si-
multaneously. But meanwhile, it requires remote optical
phase locking, which is challenging in the real deploy-
ment.
The key point for an active RRDPS is to realize the
random time delay. Takesue et al. (Takesue et al., 2015)
exploits a one-input, four-output optical splitter followed
by four silica waveguides based MZI with 0.5,1.0,1.5,2.0
ns temporal delays respectively, as is shown in Fig. 24b.
Any two delays constitute a new MZI and the whole sys-
tem realizes a L = 1− 5 variable delay. With this delay,
the authors achieved secure key rate through 30 km fiber
with an error rate of 18%. Later, Wang et al. (Wang
et al., 2015c), shown in Fig. 24c, combines a three-port
circulator, a beam splitter, two 1×8 optical switches fol-
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FIG. 24 (Color online) The experimental setups for RRDPS
QKD, reported in the references of a, (Guan et al., 2015); b,
(Takesue et al., 2015); c, (Wang et al., 2015c); d, (Li et al.,
2016). [Figures reproduced from (Guan et al., 2015; Li et al.,
2016; Wang et al., 2015c)].
lowed with two groups of fiber delays. The two optical
switches shall actively choose different delays and achieve
a L=1 to 64 bit variable-delay Faraday-Michelson inter-
ferometer. Based on the delay, Wang et al. distributed
a secret key over a distance of 90 km fiber. In addition,
Li et al. (Li et al., 2016) exploited a different configura-
tion, which can be seen in Fig. 24d. They put 7 MZI in
series to achieve a 127-value variable delays. And each
MZI is constructed of a Pockels cell, a fiber, or free-space
link with specific length and two polarizing beam split-
ters (PBSs). The Pockels cell, controlled by a random
number, may change the polarization of the photon and
thus provide a delay. Very recently, the secure distance
is extended to 140 km by increasing the bound on infor-
mation leakage (Yin et al., 2018).
2. High-dimensional QKD
Besides the qubit-based QKD, the secret keys can also
be encoded with multi-level system, i.e. high-dimensional
a b
c
FIG. 25 (Color online) The experimental setup for HD QKD.
a,HD QKD with time-energy entangled photon pairs (Ali-
Khan et al., 2007). b, Dispersive-optics time-energy HD QKD
(Lee et al., 2014). c, A field test of OAM HD QKD in the city
of Ottawa (Sit et al., 2017). [Figures reproduced from (Ali-
Khan et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2014; Sit et al., 2017)].
QKD (HD-QKD). HD-QKD can provide higher key rate
per particle comparing to the qubit system (Bourennane
et al., 2001), and it has a higher tolerance to noise (Cerf
et al., 2002). A recent review on the subject can be
seen in (Xavier and Lima, 2020). The first experimen-
tal attempts of HD-QKD are using higher-order dimen-
sional alphabets with spatial degrees of freedom of pho-
tons (Walborn et al., 2006) or energy-time entangled pho-
ton pairs (Ali-Khan et al., 2007). The later is shown in
Fig. 25a. With this setup, Ali-Khan et al. can generate
a large-alphabet key with over 10 bits of information per
photon pair, albeit with large noise. QKD with 5% bit
error rate is demonstrated with 4 bits of information per
photon pair, where the security of the quantum chan-
nel is determined by the visibility of Franson interference
fringes.
Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2014b) reported a com-
plete security proof of time-energy entanglement QKD
using dual-basis interferometry. Mower et al. (Mower
et al., 2013) suggested to utilize dispersive optics to re-
place the Franson interferometer and demonstrated its
security against collective attack. In this scheme, as
shown in Fig. 25b (Lee et al., 2014), Alice or Bob utilize
normal or abnormal group-velocity dispersive element to
measure the frequency basis. The absolute group delays
of their dispersive elements are matched such that the
group-velocity dispersion is nonlocally canceled. Alice
and Bob use time basis measurements for generating keys
and frequency basis measurements for bounding Eve’s
maximum accessible information about the time basis
measurements. This is based on the fact that the dis-
persion cancelation only happens with entanglement and
any reduced entanglement visibility due to eavesdropping
will bring a broaden time correlation measurement.
With the time energy entangled photon pairs, Zhong
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et al. observed a secure key rate of 2.7Mbps after 20 km
fiber transmission with a key capacity of 6.9 bits per pho-
ton coincidence (Zhong et al., 2015). Recently, high-rate
QKD using time-bin qudits was reported in (Islam et al.,
2017). Time energy type HD-QKD has advantage with a
constant clock rate because it can utilize more time slots
with high time resolution single photon detector. How-
ever, the advantage will be offset when the clock rate can
be increased to the bandwidth of the single photon de-
tector (Zhang et al., 2008). One solution is to utilize a
degree of freedom other than time, for example, the op-
tical angular momentum (OAM). The first HD-QKD for
OAM was published in 2006 (Gröblacher et al., 2006).
Qutrit entangled photon pairs were utilized to generate
quantum key. In an E91-type protocol(Ekert, 1991), the
violation of a three-dimensional Bell inequality verifies
the security of the generated keys. A key is obtained with
a qutrit error rate of approximately 10%. Later, Etchev-
erry et al. report an automated prepare-and-measure
HD-QKD with 16-dimensional photonic states (Etchev-
erry et al., 2013); Mafu et al. exploit high-dimension
OAM up to five dimensions for HD-QKD (Mafu et al.,
2013); Mirhosseini et al. use the OAM of weak coherent
state and the corresponding mutually unbiased basis of
angular position (Mirhosseini et al., 2015); Sit et al. (Sit
et al., 2017) implement a field test of OAM HD-QKD in
the city of Ottawa, where 4-dimensional OAM HD-QKD
was implemented and a QBER of 11% was attained with
a corresponding secret key rate of 0.65 bits per sifted
photon (see Fig. 25c). Recently, Cozzolino et al., demon-
strated OAM HD-QKD over a 1.2-km-long multi-mode
fiber (Cozzolino et al., 2019). Different groups utilized
spatial-division multiplexing optical fibres, such as multi-
core fibres, to perform HD-QKD (Cañas et al., 2017; Ding
et al., 2017).
Naively, one might think that since a HD-QKD sys-
tem offers a higher key rate per signal than a qubit-based
QKD system. It seems always better to use a HD-QKD
system. One has to be very careful in making such a
comparison, because key rate per signal may not be the
best measure when the signal size itself is big. Key rate
per second (certain period of time) can be a better merit
for applications. In fact, a HD-QKD protocol uses many
e.g. time-bins/modes for each signal. Now, if one were to
use the many time-bins/modes separately and in parallel
(with many sets of high-speed single photon detectors),
one would actually get a higher key rate in such a mul-
tiplexed QKD system. At the end of the day, the pri-
vate capacity per mode of a simple prepare-and-measure
QKD system is limited by fundamental bounds (Piran-
dola et al., 2017; Takeoka et al., 2014). The key rate of
HD-QKD is still limited by those fundamental bounds.
Nonetheless, HD-QKD may be useful in a practical sit-
uation, where the single photon detector has long dead
time or resetting time and it can not operate at high
speed (Zhong et al., 2015). Overall, the practical advan-
tages of HD-QKD in real-life applications remain to be
seen in future.
3. QKD with wavelength-division multiplexing
Except for the new protocols, reducing the cost of
QKD system is another important topic in the field.
Wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) technology,
which enables the coexistence of QKD and telecom com-
munication in a single fiber, is exploited to reduce the
cost of the channel.
In order to protect ultra-weak QKD signals, most
of previous QKD experiments are implemented in dark
fibers. This implies dedicated fiber installations for QKD
networks, which bears cost penalties in fiber leasing and
maintenance, as well as limitations on the network scale.
In classical optical communications, WDM technology
has been widely exploited to increase the data bandwidth
and reduce the requirement of fiber resource. Then, it is
natural for QKD to coexist with classical optical commu-
nication based on WDM technology. The scheme of si-
multaneously transmitting QKD with conventional data
was first introduced by Townsend in 1997 (Townsend,
1997). A series of QKD experiments integrating with
various classical channels have been demonstrated (Cha-
puran et al., 2009; Dynes et al., 2016; Eraerds et al., 2010;
Patel et al., 2014, 2012; Wang et al., 2015b). Currently,
by using spectral and temporal controls, state-of-the-art
developments have been made to realize co-propagation
of QKD with one 100 Gbps dense wavelength-division
multiplexing (DWDM) data channel in 150 km ultra-
low loss fiber at −5dBm launch power (Fröhlich et al.,
2017). By setting QKD wavelength to 1310 nm and in-
serting 100GHz DWDM filters, Wang et al. implement
QKD together with classical traffic with 11dBm input
power over 80 km fiber spools (Wang et al., 2017b). A
field trial of simultaneous QKD transmission and four 10
Gbps encrypted data channels was implemented over 26
km installed fiber at −10dBm launch power (Choi et al.,
2014).
Recently, the coexistence of QKD and commercial
backbone network of 3.6Tbps classical data over 66 km
fiber at 21 dBm launch power has been demonstrated
(Mao et al., 2018). The system provides 3 kbps secure
key rate with a 2.5% quantum bit error rate. Note that
in current backbone networks, the data traffic is around
Tbps and the launch power is around 20 dBm. In that
sense, the recent work (Mao et al., 2018) demonstrate the
possibility of coexistence of QKD with backbone network.
4. Chip-based QKD
Integrating QKD system has attracted more and more
attention due to its advantage at compact size, low en-
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FIG. 26 (Color online) The experimental layout for a, Low cost and compact QKD setup (Duligall et al., 2006), b, Silicon
photonic QKD emitter (Ma et al., 2016a), c, A compact QKD transmitter, QCard (Hughes et al., 2013), d, InP based QKD
sender and SiOxNy receiver chip (Sibson et al., 2017a). [Figures reproduced from (Duligall et al., 2006; Hughes et al., 2013;
Ma et al., 2016a; Sibson et al., 2017a)].
ergy consumption and potential for low cost (Orieux and
Diamanti, 2016). QKD, including optics and electron-
ics, is a complicated system. Thus an integrated QKD
system research should include integrating both optics
and electronics. Fortunately, the integrated circuits (IC)
is already commercialized and integrated optics is also
well developed in industry. Table VI summarizes a list
of chip-based QKD experiments.
In 2005, a commercial unbalanced Mach-Zahnder in-
terferometer made of planar lightwave circuits (PLC)
based on silica-on-silicon technology was exploited for
the first time in a QKD system (Takesue et al., 2005)
to replace the fiber based interferometer. Comparing
to its fiber counterpart, PLC interferometer is more sta-
ble and can maintain its phase for several hours without
any feedback (Nambu et al., 2008; Takesue et al., 2007).
Meanwhile, IC is exploited in a research towards compact
and low cost QKD system (Duligall et al., 2006). As is
shown in Fig. 26a. Alice module uses off-the-shelf IC
components in a driver circuit to control four AlInGaP
LEDs to emit four polarized BB84 states. The channel
is a several-meter free space link, which is supposed to
find application in a future quantum based Automated
Teller Machine and even in a smart phone (Pizzi et al.,
2012) according to the authors. Along this direction of
research, Gwenaelle Vest et al. demonstrated an inte-
grated QKD sender (Vest et al., 2015), where an array
of four vertical cavity surface emitting lasers (VCSELs)
emit synchronized picosecond optical pulses, which are
coupled to micro-polarizers generating the polarization
qubits. The final size of the QKD device can be as small
as 25mm × 2mm × 1mm, which makes the system a
strong candidate for short distance free-space QKD ap-
plications.
On the metropolitan fiber network side, many individ-
ual users in the network will trust a central relay station.
This is so called network-centric structure (Hughes et al.,
2013) or access network (Fröhlich et al., 2013). In such a
structure, many users are all the senders and share only
one central relay receiver. In that sense, the receiving
station can have more space and expensive and bulky
detection system can be used. Therefore, the community
concentrates more integration efforts in the sending side.
Hughes et al. provided a QCard (Hughes et al., 2013)
in their pioneering paper, as is shown in Fig. 26b. The
QCard has a similar size as an electro-optic modulator
or a normal key. It incorporates a distributed feedback
laser and modulator. The laser is attenuated into single
photon level and modulated into BB84 polarization-state
with decoy state. The repetition frequency is 10 MHz at
the wavelength of 1550 nm, the telecom band.
Recently, the size of the QKD sender has reduced
dramatically. In 2014, Zhang et al. put forward an
on-chip LiNbO3 polarization rotator and demonstrated
the reference-frame-independent QKD protocol to over-
come unstable fibre birefringence (Zhang et al., 2014a).
In 2015„ the same group from University of Bristol
implemented integration of QKD based on an indium
phosphide transmitter chip and a silicon oxynitride re-
ceiver chip (Sibson et al., 2017a). This chip is shown in
Fig. 26d. The authors exploited the chips in three differ-
ent QKD protocols, namely BB84, coherent-one-way and
differential-phase-shift QKD.
Later, researchers from University of Toronto (Ma
et al., 2016a) and Bristol (Sibson et al., 2017b) exploited
Silicon photonics to build QKD sender system, respec-
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tively. As shown in Fig. 26c, Ma et al. (Ma et al., 2016a)
fabricated the QKD sender chip with a standard Si pho-
tonic foundry process and integrated two ring modu-
lators, a variable optical attenuator and a polarization
modulator in a 1.3mm× 3mm die area. Meanwhile, Sib-
son et al. (Sibson et al., 2017b) demonstrated coherent
one-way QKD, polarization encoded BB84, and time-bin
encoded BB84 based on Si photonic devices. The au-
thors achieve estimated asymptotic secret key rates of
up to 916 kbps and QBER as low as 1.01% over 20 km of
fiber. The clock rate of later experiment is much higher
than the former one. However, Ma et al. integrated more
components on the chip, i.e., the whole QKD emitter.
Very recently, other research groups have demon-
strated high-speed Si photonic chips for high dimen-
sional QKD over multimode fiber (Ding et al., 2017),
transceiver circuit (Cai et al., 2017) and metropolitan
QKD (Bunandar et al., 2018). Moreover, CV-QKD is
naturally suitable for photonic chip integration as its im-
plementation is compatible with current telecom tech-
nologies (see Section VII). In particular, CV-QKD essen-
tially uses the same devices as classical coherent com-
munication, and only homodyne detector is required
rather than the dedicated single-photon detector. In-
deed, a recent experiment demonstrates Si photonic chips
for CV-QKD, which integrates all the optical compo-
nents (except the laser source) (Zhang et al., 2019a).
Furthermore, based on the directly phase modulated
light source (Roberts et al., 2018; Yuan et al., 2016), a
modulator-free QKD transmitter chip was demonstrated
in (Paraïso et al., 2019). This approach has the advan-
tages that do not require conventional phase modulators,
and it is versatile to accommodate several QKD proto-
cols, such as BB84, COW and DPS, using the same op-
tics.
C. Other quantum cryptographic protocols
So far, QKD is the most developed and mature sub-
field of quantum cryptography. Meanwhile, quantum
cryptography has many other protocols (Broadbent and
Schaffner, 2016), which also have achieved quite remark-
able progresses. A list of recent developments of other
quantum cryptographic protocols is shown in Table VIII.
We will review a few examples.
1. Quantum bit commitment
Bit commitment is another important and fundamen-
tal cryptographic task that guarantees a secure commit-
ment between two mutually mistrustful parties. Alice
first commits her to a particular bit value b. After a
period of time, Alice reveal the bit value to Bob. A suc-
cess bit commitment requires that Bob can not learn b
before Alice reveals it, which is called concealing crite-
rion. Meanwhile, Alice should not change b once she
made the commitment. This is called binding criterion.
Bit commitment is a building block for many crypto-
graphic primitives, including coin tossing (Brassard and
Crépeau, 1991), zero-knowledge proofs (Goldreich et al.,
1986; Goldwasser et al., 1989), oblivious transfer (Ben-
nett et al., 1992b; Unruh, 2010) and secure two-party
computation (Kilian, 1988).
In conventional cryptography, bit commitment is based
on computational complexity assumptions similar to
public key exchange protocols and might be vulnerable
to quantum attacks. Unfortunately, it has been proven
that information-theoretically secure bit commitment is
impossible even if Alice and Bob are allowed to use quan-
tum resources in the standard quantum circuit model by
Mayers (Mayers, 1996, 1997) and by Lo and Chau (Lo
and Chau, 1997). Subsequently, such a no-go theorem
has been further extended to case with superselection
rules (Kitaev et al., 2004). For an re-examination of
this result, see e.g. (D’Ariano et al., 2007). Furthermore,
information-theoretic security of oblivious transfer and
two-party secure computations are also proven to be im-
possible in (Lo, 1997).
Interestingly, if we take into account the signalling
constraints implied by the Minkowski causality in a
relativistic context, it has been shown that there are
bit commitment protocols offering unconditional security
(Kaniewski et al., 2013; Kent, 2012). On the experimen-
tal side, two groups implemented the secure relativistic
quantum bit commitment simultaneously in 2013. One
followed the original protocol and utilized decoy state
method in free-space channel (Liu et al., 2014) and the
other exploited a revised protocol with a plug and play
system, in fiber link (Lunghi et al., 2013). Both exper-
iments were secure against any quantum or classical at-
tack. The commitment time is defined as the maximal
time during which the commitment can be held. The
commitment time in these two experiments, however is
limited to 21 ms if all attendees are located on Earth con-
sidering the relativistic constrains. Later, new protocols
with weaker security but longer commitment time was
proposed (Chakraborty et al., 2015; Lunghi et al., 2015).
A 24-hour committed experiment (Verbanis et al., 2016)
was presented, which is secure against only classical at-
tacks. Alternatively, secure quantum bit commitment
can be achieved with some additional physical assump-
tions as, for example, that the attacker’s quantum mem-
ory is noisy (Ng et al., 2012).
2. Quantum digital signature
Comparing to the previous two-party protocols, digital
signature has one sender and multiple recipients, requir-
ing that the messages cannot be forged or tampered with.
54
Classical digital signature mainly exploits the Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman protocol (Rivest et al., 1978), the secu-
rity of which is based on the mathematical complexity of
the integer factorization problem. Based on the quantum
physics, quantum digital signature (QDS) protocol was
provided (Gottesman and Chuang, 2001), which could
provided information-theoretical security (Guest, 2001).
Although novel, this protocol needs nondestructive state
comparison, long-time quantum memory, and a secure
quantum channel for real application. Thereafter, QDS
has attracted a great deal of interest in both theory (An-
dersson et al., 2006; Dunjko et al., 2014; Wallden et al.,
2015) and experiment (Clarke et al., 2012; Collins et al.,
2014; Donaldson et al., 2016). All the three requirements
have been fixed sequentially (Clarke et al., 2012; Collins
et al., 2014; Donaldson et al., 2016). Later, more than
100 km QDS experiment has been demonstrated based on
decoyed BB84 system (Yin et al., 2017a) and DPS QKD
(Collins et al., 2016), which are also secure against PNS
attack. Very recently, measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QDS have been implemented in both lab (Roberts
et al., 2017) and field (Yin et al., 2017b).
3. Other protocols
QKD has been assuming that the eavesdropper has
unlimited power as long as it is not violated quan-
tum physics. A protocol is said to be information-
theoretically secure if it allows an adversary (e.g. an
eavesdropper) to have unlimited quantum computing
power as long as it does not violate quantum mechan-
ics. As noted in Section VIII.C.1 above, information-
theoretic security is not possible for quantum bit com-
mitment, quantum oblivious transfer and two-party se-
cure quantum computation. Naturally, restriction on
adversary’s power can expand the territory of quantum
cryptography. Wehner et al. (Wehner et al., 2008) pro-
posed one realistic assumption that quantum storage of
qubits is noisy and demonstrated that an oblivious trans-
fer protocol is unconditionally secure for any amount
of quantum-storage noise (DamgÅrd et al., 2008; Konig
et al., 2012). Similar as bit commitment, oblivious trans-
fer protocol is another primitive cryptograph protocol be-
tween two entrusted parties. The demonstration of the
protocol was performed based on a modified entangled
QKD system (Erven et al., 2014). The experiment ex-
changed a 1,366 bit random oblivious transfer string in
3 minutes and include a full security analysis under the
noisy storage model, accounting for all experimental er-
ror rates and finite size effects.
Similar to bit commitment and oblivious transfer, a
quantum protocol for coin flipping (Blum, 1981) can be
unconditionally secure when considering relativistic con-
strains. This also means that without relativistic de-
signs, no bias coin flipping could not be uncondition-
ally secure (Lo and Chau, 1998). Nevertheless, a quan-
tum protocol can limit the cheating probability strictly
lower than 1/
√
2 (Aharonov et al., 2000; Kitaev, 1999).
The first experimental demonstration was provided with
OAM qutrit entangled photon pairs, which shows the
quantum advantage in coin flipping for the first time
(Molina-Terriza et al., 2005). As a proof of principle
demonstration, this experiment does not consider the
channel loss. Theoretical and experimental efforts have
been attempted towards this direction (Berlín et al.,
2011; Nguyen et al., 2008; Pappa et al., 2014). For in-
stance, an implementation of the loss-tolerant protocol
using an entangled-photon source was provided (Berlín
et al., 2011). The secure distance was extended to 15
km with a modified plug and play system (Pappa et al.,
2014).
Quantum data locking (DiVincenzo et al., 2004) allows
one to lock information in quantum states with an expo-
nentially shorter key, presenting an efficient solution to
many resource-limited secure applications. However, the
original quantum data-locking scheme may suffer from
significant qubit loss. In 2013, Fawzi, Hayden, and Sen
(FHS) developed a loss-tolerant quantum data-locking
scheme (Fawzi et al., 2013), in which the possible infor-
mation leakage can be made arbitrarily small in a lossy
environment while the unlocked information is signifi-
cantly larger than the key size. This feature makes the
protocol attractive also in secure communication (Lloyd,
2013; Lupo et al., 2014). Two groups have implemented
the loss tolerant protocols respectively (Liu et al., 2016;
Lum et al., 2016).
Quantum secret sharing was proposed to share a secret
quantum state among multiple parties (Cleve et al., 1999)
or to use quantum states to share classical secrets (Cleve
et al., 1999; Hillery et al., 1999). Moreover, secure multi-
party computing has been extended to quantum compu-
tation with quantum inputs and circuits (Crépeau et al.,
2002).
In distributed quantum computing, quantum crypto
protocols are still inevitable. Quantum computing is
currently attracting tremendous interest from both aca-
demic and industry (Mohseni et al., 2017). However, due
to its implementation complexity and cost, the future
path of quantum computation is strongly believed to del-
egate computational tasks to powerful quantum servers
on cloud (Fitzsimons, 2017). Universal blind quantum
computing (UBQC) (Broadbent et al., 2009) is an ef-
fective method for a common user, who has limited or
no quantum computational power, to delegate computa-
tion to an untrusted quantum server, without leaking any
information about the user’s input and computational
task. The security or blindness of the UBQC protocol
is unconditional, i.e., the server cannot learn anything
about user’s computation except its size. A proof of con-
cept demonstration was reported in 2012 (Barz et al.,
2012). Recently, UBQC protocol with completely clas-
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sical clients was proposed (Reichardt et al., 2013) and
demonstrated in experiment (Huang et al., 2017). UBQC
with weak coherent states was proposed in (Dunjko et al.,
2012), and adding the ingredient of decoy states, an ef-
ficient experimental demonstration with weak coherent
states was made in (Jiang et al., 2019). Because of the
developments in the field of quantum computing, we ex-
pect that BQC will play an important role in the future
infrastructure of delegated quantum computation (Fitzsi-
mons, 2017).
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this review, we have discussed the security aspects
of practical QKD. These range from the security proofs
of practical QKD (Section II), the implementation (Sec-
tion III), the practical vulnerabilities (Section IV), to the
solutions of advanced QKD protocols (Sections V, VI
and VII) and the advances of other quantum crypto-
graphic protocols (Section VIII.C).
Historically, QKD has been a concrete playground for
concepts in quantum mechanics. The study of QKD of-
ten leads to unexpected insights in other areas of quan-
tum information. For instance, apparently the concept
of quantum teleportation was invented during a search
for a security proof of QKD (Bennett et al., 1993). We
expect that in future the study of QKD will continue to
lead to many new insights in other subfields of quantum
information.
Meanwhile, as a new technology stemming from the
counterintuitive theory of quantum physics, QKD might
not be easy to be understood and recognized by a gen-
eral audience. For broad interest, in Appendix A, we
summarize a few frequently asked questions/concerns on
practical QKD, together with our views on how they can
be overcome. Finally, we discuss the perspectives on the
past, the present and the future about the developments
of QKD.
Overall, during the past three decades, the theory and
practice of QKD have developed extensively. These de-
velopments can be divided into several stages, which can
be summarized as follows (with a focus on DV-QKD).
1. Stage 1. After the invention by Bennett-
Brassard (Bennett and Brassard, 1984) and Ek-
ert (Ekert, 1991), QKD was first demonstrated
in the early 1990s (Bennett et al., 1992a),
which started a series of theories and experi-
ments (Franson and Jacobs, 1995; Muller et al.,
1996; Townsend, 1994; Townsend et al., 1993) to
prove the possibility of QKD.
2. Stage 2. The implementation of QKD was ex-
tended from laboratory to outdoor environments,
and various technical difficulties were studied (But-
tler et al., 1998; Gobby et al., 2004; Hughes et al.,
2000; Ribordy et al., 2000; Townsend, 1997). See
ref. (Gisin et al., 2002) for a review on the devel-
opments in early experiments. Meanwhile, on the
theory side, the security proof of QKD was a major
challenge until a few papers appeared and solved
the problem (Biham et al., 2000; Lo and Chau,
1999; Mayers, 2001; Shor and Preskill, 2000). These
results put the security of QKD on a solid founda-
tion.
3. Stage 3. With the security proofs for QKD under
imperfect devices (Gottesman et al., 2004; Hwang,
2003; Lo et al., 2005; Wang, 2005), the feasibil-
ity of QKD was demonstrated from short range
to long range, up to the scale of 100-km stan-
dard fiber (Peng et al., 2007; Rosenberg et al.,
2007; Zhao et al., 2006b) and free space (Schmitt-
Manderbach et al., 2007).
4. Stage 4. QKD was extensively deployed from point-
to-point to small-scale metropolitan networks in
field (Chen et al., 2009; Elliott et al., 2005; Peev
et al., 2009; Sasaki et al., 2011). Meanwhile, the
practical security loopholes, particularly those for
detection devices, were identified (Lydersen et al.,
2010) and then removed by the advanced MDI-
QKD protocol (Lo et al., 2012) [see also (Braun-
stein and Pirandola, 2012)].
5. Stage 5. The feasibility of QKD was extended to
long distances and high rates, such as in a scale
of 400 km (Boaron et al., 2018; Yin et al., 2016)
over ultra low-loss fiber and 1200-km over free
space (Liao et al., 2017a), and a secret key rate
of over 10 Mbits/s with GHz QKD system (Yuan
et al., 2018).
6. Stage 6. QKD was implemented from small scale
to large scale that covers a wide area (Chen et al.,
2020). See Fig. 2 for an example of the QKD net-
work which has more than 700 QKD links, and cov-
ers more than 2,000 km area. New TF-QKD proto-
cols (Lucamarini et al., 2018) were proposed to en-
able secure QKD over even longer distances (Chen
et al., 2019; Fang et al., 2019).
In future, towards the ultimate goal of a global QKD
network, we expect that more and more QKD networks
will be built in different countries. Besides physics, com-
munities of computer science, engineering, optics, math-
ematics and so forth may work together to realize this
goal. We do believe that a revolutionized global QKD
network for secure communication stemming from quan-
tum physics will be deployed and find widespread appli-
cations in the near future. This review is concluded with
a discussion on a few directions for future research.
1. Quantum repeaters. Quantum repeater can achieve
an effective restoration of the quantum information
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without resorting to a direct measurement of the
quantum state (Briegel et al., 1998; Duan et al.,
2001), enabling the realization of global quantum
network in existing optical networks. Quantum re-
peater has received intense research efforts in re-
cent years (Kimble, 2008; Pan et al., 2012; San-
gouard et al., 2011; Wehner et al., 2018). Nonethe-
less, the limited performance of quantum mem-
ory is still a major obstacle in realizing practical
quantum repeaters without a future experimen-
tal breakthrough (Sangouard et al., 2011; Yang
et al., 2016). New recent approaches manage to re-
duce the need for a quantum memory by using all-
photonic quantum repeaters (Azuma et al., 2015a;
Hasegawa et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019), but they
require the resources of large-scale cluster states.
Overall, we believe that quantum repeater is an im-
portant subject for future research. The first goal
is to realize a practical quantum repeater that can
beat the fundamental limits of direct quantum com-
munication (Pirandola et al., 2017; Takeoka et al.,
2014).
2. Standardization. Towards the widespread applica-
tions, the commercial standards for QKD should be
established. Important progress has been made in
this direction, such as the efforts of ETSI, ISO/IEC,
CCSA and ITU by several countries. One impor-
tant direction is to include the practical security
into the standardization process, by defining the
best practices to operate QKD systems and stan-
dardizing those countermeasures to guarantee the
security of a QKD setup. We encourage future re-
search to establish the commercial standards for
QKD.
3. Battle-testing security. We have provided a review
on the practical vulnerabilities in Section IV, to-
gether with the solutions of advanced countermea-
sures and QKD protocols. However, the practical
security issue has not been perfectly solved. For
instance, as discussed in Section VI.B, a security
assumption in MDI-QKD is that the source should
be trusted without loopholes. It is important to
verify this assumption in practice. Hence, the re-
search in analyzing the practical security of QKD
setup should continue. This includes the develop-
ments of practically-secure QKD systems building
on the experience gained from the research on prac-
tical vulnerabilities and advanced countermeasures.
It is highly important to battle-test existing QKD
implementations, quantify and validate the security
claims of real-world QKD systems, and design real-
life QKD systems with testable security assump-
tions.
4. Small-size, low-cost, long-distance system. Recent
developments of integrated QKD system have been
reviewed in Section VIII.B.4. These developments
should continue to further reduce the costs and
sizes of QKD, and to realize robust fully-integrated
chip-based QKD systems. One important direc-
tion is to develop the star-type quantum access net-
work (Fröhlich et al., 2013; Hughes et al., 2013), in
which the expensive devices such as single-photon
detectors can be placed in the central relay and
many users share this relay. Each user requires only
a low-cost transmitter such as a compact QCard
(Hughes et al., 2013) or a simple Si chip (Ma et al.,
2016a; Sibson et al., 2017a). Together with MDI-
QKD, the central relay can be untrusted. Wei
et al., already implemented the first chip-based
MDI-QKD at high secret key rates (Wei et al.,
2019b). This is particularly valuable for star-type
metropolitan QKD networks. Moreover, by using
the new type of twin-field QKD (Lucamarini et al.,
2018), the distance can be further extended for in-
tercity QKD. Therefore, we expect that MDI-type
QKD networks will play an important role in the
future global quantum network.
5. QKD network with untrusted relays. The previ-
ously deployed networks were based on trusted re-
lays (Chen et al., 2009, 2020; Elliott et al., 2005;
Peev et al., 2009; Sasaki et al., 2011), which may
raise the concern about the security properties of
the relays. To remove this concern, it is impor-
tant to develop QKD network with untrusted re-
lays. In fact, MDI-QKD is naturally suitable for a
star-type metropolitan network with an untrusted
relay. Tang et al., already put forward the first im-
plementation of a MDI-QKD network (Tang et al.,
2016b). We expect that metropolitan MDI-QKD
networks will be built soon. Besides, the TF-QKD
can also be adopted to extend the transmission
distance with an untrusted relay. Moreover, in
entanglement-based QKD, the relay can be fully
untrusted. A possible direction is to develop a
entanglement-based QKD network, e.g., based on
satellite (Yin et al., 2019). For ultralong-distance
QKD in fiber, it needs the quantum repeaters (San-
gouard et al., 2011) to realize QKD networks with
untrusted relays. We expect that with the techni-
cal improvements, quantum-repeater assisted QKD
network may be achieved in the near future.
6. Satellite-based QKD. The reported satellite-based
QKD was based on a low-earth-orbit (LEO) satel-
lite of Micius (Liao et al., 2018, 2017a). To in-
crease the coverage time and area for a more
efficient satellite-based QKD network, one can
launch higher-orbit quantum satellites and imple-
ment QKD in daytime. Important progress has
been made in this direction (Hughes et al., 2002;
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Liao et al., 2017b). An ultimate goal is to realize
a satellite-constellation-based global quantum net-
work.
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Appendix A: General questions to QKD
We summarize a few frequently asked concerns on
QKD and our views on how they can be overcome.
1. Concern 1. Since RSA is secure under current com-
putational power, we do not need QKD now.
Our view. Some important data such as govern-
ment secrets and health data need to kept secret
from decades, i.e., long-term security. RSA can-
not guarantee long-term security, because one can
record the encrypted information and later on de-
crypt it when the quantum computer comes up or
new advanced algorithm is discovered. In contrast,
QKD can provide everlasting security, which is in-
dependent of all future hardware advances. Hence,
QKD is required today for the transmission of top-
secret data.
2. Concern 2. QKD vs post-quantum cryptography.
Our view. QKD and post-quantum cryptography
are two parallel research directions. They go hand
in hand with each other. It is not an “either-or"
situation. Post-quantum cryptography has the ad-
vantages of being compatible with existing crypto
infrastructure, but it has the drawback that its se-
curity cannot be proven or it is only secure against
known quantum attacks. In contrast, QKD has the
advantage of proven security based on the laws of
quantum physics, but it is a symmetric-key algo-
rithm, which can not replicate all the functionali-
ties of public-key cryptography. In future, we be-
lieve that QKD is likely to be combined with the
post-quantum cryptography to jointly form the in-
frastructure of quantum-safe encryption scheme.
3. Concern 3. QKD does not address large parts of
the security problem.
Our view. The secure keys generated from QKD
have widespread applications, such as encryption
and authentication. Note that in QKD, authenti-
cation is only required in a short period, and once
it is done, QKD can be employed for encryption in
a rather long period20. Moreover, with the devel-
opments on high key-generation rate, QKD is also
suitable for some of the future challenges such as
securing the Internet of Things, big data, or cloud
applications. Furthermore, as mentioned in Sec-
tion VIII.C.2, there exists quantum digital signa-
ture schemes with information-theoretical security.
4. Concern 4. Distance limitation.
Our view. In fiber, even without quantum repeater,
the feasibility of QKD has been proved in exper-
iments over long ranges of 400-500 km (Boaron
et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2019; Fang et al., 2019; Yin
et al., 2016). Using trusted relays, the distance has
been extend to 2000 km fiber (Chen et al., 2020).
Using quantum satellite, QKD has been demon-
strated 7600-km (Liao et al., 2018). Moreover, with
the help of quantum repeaters (Briegel et al., 1998;
Duan et al., 2001), QKD is feasible over arbitrar-
ily long distance even with untrusted relay nodes.
Important progress has been made in the develop-
ments of quantum repeaters (Munro et al., 2015;
Pan et al., 2012).
5. Concern 5. Cost limitation.
Our view. The recent developments of integrated
QKD, such as compact transmitter (Hughes et al.,
2013) and Si photopic chip-based QKD systems(Ma
et al., 2016a; Sibson et al., 2017a; Wei et al., 2019b),
demonstrated already the possibility of low-cost
hardware for QKD. Hence QKD is very likely to
be cost-effective. See Section VIII.B.4 for detail.
6. Concern 6. Point-to-point limitation.
Our view. Small-scale metropolitan QKD networks
were intensively deployed in field by several coun-
tries (Chen et al., 2009; Elliott et al., 2005; Peev
et al., 2009; Sasaki et al., 2011). A large-scale
20 As an example, one can even use public key based authentication
scheme in the initial authentication of a QKD session. Provided
that the public key based authentication scheme is secure during
the short time for initial authentication, the generated QKD key
will be secure forever. Therefore, post-quantum cryptography
and QKD may go hand in hand.
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network which covers a wide area was established
lately (Chen et al., 2020). These networks already
enable secure QKD for multiple users instead of
point-to-point. Furthermore, the recent discovery
of MDI-QKD protocols (Lo et al., 2012) and TF-
QKD protocols (Lucamarini et al., 2018) work well
in a star-type network setting (Xu et al., 2015a)
by sharing a single detection system between mul-
tiple users. A prototype of MDI-QKD network has
already been implemented in 2016 (Tang et al.,
2016b). Therefore, these QKD networks and ad-
vanced QKD protocols enable QKD for network
settings beyond point-to-point.
7. Concern 7. Trusted-relay limitation.
Our view. The discovery of MDI-QKD proto-
cols (Lo et al., 2012) and TF-QKD protocols (Lu-
camarini et al., 2018) enable QKD with untrusted
relays. Moreover, entanglement-based QKD works
well with untrusted relays, and it has been demon-
strated between two ground stations separated by
a distance over 1120 kilometers (Yin et al., 2019).
Furthermore, quantum repeaters (Briegel et al.,
1998; Duan et al., 2001) enable secure QKD over
arbitrarily long distance even with untrusted relay
nodes. Hence trusted node is not a true limitation
in QKD.
8. Concern 8. Hardware patches are expensive.
Our view. MDI-QKD already enables secure QKD
with untrusted measurement devices, in which the
expensive measurement devices do not need to be
recalled/replaced once they are installed. More-
over, chip-based QKD makes the patches for hard-
ware at a low-cost and simple manner. We believe
that a star-type of MDI-QKD network, together
with chip-based transmitter, is promising to realize
a low-cost and practical QKD for applications.
9. Concern 9. Security loopholes in practical QKD.
Our view. Researchers in the filed of QKD have
extensively understood and managed the secu-
rity loopholes. All quantum attacks reported in
the literature have been reviewed in Section IV.
Those crucial loopholes have been eliminated by de-
signing advanced countermeasures (Sections V, VI
and VII). In particular, MDI-QKD has removed the
weakest security link, i.e., the detection, in a stan-
dard QKD system (Lo et al., 2012). Secret shar-
ing ideas have been proposed to foil covert channels
and malicious classical post-processing units (Curty
and Lo, 2019). Advanced technology in the future
might make DI-QKD feasible (Hensen et al., 2015).
Therefore, the gap between theory and practice of
QKD has been reduced remarkably, and a number
of loopholes have been completely removed. These
achievements have made QKD a robust solution for
secure communication.
10. Concern 10. Denial of service (DoS) attack.
Our view. One solution for DoS attack is to use
alternative channel links by designing suitable net-
work architectures. For instance, a circle type of
QKD network has been implemented in the Bei-
jing metropolitan network (see Fig. 2). Moreover,
Tokyo (Sasaki et al., 2011) and SECOQC (Peev
et al., 2009) QKD networks have demonstrated ro-
bustness against DoS attacks already. The other
solution is that the secure communication can be
done offline. One can load the secret keys, gener-
ated from QKD, to USB or mobile phones. The
secure communication via mobile phone will be im-
mune to DoS attack. This method already finds
commercial use, see e.g., the QUKey21.
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